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I'
Since the L'SDA Forest Service began managing public lands nearly one hundred years 
ago the agency's mission and methods have shifted in accordance with public desires 
numerous times. In this dissertation I suggest that in addition to being responsive to 
changes in social values and economic and ecological conditions, the Forest Service (and 
forestry education) must also be responsive to the shifts in our understandings of 
language, knowledge, power, and authority. These shifts, many o f which are documented 
and expounded upon in the humanities, have profound implications for the praxis of 
forestry generally and on the discourse o f forest health in particular.
In this paper. I outline some o f the dominant strains in continental philosophy 
(Kierkegaard's theory o f being, de Saussure's semiotics. Derridean deconstruction. 
Lyotard's analysis o f knowledge in the post modem worid. Foucault's archeology of 
power and knowledge) and use them to "reread" the FS discourse on forest health. In 
addition to deconstructing the FS discourse on forest health. I also examine the medical 
establishment's discourse on human health. The comparison is enlightening: the medical 
community and the Forest Service are facing similar critiques and challenges to their 
know ledge and power structures, but their responses have been somewhat different. Even 
as the Forest Service is seeking to establish and strengthen objective, biophysical criteria 
for the determination o f forest conditions, the medical community— or at least part o f it— 
is slowly moving away from its exclusive commitment to a narrowly biophysical 
definition of health and the medicine-as-science model of health care toward a 
biopsychosocial model that demands the use o f multiple sources o f  knowledge, some of 
which are distinctly non-scientific.
1 conclude with a suggestion that in order to be more responsive not only to the shifts in 
understandings o f knowledge noted above, but also to those brought about by forestry's 
ow n reconceptualization of the forest as an ecosystem, forestry education might consider 
introducing forestry students to alternative ways o f knowing. In short. I suggest that 
forestry become aware o f its own situatedness and educate its students to the ever- 
changing cultural context in which the discourse and practice o f forestry is carried out.
11
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When I use a  word, it means ju s t  what I choose it to m ean—n either m ore nor less.
-H um pty Dumpty
The con trasts an d  con tradictions that can perm an en tly  live peacefu lly  side hy side in a  
skull make a ll the system s o f  p o litica l optim ists a n d  p essim ists  illusory.
--Albert Einstein
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table o f Contents
I. Chapter One Introduction 1
II. Chapter Two Words and Things 12
III. Chapter Three Forest Health: The Undiscovered Country 47
IV. Chapter Four Medicine 80
V. Chapter Five Through the (Medical) Looking Glass 122
VI. Chapter Six Conclusion 157
VII. Bibliography 120
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1
Chapter One 
Introduction
Words and magic were in the beginning one and the same thing, and even today 
words retain much o f  their magical power. ... Words call forth  emotions and are 
universally the means by which we influence our fellow  creatures. Therefore let us 
not despise the use o f  words ...
-Sigmund Freud
This is an essay about words, about the problems o f interpretation and those o f meaning, 
and how those words ultimately affect what we do in the forest. It accepts (with 
qualifications which will become clear) the premise that for humans, the word, logos, 
language, is fundamental: “ In the beginning was the word,” John tells us. The essay 
tentatively assents to the presumption (and one could say, arrogance) o f  the generative, 
creative power o f language, o f the ability o f  humans to “speak the world into being” 
without, however, naively assenting to the oft heard assertion that there is nothing other 
than words. Just as the god o f the Old Testament did to the world in Genesis— “And God 
said let there be ..." , so we do on a daily basis. Out o f chaos and formlessness, god— and 
we— speak identity and  difference into being— and thereby establish in some 
sense, the possibility o f being itself. The question then o f who gets to speak and to 
interpret, to establish the criteria by which knowledge is deemed knowledge, is not 
negligible: the one who defines the terms o f the discourse is the one who ultimately 
controls the discourse and the actions that follow therefrom. This dissertation is about 
coming to terms in forestry.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In the management of public lands and natural resources, control o f the terms o f the 
discourse is hotly contested. That portion o f the general public that is concerned or 
interested is no longer content (if ever it was) to accede to professional authority, to leave 
interpretation and establishment o f meaning to the Forest Service. Today, there are 
multiple contenders for the job o f speaker and “high interpreter:” interested individuals, 
environmental groups (a heterogeneous lot that does not speak with one voice), user 
groups (also heterogeneous), affected land owners, individuals whose livelihoods depend 
upon using the forest in some fashion or another, corporations, etc. They question 
everything from the commodity production orientation o f forest practice (or the lack 
thereof), the production of knowledge that legitimates and dictates those practices to the 
discursive traditions that are used to construct nature itself. “Salvage.” “forest health." 
"roadless area." “wilderness.” “ecosystem” to name but a very few. are examples of 
words or phrases that lead to radically different actions depending on how they are 
interpreted.
In this dissertation I examine the discourse o f “forest health.” I look at its defmition(s), 
the meanings and values ascribed to it (or concealed within it), how the discourse 
constructs or understands its object (the ecosystem or forest), and the knowledge 
frameworks that are brought to bear in articulating it, with the objective being to 
deconstruct forest health as a term— by which I mean to better understand how the term 
functions (or fails to function) in the continuing debate over forestry praxis on Forest 
Service lands.
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As my research proceeded, ambiguity increased. Definitions were unable to resolve 
problems of interpretation in key terms; they only provided more key terms that needed to 
be unpacked. The ambiguities inherent in the terminology (inherent, one begins to 
suspect, in language itself) revealed potentially irresolvable internal contradictions 
between stated objects and objectives and epistemological commitments.
In an effort to get a better fix on the “health” term itself, to understand how it might be 
used and understood in other areas o f practice and discourse, I performed the same 
analysis on the medical discourse on human health. This second task, however, 
fragmented into two distinct parts upon closer examination: the medical community or 
discourse is deeply divided along ontological and epistemological lines. On the one hand 
are those who conceive o f medicine as a natural science, treatment as a technical 
endeavor, and health as a strictly biophysical condition; they are concerned only with the 
body and the bodily manifestations and biological vectors of disease. On the other hand 
are those who are committed to an “ecological theory” o f health; they see medicine as a 
social science (science understood broadly in its Latin sense o f “knowledge”) and health 
as a culturally mediated condition o f  the real (body); their focus is on persons, as beings 
who exist in the cultural or symbolic and the real.
My third task in the discussion on health (Chapter Five) is a cross-discursive comparison 
or "rereading” of forest health through the (refocused) lens o f the medical discourse on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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health. The inconsistencies that arise in forest health between object, objective, and 
epistemology begin to yield when reevaluated in light o f the insights gained in 
articulating the distinction between ''medicine as a natural science and health as a value- 
neutral biophysical condition” and "medicine as a social science and health as an 
ecological condition that involves the whole person.” The specter o f contradictions 
concerning what is and what we think is and what we want to be continues to loom: but 
contradiction is. as Kierkegaard would say, the fundamental condition o f being a 
concrete, actually existing being, that lives in the real as well as the symbolic, in the past, 
present, and future, in the world that is and the world that it wants to be. In other words, 
life itself is possible precisely because o f the irreducible tension between the simultaneity 
o f either-or. The re-reading does not reduce ambiguity either— if the linguists are right, it 
never will— but the ecological model o f health internalizes ambiguity, treating it not as 
something to be gotten over, disregarded, or dispelled by reduction and isolation, but as 
an essential and ineluctable attribute that makes agreement possible.
Forestry, like medicine, is one o f those endeavors that straddles the divide between the
symbolic and the real; it rides what N. Kathryn Hayles calls the "cusp”— the "self-
organizing, transformative process” by which we make sense o f  the chaotic "unmediated
flux" of the "out there” (Hayles, in Soule 1995, 49). These transformative processes
*
include "sensory, contextual, and cognitive components;” we see and experience what we 
do (conceptualized as observations and experiences or events) because o f  our peculiar 
physiology and anatomy (i.e., as a species), our individual histories, our cultural history.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and our particular situation within time and space. That is, what we know o f the world is 
the result o f an ongoing negotiation between what is out there and who or what we are. 
Because forestry. like medicine, rides the cusp foresters and physicians must open the 
epistemological portals wider to include multiple sources o f knowledge qua knowledge, 
not as opinions or expressions o f ‘"desires” that are somehow inferior or secondary to the 
"hard data" of scientific knowledge. Foresters and physicians must make an effort not 
only to "interrogate the referent” but to interrogate themselves interrogating— to examine 
the conditions under which one might know the forest or the body, but also those under 
which one might know what one thinks one knows about the forest or the body, and this 
means accessing knowledge produced in other disciplines and by other people. The 
forester, like the physician, must learn to "speak in tongues;” to try to understand not only 
what is "out there.” but to understand the stories that we all have about what is out there.
This dissertation is a step in that direction; it is an effort to come to terms, in all their 
ambiguity and contradiction, with the ineluctably “fissured” and open nature o f the USFS 
discourse on forest health by looking at the terms themselves and following where they 
lead. Hal Salwasser (then director o f  the USFS' New Perspectives Program) understood 
the need to come to terms, and in his case, the need to try to control them. In 1992, in an 
effort to convince Dale Robertson, then Chief o f the USFS, to adopt Ecosystem 
Management as Forest Service policy sooner rather than later, Salwasser argued that “it's 
time that the Forest Service adopt Ecosystem Management terminology ..., and that we 
shape it. rather than let somebody else define what it is and then us having to live with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that definition... we should embrace the terminology and at least play a part in shaping 
what it comes to mean” (Salwasser, reported in Freeman 1998 , 205). He worried that the 
USFS would lose control of the terms o f  the discourse, and by association, control o f the 
referent. Salwasser’s understanding o f the peculiar relationship between words or 
discourse, power, and management o f  the ‘‘out there” is distinctly at odds with the 
understanding articulated by a team o f USFS researchers in a General Technical Report 
on forest health in the Southwest. In what begins as a promising foray into semiotics and 
its impacts on forestry, the authors close with this assertion:
Science, environmentalism, wise-use. conservation, and popular culture all 
interpret nature according to the mythologies o f its own interest group. Behind all 
these mythologies lies the physical reality o f wildlands. Agencies concerned with 
forest ecosystem health must sift through the cultural constructs to find core 
reality. The Forest Service cannot manage mythological wildlands (USDA FS 
TDahms and Geilsl997, online).
Apparently, they think the Forest Service alone can directly access the “core reality,” the 
"flux" behind all the stories; the rest o f  us are stuck with myths. (I am reminded o f  one o f 
Einstein's aphorisms “Whoever undertakes to set himself up as judge in the field o f Truth 
and Knowledge is shipwrecked by the laughter o f the gods.” The FS is perilously close!) 
Salwasser's position and that o f the team o f USFS researchers delineate the two radically 
different approaches to understanding the relationship between knowledge and language.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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us and the "out there," the symbolic and the real that characterize the field o f 
investigation in this dissertation. My argument is that the USFS is in no better position to 
define the terms o f engagement on the grounds o f  some privileged access to the real than 
the rest o f us are; for all its outward looking, it (and its researchers) are as bound by the 
constraints o f culture, history, language, and physiology as any other human or human 
discourse.
This project is prompted by Derrida’s insight into the ineluctably ’‘fissured" or open 
nature o f discourse; thus forestry, as a discursively generated or language-based practice 
is eminently vulnerable to critique from without and deconstruction from within. It also 
accepts his insistence that this fissure, this openness, demands from each o f us the utmost 
vigilance: because we can’t know the Truth (which might serve to check or restrain our 
discourse and our discursively based actions), we have a responsibility to avoid 
foreclosing our disourse in such a way as to exclude other voices (Derrida, in Caputo 
1997). "Health" is the fissure in the discourse on which I have focused; it provides a way 
in as well as a way out. By this I mean that unpacking the USFS' understanding o f  the 
term health leads one to investigate other terms in the USFS health discourse, and 
because the term health is also used in other discourses, because it is dispersed, it also 
invites comparison to non-forestry discourses.
Much of the theory (theories, really) that informs this project comes out o f a field of 
thought (or better y e t , an approach to thinking about being, knowledge, and language)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that is known as continental philosophy. In this work, I am indebted to Kierkegaard’s 
understandings o f being, Saussure’s work in linguistics, Derrida’s insights into text and 
his rereadings of Saussure’s work, Foucault’s analysis o f the relationship between 
knowledge and power, and to Lyotard’s (following Wittgenstein) examination o f the 
state o f knowledge in a postmodern world. I am also indebted to what N. Kathryn Hayles 
calls ‘'constrained constructivism,” an eclectic approach that seems to normalize 
contradiction and ambiguity by insisting upon the retention o f the simultaneity o f the 
either-or/neither-nor (in other words, be refusing to choose). All o f these will be more 
fully elaborated in Chapter Two.
The analysis itself is done on written texts. I chose to limit my attention to those texts on 
forest health produced by the USFS, most o f which have been produced in the last 
decade. With respect to the texts used in Chapter Four (on medicine) I limit myself to 
those produced by medical practitioners or those involved in the education o f  future 
practitioners. It is a convenience, one that artificially limits the interpretive possibilities, 
but this is true o f all critical analyses. I settled upon USFS literature because in the final 
analysis, it is the USFS who manages for forest health on public lands; if they are 
incorporating meanings o f forest health generated in external discourses, then it should 
show up somewhere in their literature.
In selecting particular USFS texts that might be “representative,” I solicited the advice o f 
two individuals who have been instrumental in the USFS and in framing the USFS
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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discourse on ecosystem management, o f which forest health is a key ( if  not the key) 
objective. In response, Dr. Hal Salwasser suggested that there was not much o f value 
coming out of the FS on forest health these days and he could offer no titles that might 
serv e my purposes (Pers. com., 10-1-00, e-mail). Dr. Jack Ward Thomas responded to my 
enquiry with a list o f his publications, none o f which took up with the issue o f  forest 
health per se (Pers. com., 10-6-00, e-mail). So, I did what most researchers with a field 
study do: I did some general reading to find out in which locations the “species” o f 
interest had been sighted (USFS literature) and to narrow down a time frame (Q: When 
did the term forest health come into serious play in FS policy and practice? A: About 
1990.): 1 then marked out my “plots" (USFS documents on forest health published in the 
last 10 years). I chose works with "forest health” in the titles and followed the citations. I 
looked at policy statements (particularly those at the national level) as well as regulatory 
and planning documents because they establish the USFS objectives. I also looked at the 
technical reports produced at the regional and individual forest level because they told me 
something of how the objectives were being interpreted and “reified” at the level of 
practice. Eventually, the documents begin to repeat themselves, to quote and requote the 
national objectives, and then to expound on the minutiae o f pathogens and 
"pathoecologies,” or to take the stock definitions, criteria, and techniques and map them 
out onto individual forest landscapes in order to determine “present conditions” or to 
aather baseline data.
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For the texts used to construct the medical view o f health, I used the same methodology: I 
queried a few professionals (two clinical physicians and a public health administrator) for 
suggestions, and I foraged among the voluminous technical and scientific publications in 
search o f the more rare treatises on health itself. In the process I discovered the broad 
schism mentioned earlier and so directed my subsequent searching to finding texts that 
seemed to "represent" both sides of the health debate. Thus, the sampling may not be 
exhaustive, but it is nonetheless illustrative o f the Forest Service position on forest health 
and the medical communities’ changing understandings o f  human health.
With respect to methods. I take my cue from Karl Popper who declares himself 
uninterested in questions o f method except insofar as the method permits o f or inhibits 
the clear statement o f an interesting problem and the critical examination o f the various 
proposed solutions (Popper 1997, 16). In other words. Popper is an advocate o f rational 
discussion, o f logical argument, produced and sustained by whatever means one may 
bring to bear in sincerely looking for a solution. Like Popper’s inquisitive and unfettered 
philosophers, we are here interested in a multi-faceted problem (the problem of forest 
health and how it might compare to that of human health), and because our problem is 
complex, we may have to "philosophize in many different ways.” We will not "pledge 
ourselves in advance" to any one method, but rather welcome any method that may help 
us to see our problem more clearly (Popper 1997, 20, 22). Thus, though I make no claims 
to being "without method,” I do submit that the complexity o f  the problem (the meaning 
of forest health) admits of multiple methods.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
As noted above, I limited my attention to USDA FS publications and did not venture out 
into the rich body of text on these issues produced outside o f the USFS. I did this for two 
reasons (other than the obvious one o f pragmatics). First, the FS is a public agency 
responsible for managing vast public lands and their management is hotly contested. 
Second, if  the FS is aware o f and responsive to ideas generated in extra-forestry 
disciplines or venues, it should show up in their publications. It may very well be that the 
FS is carrying on an internal dialogue about problems of method, alternative knowledges, 
the role and/or limitations o f science, the changing role of authority and expertise, the 
connection of knowledge and power, and the "heterogeneous multiplicity” o f the concept 
of health. But if this dialogue does not appear in the publications, and if  it is thus 
concealed from the general public, then the general public will make its assessment o f the 
FS motives and programs based on what it does put “out there” for public consumption. 
The fact remains, however, that the words are the FS’ own and thus presumably represent 
the FS' position on forest health, they are in print and published for public consumption, 
and are thus available for deconstruction and critique. Again, the dissertation does not 
pretend to be exhaustive. It is however, the result, as Stuart Kauffman says in his book At 
Home in the Universe, o f “one mind’s transect” through the forest o f literature on human 
and forest health (Kauffman 1995).
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12
Chapter Two 
‘Words and Things’
 4 task that consists o f  not— o f  no longer—treating discourses as groups o f  signs
(signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that 
systematically form  the objects o f  which they speak. O f course, discourses are composed 
o f  signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things.
-Foucault
An Archeology o f  Knowledge
My task in this chapter is to sketch out the broad themes or features o f  the field o f inquiry 
known as continental philosophy (CP). Having delimited the space. I will then identify 
and elaborate more fully on those features or approaches that are pertinent to this 
project— an approach that might (over-simply) be called textual analysis by way of 
Saussure. Derrida. Foucault, and Lyotard, among others. Selectivity is necessary (though 
dangerous) because even though continental philosophers share some fundamental 
epistemological and ontological commitments, these commitments are elaborated and 
articulated in sometimes conflicting methodological and theoretical frameworks. As one 
editor ironically notes in his Introduction to a volume bearing the impressively 
comprehensive title o f Continental Philosophy: An Anthology, the ambiguity and 
instability o f the field o f inquiry designated by the name is a “sign o f the times” (McNeill 
and Feldman 1998, 2). CP is not a homogenous, monolithic philosophy organized around 
one central theme with a single, obligatory methodology, but an approach to knowledge 
and language that fosters dispersion and eclecticism. I f  there is a connecting thread that 
runs through all o f CP. it is woven from the proposition that words, signs, tend to be 
inexact—or less exact than philosophy had assumed them to be; that ambiguity is 
therefore inherent, ubiquitous, and ultimately irreducible; that there is no necessary
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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connection between a sign and a referent—that is, the mind is not a mirror o f reality, and 
structures o f knowledge or logoi bear no essential, obligatory, ineluctable connection to 
"structures'' in the real. Thus knowledge (as a function o f language) is always contingent, 
partial, situated. Different continental philosophers tease this thread out in different ways; 
they make different inferences from this basic insight about words; they apply it to 
different philosophical, social, political, and economic institutions and knowledge 
frameworks with different results; they draw different conclusions about what we can 
know and how we know it. about the relationship between “mind and m atter’ and who 
we are.
Despite these radical internal differences. CP is sufficiently coherent that we can say that 
its way o f thinking about knowledge and language is radically different from the way of 
thinking that has informed Western scientific practice (and by association, land 
management) to date, i.e., logical positivism. Suffice it to say that even though logical 
positivism is generally acknowledged as passe in many fields, forestry remains largely 
committed to the project of objective knowledge, or radical empiricism, and the 
correspondence notion o f truth. My thesis questions that implicit commitment and 
reexamines the praxis o f  forestry from the perspective o f  CP in an effort to open it up to 
the possibility o f  its own future (Derrida).
But we need a more elaborate, detailed articulation o f this overly-general characterization 
of CP that takes into account its differences. The editors o f the above mentioned 
anthology struggle to articulate a “definition” o f  CP— a near Herculean task given its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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eclecticism and internal resistance to reduction under a singular name or title.
Nonetheless, they suggest that
Continental philosophy broadly accepts and shares a fundamental insight o f 
Hegel's thinking: namely, that reason, rationality, thought, i.e. logos in general, 
are constituted in an intrinsically historical manner; that their mode o f  being is the 
same as that of human existence itself, and in this sense guarantees no eternal 
truths or certainties. ... [T]he desire for scientific truth is no less historically 
contingent and questionable than any other purely “logical” truth, and offers no 
eternal or ultimate solutions to fundamental questions of human existence. ... 
[This] awareness o f the intrinsic historicality of its own undertaking thus tends to 
be a distinctive hallmark o f continental philosophy (McNeill and Feldman 1998. 
1- 2 ).
What is distinctive about CP then is that it is a “style o f philosophizing in which the 
practitioners put their own traditions, cultures, histories, and languages into question and 
into dialogue with one another;” i.e., it is self-conscious (McNeill and Feldman 1998. 2).
It philosophizes about philosophy, it interrogates itself interrogating; every thought, 
statement, or discourse is subject to “deconstruction” (an internal critique), as well as 
contest from without. “Doing” continental philosophy is like thinking yourself thinking, 
seeing yourself seeing— it is an endlessly iterative, reflexive and reflective language game 
that is both inwardly and outwardly directed; that is, it questions the possibility o f thought
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and conditions for knowledge that obtain both within the system or particular discourse 
and without it.1
CP has abandoned the search for ultimate truth and certainty since no person can 
legitimately claim a universal position above and beyond his own bodily existence; in 
fact, it is bodily existence that is the condition for knowledge (cf. Kierkegaard and 
Lyotard). In reestablishing the universality of doubt (an Enlightenment project that logical 
positivism sought to abandon), CP focuses instead on the problems o f signification, 
interpretation and meaning, and knowledge as well as on power, author-ity. and 
responsibility in a world in which signifiers are acknowledged as floating free o f the 
signified and signs of referents; it rejects the ontological primacy o f an objective 
obligatory unifying logos; it decenters and fragments the •‘knowing'’ presence or subject; 
and it posits a world in which the structures o f logos cannot be shown to be a perfect 
analogue o f the structures o f reality, thereby foreclosing/precluding the possibility of any 
knowledge being known to be eternally or universally true. O f course, we cannot know 
that we don 't have the truth. Knowledge is reflexive— we know, and through 
corroboration we know that we know. But this is the knowledge that we can’t have. All 
we can have is that “we know and we think that we know,” corroboration is never perfect 
and complete and the truth remains always in doubt.
' "Games" here should not be understood as trivializing or mere fun. Word games, in the way that Lyotard 
and Wittgenstein mean them to be understood, are deadly serious. Word games are how we broker 
power/knowledge, and in practices like forestry and medicine, control o f  the words means control o f  the 
knowledge, which means (ideally) control o f  the forest or the body. My argument, however, is also that 
control o f the words is fleeting and illusory— which assertion does not stop us from speaking!
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
For our purposes, it is especially important to note that this way of doing philosophy is 
not restricted to philosophy; this method, if  you will, o f openness, o f reflexivity or 
criticalitv is increasingly an integral part o f  such diverse fields o f inquiry as the social 
sciences, science studies, cultural studies, anthropology, medicine, psychology, art and 
literature, political studies, economics, and even (eventually perhaps) the “hard” sciences 
like biology, physics, chemistry, and all their various permutations into specialties, sub­
specialties. and sub-sub specialties (see Haraway, Harding, Levins and Lewontin, Sorrell, 
Prigogine and Stengers etc.). Forestry- is an (unacknowledged and unwilling, I think) 
irreducibly cultural and interdisciplinary praxis, not just because it has political, social, 
economic, ethical, philosophical, ecological, and scientific facets or components, but 
because each "facet" is inextricably intertwined with and intimately informed by all the 
others.2 As such, it cannot escape the radical effects o f continental philosophy on our 
perceptions and/or constructions o f ourselves and the world, on knowledge and ways o f 
knowing. Nor. for that matter, can any other praxis (including CP itself).
Over the decades, continental philosophy has gone through many incarnations; the traces 
of these "incarnations” remain: CP has not so much moved on as added on. Each new 
articulation or application incorporates and grows out o f some earlier theoretical 
orientation. At one point, it was virtually “synonymous” with Husserl’s phenomenology 
and Heidegger's ontological expositions; at another with the existentialism o f Sartre and
■ As nearly as I can tell, what the FS means by “interdisciplinary” !<= that we must consider all the sciences 
when managing ecosystems. To that end, they have diversified their staffs to include researchers from a 
variety o f  scientific disciplines, including the social sciences.
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de Beauvoir, and at yet another, it was almost indistinguishable from semiology a la 
Saussure. CP was at one time characterized by structuralism a la Levi-Strauss, Marx, 
Freud. Barthes, and Foucault among othersJ and, after the revolutionary May o f  1968 in 
Paris, it took on the guise o f poststructuralism—  whose most notable proponents are 
perhaps Deleuze. Lyotard, Irigaray, and Kristeva. At present, continental philosophy is 
closely associated with the philosophic approach known as deconstruction—  which may 
or may not be a particular style o f thought within poststructuralism — and whose 
progenitor and foremost practitioner is Derrida (Audi 1995, 158). Yet another persistent 
strain of continental philosophy is known as critical theory, a style o f philosophizing that 
permits— and in fact requires— the critique of social, economic, and political institutions 
and practices and  the construction o f an alternative theoretical construct. Present day 
critical theory has its roots in Marxism, the Frankfurt School, and in Habermas's theory 
of communicative action. Contemporary discourses such as feminism, ecofeminism. gay 
studies, deep ecology, environmentalism, cultural studies, etc. are considered by some to 
be potential candidates for inclusion either under continental philosophy in general or 
critical theory in particular (McNeill and Feldman 1998).
Rather than establishing particular theoretical or methodological guidelines, continental 
philosophy fosters a critical environment based on the premise that we are all living, 
existing, situated, becoming beings who thus cannot know everything, (but who also
' As an example o f  the fuzziness o f  the divisions between “movements” or themes in Continental 
philosophy, it is worth pointing out that Levi-Strauss and Foucault are sometimes also considered as
poststructuralists. ( Conley 1997, 3-5)
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cannot know what we don't know). In other words, no one can make a  claim to know the 
Truth nor, conversely, can we claim that what we think we know is not the truth. We are 
linguistic beings, a “symbolic species," and it is through our categories o f thought, our 
signs, that we know the world; that is, knowledge o f the “out there” is knowledge because 
it is expressible in language.
This elaborate premise establishes the grounds for challenging structures o f power 
(political, social, economic, ethical, etc. institutions) that are inextricably tied to 
structures o f knowledge that have “forgotten” their own contingency and constructed 
themselves as "unsurpassable a priori limits”(Foucault). Challenges to the current power 
and knowledge structures are ubiquitous: race relations (cultural studies, post­
colonialism). gender relations (feminism and ecofeminism and gay studies), economic 
relations (Marxism, developmentalism. Cobb and Daly, Schumacher. Escobar), politics 
(Foucault. Derrida. Conley. Marx, etc.), medicine (Sacks. Weil, homeopathy, 
naturopathy, chiropractic, etc.), academia, human-nature relations (deep-ecology, 
ecofeminism. environmentalism, etc.), a r t , ... Just about every institution that is 
established upon some sort of knowledge or way of knowing is contestable by often well- 
articulated and persuasive alternative narratives that privilege different ways o f knowing 
and being. Continental philosophy thus demands o f its “practitioners” extreme vigilance 
and profound responsibility: the Truth is not out there; we are ultimately responsible for 
discourses that we produce and thus must take care that the words we loose do not 
destroy the other. Incidentally, this criticality, if  you will, is not merely an affect o f
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academics with nothing better to do than quibble over semantics. Its roots may arguably 
be in academia, but it has escaped the narrow bounds o f the ivory tower (some might 
point to the student revolts in May of 1968 in Paris (V. A. Conley and J.-F. Lyotard) 
while others would point to the tree hugger’s embrace o f positions like deep ecology) to 
permeate and flourish in the culture at large.
But we have gotten ahead o f ourselves— or more precisely, we have gone “ large”—  when 
we need to go small. What we need to do is to articulate some o f the details or specific 
features that constitute the backbone of CP and inform its many permutations (and the 
theoretical and methodological orientations of this dissertation). That is, we need to look 
at how it "constructs" or understands self (and other— both other persons and forests), 
how it understands language, how these understandings relate to knowledge, how that 
knowledge affects and effects forest policy, and how policy affects and effects forest 
health. Much o f continental philosophy hinges on what Derrida calls the never-ending 
task o f "reading and rereading” Hegel, and so we will begin here, with Hegelian 
metaphysics' presumed closure o f  knowledge and the end o f  philosophy (quoted in 
Taylor 1986. 1). The speculative, metaphysical unity o f Hegelian philosophy upon which 
much o f modernity (and logical positivism) is founded, is achieved only by willfully 
forgetting what Kierkegaard calls the concrete, empirical, living subject; that is. Hegel’s 
perfect closure o f knowledge is effected by the identity o f thought and being, an identity 
which comes at the cost o f the “particular existing human being,” or at the cost o f 
difference, o f existence and life themselves (Kierkegaard in Taylor 1986, 170). For
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continental philosophers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Lyotard, this cost is too high. If 
knowledge depends upon abstraction, upon the transcendental unification (identity) o f 
self and other . a unification and abstraction which necessitates rejection o f  the 
particularity o f the circumstances o f lived experience then we may perhaps need to 
rethink knowledge. For them, Hegelian philosophy’s speculative unity is an interesting 
and provocative thought experiment, but not a very useful one if what we are looking for 
is a way for us as living beings to know the world we live in: the actually existing world 
in which we are actually existing beings. This, o f course, is the world that forestry praxis 
inhabits. O f what value is abstract knowledge if  one doesn’t actually live in an abstract 
world'? What is the point o f positing some “perfect” unity o f  thought and being 
(omnipresence) when we so clearly are not omnipresent? We don’t experience ourselves, 
or know ourselves, as identical with all o f existence (the arguments of deep ecologists 
notwithstanding). In fact, our knowledge o f the world and  o f  self appears to be both 
differential and deferred. that is, it is predicated upon perspective, on mediation: we 
know, and we know this because we think that we know. Absolute knowledge o f  some 
abstract reality that is predicated on some abstract self is not likely to be very useful when 
it comes to living in the here and now. It is more useful to figure out the conditions o f 
knowledge that obtain in a world in which there is always an outside; a world in which 
there is always something that is not known; and a world in which as limited, situated, 
embodied beings we cannot know the extent o f what we don’t know.
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This is the ineluctable tension inherent in human existence: we abstract in order to know 
(language, naming, is an abstraction, a violence,4 an objectification, a stepping back from 
the particular thing to the general category o f things that fall under that name: tree, 
ecosystem, forest) and in order to survive, but our abstractions as abstractions leave out 
features whose importance we cannot even pretend to estimate, and the loss o f which may 
prove fatal. For Kierkegaard, the tension o f lived experience and its urgency is located in 
the paradoxical nature o f the simultaneity o f either-or (like answering yes to a question of 
"either... or...?"’). The contradiction cannot be overcome except at the expense o f life 
itself. For Kierkegaard the one inescapable condition o f knowledge is the temporality of 
the lived subject and this one fact determines everything else:
not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject is an existing individual, 
and that existence is a process of becoming, and that therefore the notion o f the 
truth as identity o f thought and being is a chimera o f abstraction, in its truth only 
an expectation o f the creature; not because truth is not such an identity, but 
because the knower is an existing individual for whom the truth cannot be such an 
identity as long as he lives in time (Kierkegaard in Taylor 1986. 174).
As knowing subjects that are always becoming, our knowledge is inevitably incomplete. 
There is always an outside, a “not-known," a gap— even an other person or an other
* This notion o f  violence is attributable to Derrida; see ‘‘The Violence o f  the Letter” in O f Grammatology.
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moment— that fosters ambiguity. The job taken on by (neo-Kantian) continental 
philosophers is to acknowledge the possibility o f that which cannot be thought, to 
apprehend the outside, the other; to refuse the comfort of “forgetting” that Hegelian 
abstraction offers; to reject the conservatism that permits closure; to renounce the illusion 
of full (spiritual) presence (a task aided by the Freudian conjecture o f an “unconscious” 
that forecloses the possibility o f full self-awareness or presence); to refuse the retreat to 
some ideal timeless unity or identity (or transcendental logos or law) that collapses 
difference thereby "dissolving the tensions inherent in concrete human existence”—  a 
Romantic unity upon which knowledge was predicated in the logical positivist project 
(Taylor 1986. 15). Simply put. the job o f  continental philosophy is to figure out as best 
we can how we as concrete, particular, contingent, dijfered and deferred living beings 
can know  anything at all about a world that is also always in the process o f becoming. We 
are biophysical, embodied beings, or minds: we are existing subjects in an existing world. 
We live in the out there and we have ideas about it; we call it a world, a planet, a forest, 
or an ecosystem. Continental philosophy's discursive critique o f knowledge is helpful 
insofar as thinking about the problem o f knowledge helps us to live in that world, that 
forest, that ecosystem, or that planet. CP does not deny the possibility o f empirical 
knowledge o f the world (which is not to say the “out there”), but it refuses to permit those 
with a particular agenda (basically all o f us) to use empiricism as an evasion o f critique or 
an exclusionary strategy.
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Continental philosophers next take up with the problem o f language because it is central 
to knowledge— of self and other. This project owes much to Saussure’s critical analysis 
or "science” o f language, semiology. Mark Taylor, a professor o f Humanities at Williams 
College, and author and editor o f several books on postmodernism, continental 
philosophy, and deconstruction suggests that there are several key themes that come out 
of Saussure's structural approach to linguistics that are important for us. First, to 
Saussure we owe the now prevalent notion that signs are “arbitrary conventions” whose 
meanings are fixed by conventional association rather than by any necessary or obligatory 
connection between signifier (“sound image”) and signified (concept) (Saussure 1972. 
67-8). Moreover, the signifiers themselves are only “differentially” identified: that is. 
each signifier is a unique entity by virtue o f its difference from other signifiers within the 
language system (the difference between “for” and “form” consists in one letter) and this 
unique signifier is meant to convey (to signify) a particular meaning or concept (a 
signified) (Saussure 1972, 118-9). The connection between the signifier and the signified 
is also purely conventional. Meaning is determined by the position o f a sign within a 
network o f shifting signs— an economy of signs that is itself always shifting, rather than 
by some obligatory correspondence to a preexisting, prelinguistic, essential reality; there 
is no transcendental signified that stands outside of the sign system, no catalogue o f 
catalogues that does not include itself (Saussure 1972, 65-66). Meaning is relative and 
differential—  that is, “identity” is a function o f difference between signs within a closed 
system, in short, o f non-identitv. Derrida, incidentally, complicates this system o f differed 
signs by reintroducing time (the problem o f always becoming, o f always opening to the
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future ) and distance (in writing) thereby also deferring meaning and thus reinstating the 
polvsemic nature of language as central and irreducible.
Yet another important point that arises out o f Saussure’s linguistics is that the speaking 
subject, in addition to constituting the world through language is itself constituted by its 
position within the sign system (Taylor 1986, 14). That is, we speak our selves, as selves, 
into being in the same way we do the world. This insight
reverses the modem philosophy o f subjectivity by suggesting what later is 
described as the ‘ decentering.' ‘dissolution.’ or ‘ deconstruction’ o f the subject. ... 
Subject is a function of system rather than system a function o f subjects (Taylor 
1986. 14-5).
This has important implications for the autonomous speaking, creative, atomistic, 
individualistic subject upon which much o f the project o f modem philosophy and science 
is predicated. According to this reading o f  the subject, o f self, we as subjects are an 
artifact o f  our language system. To become (self-conscious subjects?), we think, speak (or 
write) and are thought, spoken or written about. To bring the world into conscious being 
for us we do the same. We are an artifact, a manifestation, o f an infinite number of 
discursive formations. Who we are is a function o f our (not always known or intended) 
positioning within these discursive formations; the self is constituted and reconstituted at 
the ever-shifting nexus o f diverse discourses.
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To bring it down to earth a bit: we define ourselves (and are defined by others) by 
reference to many different conceptual categories. Imagine Tom. He identifies himself 
simultaneously as Chinese, male, an accountant, a student, father, brother, son, rich, tall, 
guilty- of peijury, a poor writer, a heavy drinker, a good driver, a bad mathematician, a 
soccer player, a hiker, a lover o f nature, a consumer o f wood products and fossil fuels, 
etc. etc. The same sort o f (only vastly more complex) constructive multi-discursive 
positioning holds true for the constitution o f the forest (or ecosystem) (think o f  the forest 
that produces pulp, that participates in the hydrological and the carbon cycles, that is 
home to wildlife (and “pests"), that offers spiritual renewal, income, aesthetic pleasure, 
etc.) — the critical difference, however, is that the ecosystem only gets to be spoken into 
being through the words we speak for it. and the “speaking we," like the thing(s) spoken 
about, do not speak with one voice.
In building his science o f language, in seeking the systematic in the midst o f the 
accidental and the incidental, Saussure focuses his attention on the synchronic (timeless, 
as in "always in the present") aspects o f language (la langue). For Saussure, time is 
anathema to system and to structure (Saussure 1972, 79-80, 84-89 ). In order to get at the 
true structure o f  language, one must extrapolate from the temporality o f  the living, spoken 
language because this language is constantly changing in sometimes unexpected ways. 
This experiential language is highly volatile, because each time a word is used, it appears 
in different contexts, with a different network of associations that are both historical
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(going backward and pointing forward in time, deferred} and current (participating 
simultaneously in the construction o f multiple (or sometimes binary (light/dark)), non­
coincident discursive realities, differedI5); that is, we look for
meaning in historical usages o f a word, its immediate context, and in the ways it is being 
used around the same time in other discourses or venues. From this view, meaning, like 
existence and knowledge, is emergent, contingent, always becoming; it is never self­
present. never simultaneous, it is both differed and deferred.
Things that change unexpectedly tend to resist systematization; in science, as well as 
traditional philosophy, the point is to get beyond the constant flax to discover the 
principles, the laws, the structures or frameworks that govern that flux; in other words, to 
abstract from the many to get to the one. Thus, in order to build a science or a philosophy 
the usual approach is to reduce, to step out o f the flux, to ignore or control for time. For 
the structuralist Saussure time is inherently disruptive and thus antithetical to system- 
building. while for many post-structuralist continental philosophers time and its passage 
are the unavoidable conditions o f lived experience (Derrida. Lyotard). The challenge after 
Saussure is to explore the conditions under which meaning is possible in a language that 
is differed and deferred, that is. in a language that is no longer closed, but open or 
fissured.
5 My use o f  differed here is slightly different, although not contradictory to, Saussure’s use. By differed. 
Saussure means that each word is a unique word in that it is different from all the other words (or signs) 
around it; i.e.. language is relative and terms receive their identities by virtue o f  their difference from other 
terms in the system.
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Thus, we have a subject who is "decentered.” who is always in the process o f becoming, 
and never fully present either to itself or to the world. This fragmented subject constitutes 
itself and its world through a language in which meaning is differential and presence is 
always deferred, self-referential (“circular'" or tautological, but imperfectly so (Derrida"s 
fissure)), and relative. And it is only through this fissured language and this fragmented 
subject that we come to have knowledge. We know nothing except in so far as we know it 
through language, through logos; all knowledge— whether it is o f self or other— is 
mediated or constituted through language. We know  nothing immediately because to do 
so would mean that we have full and perfect cognitive presence (identity), and to say that 
we are fully present is to ignore the undeniable fact o f our self-conscious experience o f 
ourselves as particular, concrete, existing beings that are always becoming in time, in a 
present-ing that never arrives (Kierkegaard).6
Know ledge requires both consciousness and cognitive process; it is mediate and never 
immediate. We know of things through language, through a sign system that though it 
bears no essential connection to the “out there,” nonetheless seems to enable us to make 
sense of and to organize the sensory data that bombards us. We are a species that is not 
content just "to be;” instead we must also think about being and about what it means to 
be. (This idea, incidentally, is not new: Locke wrestled with this problem of the dual 
nature of man. In Lockean terms, knowledge consists o f complex ideas, unlike simple 
ideas (sensations) that can be “immediate.” Kant agreed with this distinction.)
’ Kant proposes that the only time that we experience ourselves as fully present is in the act o f creation, in 
artistic activity. Kierkegaard holds that we experience ourselves as fully present only momentarily.
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Knowledge, then, is never just personal, but always social— via language. Foucault's 
analysis o f discourse and its relationship to power is also applicable here. In his 
Archeology o f  Knowledge Foucault develops the thesis that systems o f  thought are 
"discursive formations" that function and evolve independently o f  the ’’beliefs and 
intentions o f those who use them.” In theorizing thusly, Foucault builds upon and further 
reifies Saussure's idea o f a "decentered” (no longer intentional, transcendental, fully 
present, or "titular”) subject:
Discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation o f  a thinking, knowing, 
speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the 
dispersion o f the subject and his discontinuity with him self may be determined. It 
is a space o f exteriority in which a network o f distinct sites is deployed (Foucault. 
1972. 55).
In order to account for change— from one formation to another, or one system to another, 
Foucault introduces a "genealogical” approach that incorporates the "non-discursive 
practices" o f social, political, and economic power structures—  vaguely reminiscent of 
Nietzsche's will in his "will to power.’’ In doing so he rejects the Marxist and Hegelian 
teleological interpretation o f inexorable "historical progress.” and instead insists that the 
resultant discursive formations are merely temporary, contingent structures based on
fleetingly. in passion. Arguably, these two come together in Kant’s treatment o f  the sublime and genius.
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epistemes— ways of knowing— that provide paradigms for understanding phenomena. 
These formations are the result of the culmination o f  small, undirected, unrelated, and 
often unintended acts and events that are dis-integrating even as they are becoming:
A discursive formation, then, does not play the role o f a figure that arrests time 
and freezes it for decades or centuries; ... it presents the principle o f articulation 
between a series o f discursive events and other series o f events, transformations, 
mutations, and processes. It is ... a schema o f correspondence between several 
temporal sites (Foucault, 1972, 74).
For Foucault, knowledge and power are inextricably intertwined. Knowledge is a form of 
control, and control (or power) creates the conditions under which knowledge is 
recognized or constituted as knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is not "a tool” 
employed by powerful interests, but “precisely as bodies o f knowledge, they are tied (but 
not reducible ) to systems o f social control;” the knowing, powerful subject is not itself 
outside of knowledge (recall our catalogue o f catalogues that perforce includes itself) (in 
Audi 1995. 276).
There is a strong ethical motive to Foucault’s philosophizing that becomes increasingly 
apparent in much o f his later work, which sought “the liberation o f human beings from 
contingent conceptual constraints masked as unsurpassable a priori limits and 
adumbration o f alternative forms o f existence” (Gutting, in Audi 1995,276, and Foucault.
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1972. 13. 24-25). For Foucault (as with later Derrida) we have a responsibility to the 
future (more accurately, if awkwardly stated as 'th e  becoming") which obligates us to 
critically examine the assumptions that inform our statements, statements that are 
themselves designed to evade or mask their own origins, limitations, and contingencies in 
hopes o f establishing themselves as True. However, we are not here doing a strict 
hermeneutics (looking for the Meaning that stands beyond the text, the extra- 
discursive."TranscendentaI signified"). Neither Foucault’s nor Derrida’s “excavation" of 
the heterogeneous multiplicity o f discursive formations or systems is intended to lead one 
to a "prediscursive" truth or a “presystematic" reality o f objects. For Foucault, “behind 
the completed system, what is discovered ... is not the bubbling source o f  life itself, life 
in an as yet uncaptured state." but rather behind, beyond, before the systems under 
investigation, one can expect to find more systems, more networks, more discourses o f  
the prediscursive (Foucault, 1972. 76).'
No one is free from discourse, including the Forest Service. It’s discourse on forest health 
seeks to assert Forest Service authority based upon a variety o f implicit claims to pre­
discursive certainty (by virtue o f its use of the scientific methodology, for instance, and 
its access to "specialists” or “authorities”). And it is this authority-seeking discourse— in 
so far as it seeks to foreclose other discourses— that we have a moral obligation (if 
Foucault and Derrida are to be believed) to challenge.
Of course, not every discourse is a discourse on the prediscursive. And there are other ways to assume 
authority (brute force, for example; or deception).
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Given the disjunct, the gaps, between mind and matter, between structures o f  thought and 
structures o f reality, between signifier and signified, sign and referent, that CP seems not 
only to recognize but to revel in and exploit, one might conclude that we can never know 
anything at all. All we have is words, and even those are slippery at the best o f times—  
even, perish the thought, scientific words. This would appear to leave us in the absurd and 
indefensible position o f asserting that nothing is real, there is no “out there,” at least not 
one that we can access. Experience, however, indicates otherwise— if for no other reason 
than that something seems to slap back, to intrude, to irrupt into our thoughts, our 
seamless narratives, and into our biophysical existence. Indeed, it is at those moments 
when the "out there" does something unexpected (contrary to our ongoing narration), that 
we are most forcefully reminded that our words haven’t quite got a grip on it. (Illness, as 
we shall see. is one o f those unexpected irruptions that leaves us scrambling for words 
and for an identity.) There are those who wish to find a way to live in a world that is both 
real and linguistically constructed—a way that acknowledges but does not succumb to the 
illusions or comforts o f either—  a world that is real and ideal, "knowable” empirically 
and rationally. N. Kathryn Hayles, among others, suggests an approach that she calls 
"constrained constructivism” in which one rides “the cusp,” or crest o f the wave that 
delineates the edge, the surface where the flux o f  the real meets and conditions, and is in 
turn conditioned by. our ideas about it (see Hayles “Searching for Common Ground,” in 
Soule Reinventing Nature). In other words, constrained constructivists seek to live on that 
verge where the brain meets the mind— in full recognition that the brain is a creation o f
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the mind and the mind a creation o f itself that (we surmise) would not exist in the absence 
of (our created or imagined) brain.
Under this view. Elizabeth Ann Bird (following Foucault) argues that scientific 
knowledge o f the "out there’* or the flux is not considered a representation of nature, but 
is instead thought o f as a "socially constructed interpretation with an already socially 
constructed natural technical object of inquiry” (Bird 1987. 255). Constrained 
constructivists are. however, keen to differentiate themselves from thoroughgoing social 
constructivists (Latour and W oolgar. among others) who contend that scientists, for 
example, do nothing other than negotiate for meaning and interpretation in an endless 
power struggle to see whose theory, whose paradigm will win out (Bird 1987. 259). 
Hayles and Bird both suggest that "we need to go beyond the [extreme constructivists'] 
notions that scientific negotiation takes place only among people and assert that science is 
engaged with nature in negotiating reality itself* (Bird 1987, 259). Thus.
Reality is being negotiated at the same time as its theoretical construction. And 
both o f those, the reality and the interpretation, are not merely social 
constructions, but at both levels negotiations with nature. Nature’s role in that 
negotiation takes the form o f actively creating something materially new and o f 
resisting or accommodating the range o f metaphorical and theoretical imaginings 
with which it is approached (Bird 1987, 259).
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Under this rubric o f knowledge, we might surmise that '‘forest health” is something that is 
both constructed and constructing; the forest, the ecosystem (understood non-essentially 
and non-mystically) participates in our definition o f health by doing whatever it does 
often in spite of our words. To some extent, we can intervene, act, so as to alter what the 
forest does, but at other times it is clearly our ideas or words that must yield to the 
imponderable force (nonmystical) o f the out there. The forest is not infinitely plastic or 
biddable to the forester’s or consumer’s demands any more than the human body or 
patient is to the physician’s interventions or advice. “Health” is no more fo u n d  out there 
in the forest than it is freely created in the human mind in the absence o f  external 
constraints.
A Word About Science
Before closing, it is necessary to broach the issue o f science and its treatment or use in 
this dissertation. As my research and writing progressed, “science” kept cropping up; as 
we shall see. it is the FS’ preferred knowledge framework or methodology as well as that 
o f the medical “establishment.” One cannot escape confrontation. Then too, some sort of 
discussion on science was necessary in an effort to resolve (or if that is too ambitious, to 
at least acknowledge) the growing contradictions and ambiguities that pervade my use o f 
that term in this essay. My discussion o f  science appears late in the paper (p. 142) for 
several reasons. First, a critique of science per se is not the theme o f this paper; in fact, 
the same criticisms that I make o f science might be made o f any discourse that attempts 
to conceal its origins and establish itself as an “unsurpassable a priori limit.” Second, I do
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
not wish to convey the sense that I am quibbling with the FS’ or the medical 
communities' use o f science. I simply wish to point out (following philosophers o f 
science and sociologists) that the Forest Service, like many institutions, organizations, or 
individuals, tends to use science uncritically with little or no examination o f its origins or 
legitimating grounds; to assert its findings as objective Truths; to invoke its name as if  to 
thereby foreclose critique; and to use science and scientific language as a means to 
establish authority and exclude or devalue other forms of knowledge and other voices. 
Third, because I wish to retain my focus on the project at hand (forest health), I limit my 
treatment o f science to the FS' use o f it in identifying or defining forest health and in 
framing the discourse on it. To that end, my discussion of science (admittedly superficial) 
incorporates much o f the work that is done in Chapters Three, Four, and Five and would 
be out o f place if moved forward. And finally, although I do not disagree with the use of 
science in the management o f public lands, for reasons which will become clear. I feel 
somewhat less sanguine about accepting forestry as just a science— even an applied one.
Thus, my enquiry into the philosophy of science is brief, limited only to a few key 
insights made by scientists themselves, about the relationship between human knowledge 
systems and language and the extent to which they affect our ability to engage with the 
world. I also note scientists’ own observations about the limits o f science, particularly 
with respect to such large, complex, amorphous “things” as ecosystems. Ultimately, they 
conclude that what we think o f the world— scientifically or otherwise— is as much a 
function o f  who we are and how our minds work as o f what the “real” is really like. And
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further, that the bigger and more complex and unbounded the object under examination, 
and the more variables included in the “experiment," the less likely one is to achieve a 
high level of certainty.
Concluding Remarks
In summation, we can say that continental philosophy rejects the unifying “grand
o
narratives” o f traditional philosophy and science. It refuses to abstract from the 
multiplicity and contingency of lived experience to some hypothetical eternal, objective, 
stable position. Continental philosophy also accepts the paradoxical nature o f language: 
language is the condition that makes knowledge o f the self and knowledge o f the other 
possible, but it is that which makes the immediate experience o f self and other (as pure 
existence or identity) impossible precisely because it constitutes the se lf and the other by 
way of signs that are differed and deferred. It accepts, without reserve, the ineluctably 
fissured nature of knowledge (as discourse), which as a product o f a language that is 
differential and deferred and a subject that is also always becoming, is always partial, 
incomplete, imperfect, situated. In short, it refuses to extrapolate, to presume to stand 
outside o f itself and its milieu, to simplify or reduce in an effort to better comprehend, 
what is not in the end either simple or comprehensible except by an act o f inconceivable 
violence— violence because such a simplification subjects the subject to a hegemony of 
improperly-assumed knowledge in the name o f authority, an authority that cannot justify 
its existence except through further violence.
3 The term "grand narrative" is attributed to Frederic Jameson; see his Postmodernism, or, the Cultural 
Logic o f  Late Capitalism, for his excavation o f  the term.
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There are several important implications that follow from these “confessions” that are 
pertinent to this project. Due to the situated, fragmented, fissured nature 
o f the discursively knowing subject, no one discourse can lay claim to an objective 
truth( including this one— a point which must remain unproven in accordance with 
Godel's theorem).9 We can only have a perspective. This assertion, far from leading to 
unbridled relativism as some assume, instead forces upon us the utmost responsibility. 
According to Derrida, the inherent limitations o f our knowledge obligate us to be ever 
vigilant, to be excruciatingly aware and critical o f our presumptions, to be open to the 
future and to the possibility o f change.10
Second, because language is slippery and  discursive systems are independent and 
contingent, meaning is never fully or perfectly controlled or controllable by any one party 
or a singular discourse (although the desire for perfect control does persist). Thus— and 
this is perhaps the most important point— “language games” (Lyotard and Wittgenstein) 
become the means by which power and knowledge (Foucault) are brokered in the 
political economy o f signs and  in social life. According to Lyotard (following 
Wittgenstein) in his book The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, language 
games, like all games, are a struggle for supremacy, a fight or a contest. But also like
Q For an elaboration o f  the Theorem (paraphrased by Douglas Hofstadter as “All consistent axiomatic 
formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions” (p. 17)) see H ofstadtefs Godel, Escher, 
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.
10 See Derrida’s Politics o f  Friendship and Caputo’s Deconstruction in a Nutshell: Com ’ersations withJ. 
Derrida for an elaboration o f  his notion o f  responsibility.
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other games, they are governed by a set of rules— rules which are not internally generated 
or legitimated by the game itself, but rather are the object o f  an explicit or implied 
contract between participants. These rules determine and specify the properties and the 
uses to which the various categories o f utterances can be put. If there are no rules, there is 
no game (Lyotard 1984, 10). One sometimes plays the game, makes some language move 
(an utterance) for the “sheer pleasure o f the invention,” for the joy to be had “in the 
endless invention o f turns o f phrase, or words and meaning.” (Lyotard 1984, 10). At 
others, the point is to “win.” to know that one's connotation, one's language, is the 
accepted one. the one that will be acted upon (this is the sort of language game that the FS 
is currently engaged in with the public). Despite these "agonistics" however, the bottom 
line for Lyotard is that language is social, and the moves in the game are the bonds that 
hold us all together (Lyotard, 11). Language games are about sharing knowledge (of 
whatever sort ). Knowledge, then, is a function o f talking across discourses 
as well as within them: it's all about coming to terms— o f constantly triangulating from 
one (or more) position(s) onto another (and back again) and grappling with what Foucault 
calls the "heterogeneous multiplicity o f concepts.”
Far from being some esoteric, obscure, unreal (and anti-real, some would argue) 
fantastical mental brain child of a bunch o f “armchair or coffeehouse” philosophers who 
have about them “no glimmer of earth, o f leaves and soil” (cf. Shepard, Soule. Sokal, 
Koertge. etc. (the quote is from Shepard, in Soule, 20)), Continental philosophy, albeit in 
an odd way. gives voice to that earth in all its infinite complexity and irreducible
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difference. It categorically refuses the comfort o f a presumed objective knowledge 
(yielding Baconian “secrets” o f  nature) gained at the expense o f abstraction from the 
actually lived existence o f the embodied human being (and the Baconian torture o f  
nature). It allows that we are a symbolic species, one that lives in a world o f thought and 
signification, a species that is as much a product as a producer o f “webs o f  meaning,” but 
also insists that we are a biological species, a species that is as much a product o f  this 
time and this place as it is a producer thereof.
For some, continental philosophy requires a philosophy o f the flesh, but one that is not 
reduced to it. It permits that one might “theorize” a rule, a law, a logos, but insists that 
one never forget that it is an abstraction that comes at the expense o f the concrete 
particular, a unification that comes at the expense o f difference, a thought that comes at 
the expense o f life. Traditionally, the object o f deconstruction and of critique or analysis 
has been philosophy itself. But as we noted above, the insights and “intuitions” o f  
continental philosophy about language and knowledge permeate the wider culture. Forest 
management, o f course, “happens” in that wider culture, as does the construction or 
identification o f the object (forest or ecosystem), the articulation o f the objective (for our 
purposes, forest health), and the establishment o f the methods and theoretical constructs 
by which both will be known (science). Forestry, (and science) as a fundamentally and 
ineluctably linguistic and social— even public—  enterprise cannot escape the impacts o f 
continental philosophy on our understandings o f language and culture.
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Prelude to Health
Which brings us to our topic: forest health, and its comparison to health as it is 
understood in the medical community. Use o f the external landscape or geography of 
nature as a metaphor for that o f the internal geography of the body is not new; nor is its 
converse. It is also not uncontested. The tendency to conceptually equate the inner and 
outer landscapes, the body and nature, and then to use this conceptual framework in 
conjunction with a hierarchical value system that justifies control and dominance o f  both 
internal and external nature has been thoroughly critiqued and deconstructed by 
environmentalists, feminists, and ecofeminists among others. Without assenting to any 
necessary or essential connection between body and nature, I am nonetheless interested in 
the following chapters in investigating the possibility o f similarities between the 
discursive traditions associated with the health o f each. Modem Western medicine is an 
attempt to manage and control the bewildering “wilderness o f our ... inner nature” by 
locating the sources o f both health and disease in the biophysicality o f  the body; diagnosis 
and treatment are articulated in the language o f pathophysiology and pathoanatomy. and 
are highly technical affairs; knowledge is objective and ideally the knowing physician is 
disinterested (Marchessault 2000, 11 and Cassell 1997, 10). M odem Western forestry 
attempts to manage and control the bewildering wilderness o f nature by casting forest 
health and disease in equally narrow biophysical terms; forest disease and health are 
generally defined in terms o f pathologies; diagnosis and treatment are left to disinterested 
and objective experts or professionals. In both instances, the result is that science 
(medical sciences in the one instance and natural sciences in the other) is the privileged
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theoretical and methodological knowledge system, and in each case diagnosis and 
treatment become matters for experts rather than laypersons. The impetus for the 
comparison does not depend upon an essential connection between body and nature; it 
depends only on the existence o f shared terminology, structures of knowledge and 
legitimation, and shared roots in the modernist tradition that give rise to particular 
practices.
The most obvious example o f shared terminology is the use o f the terms health and 
disease. Nearly sixty years ago Aldo Leopold wrote that conservation was the ‘‘effort to 
understand and preserve" the “health” o f the land. By health he meant “the capacity o f the 
land for self-renewal.” He may not have been the first to speak o f land management in 
terms of health maintenance, and certainly his notion o f health as a primary goal of 
management did not catch on until the late 1980s-early 1990s, but forest health, as an 
unquestioned good is now the dominant theme in forestry discourse. In fact, in the USDA 
Forest Serxice Strategic Plan (2000 Revision): Integrity and Accountability: A 
Framework fo r  National Resource Management the Forest Service states that its mission 
is “To Sustain the Health, Diversity, and Productivity o f the Nation’s Forests and 
Grasslands to Meet the Needs o f Present and Future Generations.” The Plan lists 
ecosystem health as its number one goal, while the objectives o f the three other goals—  
multiple benefits to people, scientific and technical assistance, and effective public 
service— are generally framed in terms o f how they fit in with the first and, what appears 
to be. overriding goal o f ecosystem health (USDA FS 2000). Given the shared
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terminology, it seems unlikely that a discourse on health in the environmental field can 
escape the traces o f meanings o f health produced and circulated in the medical discourse 
on human health. It is thus also unlikely that a forest discourse on health would be 
immune to critiques being leveled against the medical discourse regarding health and
disease.
Another reason for a cross-discursive comparison arises from shared roots in the 
modernist, positivist tradition that tends to favor science and scientific methodology as 
the standard o f knowledge and legitimacy. In both instances, but even more so in the 
medical sciences than in the environmental field (at least thus far), the assumptions that 
underlie this traditional commitment to science, as well as the role o f science itself, are 
being challenged by alternative conceptual frameworks and value systems. Furthermore, 
the practices that concern themselves with health— medicine and forest management—  
share similar organizational and institutional commitments. Both are professional fields, 
dominated by experts trained or certified in the esoteric knowledges and sophisticated 
technologies that delineate their fields (again perhaps more so in medicine than in 
forestry). As we shall see. both fields face similar threats to these knowledge and power 
structures from a variety of sources. '‘Consumers’’ (of nature or the body) can access 
information directly, even scientific information, from a wider variety o f sources; 
palpable (if not pervasive) public dissatisfaction with the results o f professional 
management (or care) coupled with a growing distrust o f professionals’ motives make 
people reluctant to leave decision-making to the experts; proliferation o f non-traditional
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organizations and institutions that deal with both nature and the body (N GO's, HMO's) 
can sometimes mount credible and appealing alternatives to traditional institutional 
programs and policies; and finally, the appropriation and dispersion o f both bioscience 
and ecology through all facets o f public and personal life (what social scientists and 
medical anthropologists call the “medicalization," and what I call the “ecologization,” of 
modem society) makes it nearly impossible for one entity— the Forest Service or the 
American Medical Association— to successfully control the terms o f the discourse.
But perhaps the strongest incentive to compare the two fields is that the forestry discourse 
itself explicitly invites comparison by occasionally invoking the human-medical analogy 
of health as an explanatory model. Leopold invokes the medical analogy when, in 
elaborating on his notion o f land health, he compares the body to the land, and land 
‘doctoring" to the doctoring o f the human body:
In general, the trend o f evidence indicates that in land, just as in the human body, 
the symptoms may lie in one organ and the cause in another. The practices we 
now call conservation are. to a large extent, local alleviations o f  biotic pain. They 
are necessary but they must not be confused with cures. The art o f land doctoring 
is being practiced with vigor, but the science o f land health is yet to be bom 
(Leopold 1991.274).
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He speaks o f ‘'pains'’ and “cures,” two concepts we don’t often associate with forests or 
forest management, but which are two major foci of medical practice. The power o f the 
analogy persists today. In a 1996 USDA Forest Service publication devoted to assessing 
forest health, the authors compare the evaluative and interpretive work o f a team of 
researchers (ecologists, entemologists, hydrologists, pathologists, silviculturists, and 
others ) to that of “heart, kidney, lung, and other medical experts who are asked to 
diagnose blood and chemistry results that fall outside normal values or that result from 
traumatic injury” (USDA/FS Dale 1996. (web site)).11 Again, my point is not to seek 
ontological convergence o f the objects o f  medicine and forestry but to provoke a 
reflective, cognitive dissonance at the epistemic level within the forestry community by 
juxtaposing forestry discourse on health with an extra-forestry discourse that finds itself 
grappling with similar dilemmas and confronting similar critiques (and with whom the 
term health is most readily identified).
Given the health cult in .America, it seems plausible that people would be as enthusiastic 
about healthy forests as they profess to be about healthy bodies— or about all those other 
entities, states, or functions to which we apply the health signifier: economies, markets, 
diets, appetites, choices, relationships, communities, families, bodies, minds, businesses, 
societies, etc.. Thus, as a rhetorical trope, a political mantra, a persuasive theoretical 
concept that gamers almost unanimous public support, the adoption o f “health”— with all
" There are those in the USFS who resist the analogy o f  forest health to human health, and by association, 
the comparison o f  forest management to the management o f  human health; nonetheless, it is impossible for 
the USFS discourse on health to escape the meanings o f  health produced and contested in that o f  human 
health if for no other reason than they share the same terms.
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its attendant positive affective values and connotations— as the ultimate goal o f all land 
and resource management is strategically brilliant. Or perhaps not.... Because, as it turns 
out. even though we all generally agree that healthy forests, like healthy bodies, healthy 
economies, and healthy relationships are generally good things to have or be, there is 
considerably less agreement on how to achieve it, and even more importantly, in what it 
consists. Then too. as is the case with human health, it is by no means clear how willing 
we are to alter our lifestyles in order to achieve health. This is true in regards to discrete 
organisms, but even more true in regard to the multi-organismal structures like societies, 
forests, and ecosystems. That is, there doesn't seem to be a universally acceptable, clear 
and unambiguous understanding o f  health that leads inexorably to definitive and 
incontestable management actions. Incidentally, as we shall see, the same lack o f 
consensus plagues medicine and medical practices with similar effect. This fact— the 
dispersion and ambiguity o f the health signifier—  is not lost on the USFS (e.g., Forest 
Health Science Panel 1997; USFS/Dahms and Geils, 1997), but while the medical 
community appears to be accepting (more or less gracefully) its loss o f control o f the 
signifier "health" in the human realm, as we shall see, the Forest Service appears to still 
be committed to a program in which health and disease are defined as objective and 
scientifically by experts trained to interrogate the biological “real" and to interpret the 
"signs" correctly.12
i: “Signs" is used here in the conventional, unexamined medical sense o f  the word: a doctor (as objective 
observer) examines a patient looking for signs— objectively knowable conditions or indicators ( a cut. a 
fever, a fracture, an amputation, etc.) -and interrogates the patient for symptoms— subjective descriptions 
of unknowable indicators (pain, nausea, dizziness, etc.). The distinction between signs and symptoms 
reproduces an increasingly criticized duality between body and mind and is “falling out o f  favor” in more 
recent medical discourses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
In the next chapter I am not so much interested in exhaustively cataloging and then 
deconstructing the whole o f the USFS discourse on forest (or ecosystem) health or in 
minutely examining and critiquing the programmatic activities that follow from this 
discourse (the articulation o f which takes up the bulk o f the USFS literature on health). 
Rather. I am interested in exploring how the USFS and the medical community define 
their terms (health and disease); what sorts o f knowledge (and technologies) they bring to 
bear on the definition o f the problem and the identification o f solutions; how their 
knowledge or epistemic commitments necessitate and reify particular power structures; 
and finally, how the forestry discourse on health might be '‘reread” in light o f some o f the 
ongoing developments in the medical and meta-medical practice and discourse.
I am working from the premise developed most fully by Michel Foucault in his 
Archeology o f  Knowledge, which in turn is derived -w ith  significant changes — from 
Saussure's work in semiology, that words receive meaning and value by virtue not of 
their connection to an objectively given referent but rather from their relative and 
constantly changing positions within a language network that consists o f open ended 
discursive practices, each o f which deploys a particular term in sometimes radically 
different ways.
I am also engaging in textual analysis, (or to a lesser extent deconstruction a la Derrida), 
to whom we owe the notion that all texts are “necessarily fissured;” that they carry within
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
them the possibility o f their own impossibility by virtue o f inherent contradictions 
embedded within all language. If one takes a strictly deconstructive approach one could 
tentatively accept, for example, the '‘closure” o f the USFS discourse on health, and then 
“pull it apart” from the inside. That is, one could undermine the certainty o f the terms by 
showing how the discourse itself is internally fissured by ambiguity. My approach 
includes elements of deconstruction, but is primarily textual analysis, focusing to a larger 
degree on the relational nature o f discourse that invites comparison across ultimately 
arbitrary' discursive boundaries. Thus, under this reading, '‘forest health” is not a “closed” 
signifier that can be unambiguously defined exclusively within the confines o f  USFS 
discourse with reference to a specific physical entity, function, or state, and then 
unproblematically applied, but is instead a term that designates a constantly shifting 
(emergent) nexus of numerous discursive practices with a similarly numerous and varied 
field o f possible empirical referents.
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Chapter Three 
Forest Health:
The Undiscovered Country
In the 1997 Report on Forest Health o f  the United States written by the Forest Health 
Science Panel, the authors state at the outset that, contrary to the customary scientific 
methodology, they are not going to define “health.” lj The problem, according to the 
authors, is that forest health has become a catch-all term, one often '"defined and 
redefined" in order to meet different objectives and to cover a wide range of different, 
often conflicting “immediate concems"’(Forest Health Science Panel (FHSP) 1997. 
Appendix C. unpaginated). In defense o f such an unprecedented action (“science usually 
deals with ambiguities o f definition by defining a term at the beginning o f a report 
..."(1)). they simply concede that the term is imprecise and then go on to say that they 
will "discuss the present and potential ability o f the forest to provide the various values 
that different people want from the foresfl’(FHSP 1991 1). They add that “’Forest Health" 
conveys various concerns that people have o f the forest’s ability to provide a range of 
values." These values, they contend, are o f two sorts: those that a forest provides (has?) 
by virtue o f its condition and function, and those that it provides fo r  humans, that is, those 
features o f the forest that contribute in some way to the quality o f human life (FHSP
L' The report was commissioned by the Honorable Charles H. Taylor, USC. 1 Ith District o f NC. The panel 
is composed almost exclusively o f scientists in academia. The goal o f  the congressman is “to educate 
himself and others on the forest science basis o f  the issues” (FHSP 1997, Appendix D, unpaginated). The 
report is important because it is a “scientific” analysis o f  the environmental, economic, and social effects of 
8 different policy options, as well as an analysis o f  present forest conditions. Its purpose is to provide 
members o f Congress with a scientific basis for decision-making at the national level.
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1997, 1.2 ). The report itself consists o f an exhaustive catalogue and survey o f these two 
different sorts o f values.
Essentially, then, what we have is a scientific report on forest health that categorically 
refuses to deal with health per se -that is, it refuses to tackle the problem o f what health 
is and what it means (as we shall see, the medical and meta-medical discourses suffer 
from a similar •'reluctance” to engage directly with the term “health”). A strange beast 
indeed, since if  the authors can’t identify in any clear way what it is they are reporting on, 
one wonders how they decided upon what to report about it. As noted above, the authors 
concede at the outset that it is nearly impossible to define such an ambiguous value-laden 
term, and further add that “a term with multiple definitions” (and definitions that are 
constantly changing) is not useful to scientists; that, in fact, such a vague, “ambiguous" 
term does nothing but “obfuscate analvses”(FHSP 1997, 1). And since “science deals 
with specifics, and terms with multiple definitions” are not specific, one might gather, 
from their own admission, that health is not a topic for the scientists”(FHSP 1997, 1). In 
this deduction, however, one would be mistaken since the Forest Health Science Panel 
proceeds to compile a several-hundred page scientific document ostensibly on the topic o f 
forest health.14
14 In Appendix D, the authors state that they have taken a “management science” approach in the analysis o f  
policy. Their intent is to separate the “analysis o f  conditions and alternatives from value judgments”; 
"conditions” then are understood as real, and their analysis and identification as objective, while the choice 
between management strategies that will promote or negate certain conditions is conceded to be subjective, 
and hence best left to policy makers.
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Despite their refusal to define their key term, the authors do provide a list o f ten 
definitions o f forest health in their appendix (Appendix A). These are definitions offered 
by different organizations and the definitions are often revised or updated as professional 
opinion changes and public opinion warrants; the USFS, for example is responsible for 
three different definitions, the Society o f .American Foresters for yet another three. For 
our purposes, the USFS definitions are o f most interest, but I also include Aldo Leopold's 
definition since it is oft cited by foresters and because his essays have informed much of 
contemporary FS discourse on forest health. For Leopold, “health is the capacity o f the 
land for self-renewal" (Leopold 1991. 258). In 1993. the USFS' preferred definition o f 
forest health was “the ability o f a forest to recover from natural and human-caused 
stressors" (FHSP 1997. Appendix A. unpaginated). By 1997, the preferred definition o f 
forest health was:
A desired state o f forest health is a condition where biotic and abiotic influences 
on the forest (for example, pests, atmospheric deposition, silvicultural treatments, 
and harvesting practices) do not threaten resource management objectives now or 
in the future (Forest Health Science Panel 1997, Appendix A, unpaginated) 
(Definition # 1).
The Panel notes that, at o f the time o f  publication o f the report (1997), the USFS was 
contemplating a change in definition to the following (a change which has since been
effected):
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A condition wherein a forest has the capacity across the landscape for renewal, for 
recovery from a wide range of disturbances, and for retention o f its ecological 
resiliency while meeting current and future needs o f people for desired levels of 
values, uses, products, and services (Forest Health Science Panel 1997, Appendix 
A. unpaginated) (Definition #2).
And finally, just to further confuse matters, the current (2001) USDA Forest Service 
National Headquarters web site defines forest health as
a measure o f the robustness of forest ecosystems. Aspects o f forest health include 
biological diversity; soil. air. and water productivity; natural disturbances: and the 
capacity o f the forest to provide a sustaining flow o f goods and services for people 
(USDA FS National. HQ web site: www.fs.fed.us/land/emterms.html) (Defintion
* 3).
The one thing that every one o f these definitions shares (excepting the pre-1993 
definition) is that forest health is connected in some way— either essentially or 
accidentally (a critical difference, as we shall see)— to peoples’ desires. That is. 
according to the definitions, forest health seems to have a dual nature: one biological 
(understood as "real”) and one cultural.
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But let's back up a moment and look at the definitions themselves. The context in which 
Leopold articulates his definition is instructive. Despite his (earlier quoted) desire to 
develop a “science o f land health”, Leopold gets to the concept o f land health by way of 
the ecological conscience, that is, by way o f ethics.
A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in 
turn reflects a conviction o f  individual responsibility for the health o f the land. 
Health is the capacity o f the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to 
understand and preserve this capacity (Leopold 1991, 258).
Health, for Leopold, is clearly not a value-neutral term that can be defined by a value- 
neutral. objective science. It is a normative concept, one that is inextricably linked to a 
normative conceptual framework called a land ethic which, in turn, is based upon an 
"ecological conscience.” For Leopold, the land ethic is the natural extension o f human 
ethics, and human ethical systems and frameworks are cultural products (arguments from 
sociobiologv notwithstanding) with deep roots in philosophical and metaphysical 
discourses. We generally agree, following Hume, that one cannot move logically and 
necessarily from an “is” to an “ought”— that is, from a particular condition or state o f 
affairs to a particular action or judgement— unless or until we insert a normative 
judgement which enables us to interpret the condition as something that means 
something affectively (producing a positive or negative emotional response), something 
that necessitates a this response and not that response. In fact, Leopold's conception o f
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health is not just normative or affective, but carries the force o f a moral imperative: our 
ecological conscience requires us to sustain land health. Thus, land health is not just "a 
good" that we should work toward, but is itself “Good." It is not, then, strictly speaking a 
science of land health that he is after—at least not one o f the disinterested sort to which 
we became accustomed under logical positivism.
On a more "practical” side. Leopold’s conception o f health is historical in the sense that a 
healthy forest (or an ecosystem) is one that can reproduce itself (as historically 
constructed) in the future. Therefore he is correct to use the terms conservation and 
preservation since his notion o f health is not so much innovative as it is conservative. 
Health is more a function o f sameness or permanence, of iteration and identity, of the 
ability of the land to re produce itself as it was. rather than o f difference or change. The 
implication is that this historical (usually understood as "pre-European” or “pre- 
contact"(— the apparent arbitrariness o f this choice will be discussed later)) forest (or 
ecosystem) was (objectively, self-referentially) healthy in the first instance.
The 1993 Forest Service definition (Definition #1) is quite provocative and is fraught 
with danger for any organization that is overwhelmingly committed to a positivist 
tradition that values certainty, abhors ambiguity, shuns even the specter o f “subjectivity." 
and privileges scientific theory and methodology. The 1993 USFS definition states 
(somewhat tautologically and thus uninformatively) that forest health is a “desired state." 
which state is a “condition where biotic and abiotic influences on the forest ...do not
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threaten resource management objectives now or in the future/' This “desired state" (of 
forest health) is simply not a category that is amenable to any sort o f reductive or 
abstractive approach; that is, desire resists rationalization, quantification, abstraction, and 
rigorous scientific testing precisely because it is essentially irrational (beyond reason, or 
more precisely, before reason). This, o f course, is not to say that desire resists articulation 
(admitting o f a bit o f slipperiness here in conflating desire with dem ands....): social 
scientists use survey techniques to catalog and rate them; economists assume given tastes 
and preferences become evident through “demand curves;” etc.. Ironically, forest health 
itself is actually left undefined because all we are concerned with is a desired state— a 
telling omission, as we shall see. But the single-most remarkable thing about this 
definition is that it defines health in terms o f already established or agreed upon 
management objectives: we first decide what we want a forest to do or have or be. both 
now and in the future, then we retroactively define forest health so as to fit (“not 
threaten") those desires. (And ironically, almost inevitably these desired present and 
future conditions are for the romanticized past (historical) conditions.) That forest health 
is somehow tied in to a future  condition, or with an ability to reproduce itself, to maintain 
its identity, into the future, and that that future state is linked to human desires, implies 
that health is somehow inextricably bound up with human expectations or hopes (my 
inclusion o f this particular feature becomes more clear in the discussion o f human health). 
The upshot is: if it can’t deliver what we want today and tomorrow, it isn’t healthy. 
Clearly, then, under this definition, health is not an objective condition that is found in a 
forest, but is instead first articulated and then looked for or created. This o f course, begs
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the (huge) question o f the acceptability or desirability o f the management objectives— an 
open-ended question if ever there was one, not to mention the question o f sustainability. 
Such a definition is virtually impossible to defend on the grounds of science. (Consider 
this: A perfectly healthy though lightweight siave would be defined as “unhealthy” if 
unable to lift the building blocks o f the Egyptian pyramids; a forest that produces a fine 
crop o f aspen is unhealthy if it is unable to produce its quota o f desired wood fiber, etc..)
In anticipation of these dangers o f trying to frame health and develop criteria by reference 
to management objectives, (some o f  which the FS admits have actually been responsible 
for the alleged unhealthy conditions15 ...) a 1992 USFS report entitled Forest Health and  
E cologica l Integrity in the Northern Rockies recommends that criteria for forest health 
be derived not from management objectives but from ecological conditions. The authors 
suggest that ”ecosystem function” provides a suitable base from which to develop 
objective criteria and state that “a forest in good health is a fully functioning community 
o f plants and animals and their physical environment.” and further, that “a healthy forest 
is an ecosystem in balance” (USDA FS/Monnig and Byler 1992. unpaginated.). In order 
to determine what a "fully functioning” “balanced” and thus healthy forest might look 
like, the report suggests that we look, once again, to the forests and ecosystems o f the pre- 
European era as models; that is. that we look into the past for the meaning o f  today's 
signs.
'■ See USDA FS Blue Mountains Forest Health Report ( 1991) Section II, page 2.
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It is worth taking a moment here to note that this focus on the past, particularly on 
“European'' settlement as the defining moment between health and its decline is a 
persistent theme in American forestry (and meta-forestry or environmental) discussions of 
forest/ecosystem health, integrity, and restoration. Both health and integrity are conditions 
(or measures) that are identified by reference to ‘‘pre-European” (the Salish-Kootenai 
foresters use the term "pre-contact”) conditions; restoration is something we do in order 
to get back to those conditions. In fact, it is even codified (and presently contested by the 
Bush administration) in several sections o f the planning regulations. Section 219.2 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations concerns how we might go about achieving and maintaining 
ecological sustainability. Sub section 219.2(a)(4) states that "Current conditions must be 
compared to the distribution o f historical conditions prior to European settlement to 
develop insights about the current status and integrity o f ecosystem components” (Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR), vol. 64. No. 192. §219.20 (4)) and further that we must 
evaluate "the effects o f  human activities.” taking care to distinguish between "activities 
prior to European settlement, which had an integral role in the landscape for a long period 
of time, from activities after European settlement, many o f which are o f  a type, size and 
rate that were not typical o f disturbances under which native plant and animal species and 
ecosystems developed” (CFR, Vol. 64. No. 192, §219.20(a)(3)). The references to "pre- 
European settlement” as the (sometimes implied, but often explicit) definition o f "the 
norm" or o f "health" are ubiquitous throughout the literature; the choice o f this point in
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time as the norm has not escaped considerable attention and criticism, but the USFS 
seems to have accepted it.16
The present USFS definitions (#’s 2 and 3), not surprisingly retreat from the unmitigated 
subjectivity o f its predecessor by identifying the term “health” with some condition in the 
presumed real. We will look first at Definition #2 (this is the definition that seems to 
appear most often in print...). Definition 2 retains a social or cultural component, but the 
relation between these two components—  culture and nature— is not entirely clear. The 
language and structure o f the definition establish an uneasy tension between people's 
desires and the objective conditions on which those desires depend. It begins with a 
statement of the objective conditions o f the forest that would classify it as healthy -"the 
capacity across the landscape for renewal, for recovery from a wide range o f disturbances, 
and for retention of its ecological resiliency” (see, for example, Clark and Munn (1986) 
for a discussion of resilience and disturbance). These conditions must be achieved or 
maintained "while meeting the current and future needs o f people for desired levels o f 
values, uses, products and services.” Grammatically, the establishment o f  certain 
ecological conditions stands alone as a complete thought (or sentence). To this already 
complete thought is appended a dependent clause that establishes a secondary role for 
human desires. Thus the structural arrangement o f the two components o f the definition 
conveys a slightly different message than that which one might read on the face o f it. The
16See for example, M.R. Wagner, etal. "Restoration Ecology” in Journal o f  Forestry (2000) 98(10):22-27: 
W. Cronon (ed.) Uncommon Ground; and, Guha, Cronon, Noss, Rolston, in J.B. Callicott (ed) The Great 
Veif Wilderness Debate ( 1998).
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establishment and maintenance o f ecological conditions appears to be on a par with 
("while") meeting people’s desires. However, because people’s desires and needs are cast 
(grammatically) as dependent upon ecological conditions, one could get the idea that 
desires are subordinate to ecology. This interpretation is bome out in both the USFS’ 
Strategic Plan 2000 and the planning regulations (see CFR §219.19, §219.20, and 
§219.21). In fact, the Bush administration is-challenging the regulations on precisely 
these grounds (elevating "natural” ecology above "human" ecology, if  you wall). I am not 
really interested in arguing the truth value o f this statement (whether people's desire are 
and should be subordinated), but only in pointing out how this construction treats health 
as a culturally independent condition— as if people's desires did not have some 
fundamental effect in defining health at the outset. The "objective" conditions appear to 
be the foreground, the prerequisite for meeting the "needs of people for desired" 
conditions: it is clear that these conditions are considered to be outside of, beyond, before, 
or other than culture and  that they are knowable and this knowledge itself is not cultural. 
By defining health in this way the FS establishes a schism that entails a dichotomous 
framew ork that effectively (or so it hopes) permits it to retain control o f the discourse of 
the objective conditions— the ecology— of the forest while simultaneously allowing for 
the inclusion of public discourses that express desires. By separating out forest conditions 
from public desires, and by retaining for itself (as we shall see) the power to define those 
conditions through a scientific discourse, the FS attempts to retain control o f the terms of 
forest management; desires are included and considered— not as essential qualities of
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health, but as adjuncts or qualifiers— , and must be pursued within the parameters o f 
ecological limits as established by science.
That people's desires are subordinate to and separate from forest health is not 
immediately obvious in the definition itself (despite the grammatical structure of the 
sentence), and is thus open to argument and interpretation. However, I believe that other 
FS literature supports this primacy and independence o f ecosystem or forest health— at 
least with respect to its own responsibilities and authorities. For example, as noted earlier 
in this paper. Goal 1 in the Forest Service’s Strategic Plan 2000— the plan that is ilthe 
keystone o f the FS management system, providing the context and purpose for [all future] 
agency actions"— is ecosystem health. The mission statement (again) is "to sustain the 
health, diversity, and productivity o f the nation's forests...." Goal 2 is to “provide a 
variety o f uses, values, products and services for present and future generations by 
managing within the capabilities o f  sustainable ecosystems" (USDA Forest Service 2000. 
iii): and later, "domestic and international activities are directed at developing values, 
products, and services in such a way as to maintain ecosystem health'1'' (USDA Forest 
Serv ice 2000. 4). The value o f each o f the four goals and each o f  the individual objectives 
is framed in terms o f its contribution to or impact on forest health (USDA Forest Service 
2000 . 11).
In another USFS document. The Committee o f  Scientists Report, the Committee states 
that sustainability is “the overarching objective o f National Forest stewardship"
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(Committee of Scientists (COS) 1998, xiv).17 It admits that sustainability can be difficult 
to define, but that it is composed o f interdependent ecological, economic, and social 
components (COS 1998. xiv). The Committee then goes on to clarify the relationship 
between the components: sustainability "calls for integrating the management of 
biological and ecological systems with their social and economic contexts, while 
acknowledging that management should not compromise the basic functioning o f  these 
system s' (my emphasis. COS 1998, xiv). And further, “ecological sustainability 
[maintaining the composition, structure, and processes of a system] lays a necessary 
foundation [is a “key goaf’ in fact] for national forests and grasslands to contribute to the 
economic and social components o f sustainability'’ (COS 1998, xvi). Management must 
"operate within a baseline level o f  ensuring the sustainability o f  ecological 
systems..."(COS 1998, xvi). Health and sustainability are not synonymous, but they are 
inextricably bound to one another in FS literature: forest (or ecosystem) health seems to 
be a prerequisite for sustainability and at the same time, health is one o f those things that 
we must sustain (see above). However, my point is neither dependent upon their 
coincidence, nor on the determination o f  whether ecology or people should come first; 
instead. 1 am only interested in pointing out that in both instances, ecological 
sustainability and/or forest health, each is considered to be a condition o f  the "out there ” 
that stands outside o f  beyond, and even over and against the needs and desires o f  people.
1 This Committee was convened in December o f ! 997 by the United States Department o f  Agriculture to 
‘provide the Secretary with scientific and technical recommendations on the FS land management planning 
process" (Society o f  American Foresters December 1998, web site). It consists o f  13 members from such 
disciplines as forest and range ecology, fish and wildlife biology, silviculture, hydrology, sociology, land 
management planning, and natural resources law.
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I interpret this deliberate juxtaposition to mean that forest health is not only not a function 
o f people's desires, but that it is also not an artifact o f culture or language. Since 1997, at 
least, the FS has been careful to maintain a distinction between the ecology o f forest 
health and the desires and needs o f people because in the end it believes that forest health 
(and/or ecological sustainability) is an objective condition that exists altogether 
independently o f the culture through which it is constructed and known.
This definition, like Leopold's, is also inherently conservative: a state o f health is one that 
is premised upon renewal, recovery, retention, and resiliency. In every instance, health is 
function o f going back, o f re production of its historical self in perpetuity: going forward 
into the future means returning to the past. Heaith, as we have seen, is almost invariably 
defined by historical (pre-European) conditions. This definition sanctions and validates 
the collection of data on historical conditions because if health is indeed understood as an 
ability to return to some preexisting historical state (which implies a sustainable cycle) 
then one must know what that state is in order to return health to it [like getting back on 
the rails o f a toy train set!]. This eternal return is reminiscent o f Hegelian conservatism in 
which knowledge, in search o f certainty and closure, turned back upon itself when 
confronted with the irreducible ignorance at its limits. Just as Hegel retreated to the safety 
and comfort o f a knowledge that always already contains not-knowledge, so forestry 
retreats to a definition o f  health that is self-referential, identical with itself—that consists
t S
largely in what is already known as (reconstructed) historical fact.
13 The choice o f  date may be arbitrary but it is not unmotivated or capricious. We choose this date because 
it is close enough for us to have some idea (not to say knowledge) o f  it and o f  the conditions that obtained.
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And finally, the definition o f health (#3) that appears in the glossary o f terms for EM on 
the USFS Headquarters web site offers some interesting contrasts: ”a measure o f the 
robustness o f forest ecosystems; soil, air, and water productivity; natural disturbances; 
and the capacity o f the forest to provide a sustaining flow o f goods and services for 
people." The first thing that pops out is that previously health was defined as a condition 
or a state, but here it is a measure. The next difference to leap out is that we have 
exchanged all the "re-’s” for '‘robustness.” According to Webster’s, robust comes from 
the Latin meaning oaken, hard, or strong. We no longer seem to be looking backward into 
history or pre-history for our health, but instead are looking for “strong and healthy; 
hardy: vigorous" forests (health is a measure o f the health o f a forest....!). Robust forests 
or ecosystems are “strongly or stoutly built.” they are “rich and full-bodied.” Then too. in 
what appears to be a radical departure, this definition normalizes “natural disturbances” 
making them a quality o f health itself rather than defining health as the capacity to 
recover from them (c/H olling (1992) and Holling, in Clark and Munn (1986)). This 
opens the door to normalizing insects, wildfires, weather “events,” geophysical “events.” 
and all sorts o f other hitherto “unhealthy” pathogenic critters and processes. And finally, 
the sentence structure (a series of grammatically equal clauses separated by semi-colons, 
joined by a final “and”) implies that all o f the listed “aspects” are o f equal value. What is 
missing, or at least left indeterminate, is an explicit statement o f how we might know (as
but far enough away that we cannot be absolutely certain o f  what it was and thus be held to unachievable 
standards. There is nothing wrong with selecting this date; just don't pretend that the forest o f  500 years 
ago is any more “healthy” or “representative” o f  “forest-ness” than the one 10,000 years ago or the one 
today. That is, the choice is based on preference, not on science or purely objective (in the sense of 
unmotivated) criteria.
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objective states) "diversity,” "productivity,” "capacity” "disturbances,” and "goods.”
Given the general commitment o f the Forest Service to objectivity and to science I might 
hazard a guess that these signifiers would be filled by interrogating not the human 
population, but the referent (the forest or the ecosystem). But I am mystified how one 
might classify a condition as productive or a population as diverse without first having 
decided upon a measure. Also, this definition makes things "for people” (i.e.. wants) an 
equal, not a subordinate part o f health. We are back to the pre-1997 definition (#1)!
This pre-l 997 definition is, it seems to me. a very interesting definition precisely because 
it defines (in the sense o f eliminates) very little. The only powerful qualifier or criteria is 
to be derived from the last clause: "the capacity of the forest to provide a sustaining flow 
of goods and services for people.” And this o f course is the crux o f the matter— this is 
where things depart from the "objective” and the scientific.
So. where is the FS on the subject o f forest health? We have looked at Leopold’s 
definition, as well as at a series o f  deeply conflicting definitions produced by the USFS. 
And indeed, we would have to agree with the authors o f the report with whom we began: 
forest health is an ambiguous term that changes over time and place. We seem to be stuck 
somewhere between health as an objective condition— a condition o f the (presumed) real 
that has nothing to do with culture or language or human categories o f  thought; health as 
a subjective state— a condition determined entirely by culture, by people’s desires stated 
in the form o f management objectives; and health as an ultimate norm, or even a moral
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good— Leopold's concept o f land health. We have the notion o f  health as a measure o f 
other things, and that o f health as a state or condition that makes other things possible. In 
some instances a healthy forest is one that looks like historic and pre-historic forests (the 
notion o f health as reflexive and reproductive, as identical with itself), in others it is 
associated with its capacity to perpetuate itself in some form into the future, and in 
another instance it has only to do with it's present “vigor."
The relationship between people’s needs and desires and forest health is also left 
indeterminate: Are they equal? Do needs and desires take precedence? Does forest health 
take precedence? I suppose the only thing we might venture to say about forest health is 
that neither we (the public) nor the FS seems to have a definitive, conclusive, stable idea 
of what it is. (It may be that the FS, like the medical community, is internally divided—  
between those who would have science rule (and objective health prevail) and those who 
want to keep the focus on human wants and needs. As o f now, neither side has “won.") In 
spite of this, as we shall see. the FS has gone on to identify a number of indicators o f 
health, developed measures for these indicators, and assigned a value to each measure all 
so that we might objectively determine the health o f a forest.
Unpacking each definition only reveals more ambiguity; behind each term there are more 
terms, each o f which is circulated in its own complex economy o f signs. It is not clear 
that looking toward the forest itself (if such a thing is even possible) will yield any greater 
clarity or definition because seeing anything at all depends upon our having previously
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determined sight categories. Then too, the assignment o f one term to an "observed” 
condition or an experience is (initially) an arbitrary choice, a choice that is then 
submitted, so to speak, to the society at large for confirmation. If the controversy over the 
FS' conception o f forest health and its interpretation o f the data is any indicator, a 
significant portion o f the public does not agree with how the FS has filled its signifier; it 
is unclear whether these people do not see the same things the FS does when it looks to 
the forest, or whether, having seen the same things, they do not interpret their meaning in 
the same way.
Bevond (or before) the definitions
Having inquired into definitions o f the objective (health) we have yet to see how the FS 
defines the object19 (the forest, or the ecosystem) that is supposed to be made healthy.
The FS' original "unit" of concern or focus was for the single resource, be it trees, or 
water quality, recreation opportunities, wildlife or fish. Regardless o f the particular 
object, it was generally treated as an isolated, decontextualized entity, state, or process; in 
other words, the concept was reified or treated as "real.” The FS dealt with parts, rather 
than wholes. The reductive approach worked well in terms o f simplifying things at the 
conceptual and modeling level; it was somewhat less successful at actually producing the 
array o f specific goods and services thus reductively identified; and so far, completely 
unsuccessful at producing/ reproducing/sustaining/restoring the more complex 
biophysical conditions and processes upon which the production or maintenance o f  goods
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and services was dependent. The FS has retreated from the single-resource approach to 
land and resource management, acknowledging that
the days have ended when the forest may be viewed only as trees and trees viewed 
only as timber. The soil and water, the grasses and the shrubs, the fish and 
wildlife, and the beauty that is the forest must become integral part o f resource 
managers' thinking and actions (Sen. Humphry 1976,122 Congressional Record 
3618-19).
The ecosystem concept now dominates forest management and it is the health o f the 
ecosystem (or the forest understood as an ecosystem as Sen. Humphry's points out) that is 
the focus. So what is an ecosystem?
The English ecologist Tanslev. the acknowledged progenitor of the term, said that an 
ecosystem includes "not only the organism-complex, but the whole complex o f physical 
factors forming what we call our environment" (Tanslev, 1935. in Kimmins 1987, 25). 
Odum proposed a more complex definition: "any unit that includes all the organisms (i.e., 
the community) in a given area interacting with the physical environment so (hat a flow  o f  
energy leads (o a clearly defined trophic structure, biotic diversity, and material cycles 
(i.e.. exchange o f  materials between living and non-living parts within the system) is an
191 am using “object” in a non-technicai sense: I mean only that it is the thing that we are looking into, the 
object o f our enquiry or o f  our activities (not as in goal, or as opposed to “subject”—just the “topic” o f  
concern, if  you will, or the thing toward which we are directing our attention.
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ecological system or an ecosystem"’ (emphasis added, Odum 1971, in Kimmins 1987, 26). 
The Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team defines an ecosystem as "a unit 
comprising interacting organisms considered together with their environment (e.g., 
marsh, watershed, and lake systems)” (Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team 
(FEMAT) 1993. IX-10). The authors o f Ecosystem Management: Principles and  
Applications define an ecosystem as “all the organisms in a given place interacting with 
their nonliving environment” (USDA FS/Everett 1994. 369). The USFS ' HQ wreb site 
"People's Glossary o f Ecosystem Management Terms” defines an ecosystem as "an 
arrangement o f living and non-living things and the forces that move among them. Living 
things include plants and animals. Non-living parts o f ecosystems may be rocks and 
minerals. Weather and wildfire are two of the forces that act within ecosystems" (USDA 
FS HQ 2001. www.fs.fed.us/land/emterms. html). With the exception o f O dum 's 
definition, which includes a very specific normative component that drastically narrows 
the list of "possible ecosystems." these definitions eliminate nothing. An ecosystem is 
everything, including one might say. the non-systematic. Ecosystem advocates are quick 
to point out that this concept also includes humans and human artifacts, such as cities or 
farms. One could even, if one wanted to add yet another layer o f complexity and push the 
concept to its logical extremes, include human symbolic or cultural systems. In other 
words, an ecosystem would not just be about spatial or physical phenomena or relations 
but also about conceptual and cognitive noumena and networks. But I will leave that 
aside for a moment.
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In light o f the FS’ reconceptualization o f  the unit o f  concern in forest management, it 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to identify any event, process, function, state, or 
entity o f any intensity, frequency, extent, or duration as unhealthy based upon some 
objective criteria of what a healthy ecosystem is. Any ecosystem, as it is, no matter what 
it is. is healthy by default i f  one is going to subscribe to the notion o f  an objective health 
that exists independently o f  human ideas o f  it. I say this, because ill-health is generally 
considered to be some deviation from a norm, to (as we shall see in the section on human 
health) indicate some departure from a predetermined “identity.” If the definition o f an 
ecosystem establishes no norm or identity-, no particular ontological qualities or 
characteristics, functions or structures, it becomes difficult to subsequently determine a 
"deviation" or "derangement” that might constitute a departure from "health.” An 
ecosystem thus defined provides no motive whatsoever to seek out data on historic or 
prehistoric conditions: there is no reason to look for "historic ranges o f  variability;” no 
reason to establish limits or baselines or trends; no indicators to identify; nothing to 
measure; indeed, no (objective) scale by which to assign a meaning or value to any 
measure taken. Unless, o f  course, one already has some specific (or perhaps only vague) 
idea of what one wants an ecosystem to do, be. or have; that is, unless the human 
component o f the ecosystem has an expectation. But that, o f course, is an altogether 
different thing.
But we will carry on. and do as the FS has apparently done and simply ignore the 
inconsistencies that are cropping up in the discourse on forest health, and see where we
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might get if we. 1) accept that forest health is an objective condition o f  the forest as 
seems to be strongly indicated (in different ways...) by the two present USFS definitions 
of it; 2) accept that an ecosystem is “a unit comprising interacting organisms considered 
together with their environment;” and 3) accept that human needs and desires do play a 
role in forest health, not at the level o f determining what it is but rather in determining 
how we will promote, use, or allow that health to be compromised in order to serve our 
own interests (Def. 2). These assumptions, which I think are not inconsistent with those 
made by the FS. lead to particular practices. The first is that the FS is overwhelmingly 
committed to a scientific exposition o f the objective condition o f  health—  scientists 
interrogate the referent, the forest, in search o f indicators, and the second is that in 
keeping with their "health as natural science" model, they tend to treat the public's 
contribution as "not-knowledge.” but as myth, opinion, or stories that bear little 
resemblance to the reality that foresters must deal with (except implementation 
strategies). In this category o f “public" I include those who may know forests or 
ecosystems in sometimes non-scientific or “other-scientific" ways (environmentalists, 
nature writers and historians, environmental philosophers and ethicists, loggers, miners, 
etc.). as well as those who deal not with forests but with knowledge itself, or with human 
systems like the economy, the culture or politics, with art or aesthetics, etc..
Because the present definition o f forest health is understood as an ecological or 
biophysical phenomenon. FS researchers head afield to “interrogate the referent” when it 
comes time to identify the sources o f disease and the criteria by which we might judge the
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status o f health. (Incidentally, this not-so-subtle-shift from a discursive focus on health to 
a practical search for disease occurs in medicine as w ell.. .it seems that it is easier to 
"identify" disease and derangement than to identify health.) The bulk o f USFS literature 
on forest health is devoted either to the exposition o f current conditions (generally agreed 
to be "unhealthy”) supported by lengthy, detailed evidentiary chains that purport to 
demonstrate the lack o f health (Science Report on Forest Health o f  the U.S., Colorado 
Forest Health Report, Blue Mountains Forest Health Report, California Forest Health,) ;  
to the development o f technical manuals designed to standardize the criteria, the research 
techniques, and the interpretation o f data (e.g.. Forest Health Monitoring: Field Methods 
Guide (National 1999)): or to the articulation of forest-health policy initiatives (Science 
Report on Forest Health o f  the U.S., USDA Strategic Plan (2000 Revision)). Almost 
without variation the discussion o f forest health is framed in terms o f fire, weather, 
animal damage, insects and diseases, and the field research is conducted with an objective 
"to determine the status, trend, and condition o f forest resources” with respect to these 
five criteria (USDA FS (Blue Mountains...) 1991, USDA FS /Dalel996). However, the 
definition o f an ecosystem gives us no objective grounds for naming any o f these 
phenomena as unhealthy; and even though the two USFS definitions o f forest/ecosystem 
health do provide some limited grounds (on the basis o f how fire, insects, etc. may affect 
resiliency, productivity, renewal, robustness, etc.) they cannot do so without the further 
addition or incorporation o f  explicit value judgements about what it means to be 
productive, resilient, robust, or renewed; and without the support o f an ecosystem 
"identity ." these value judgements will have to be acknowledged as referring to human
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constructs not "found” qualities o f ecosystems. Furthermore, the value o f the status, 
trend, and present condition is almost inevitably judged by reference to the past; the 
"benchmark” for the norm in all instances is “pre-European settlement.” Once again, the 
choice o f this particular point in (pre)history as the standard o f ecosystem health is not 
one that is necessitated by either the definition o f an ecosystem or that o f health.
One gets the sense that the criteria like the measures themselves are established by fiat; 
we are provided no sustained, in depth discussion o f the justification for their use nor 
offered any explanation of why or how these are essentially related to health, are signals 
thereof, or are healthy or unhealthy in and of themselves. To establish these connections, 
these explanatory and justificatory frameworks, one would need to go beyond science, to 
the realm o f narrative (Lyotard 1984). The Forest Service’s lack o f sustained enquiry into 
the choice o f these indicators becomes particularly poignant when we are told by these 
same researchers in these same publications that these same “diseases.” "catastrophic 
events.” and “dysfunctional processes” are also absolutely critical to maintaining forest 
health— or even are healthy them selves....( USDA FS 1991 Blue Mountains .... II-1: 
USDA FS 1998 Colorado Forest.... 22; USDA FS 1992 Forest Health...)). Nonetheless, 
research scientists proceed to measure biodiversity; the quality o f water, air. and soil; 
determine the presence or absence, decline or increase, frequency, intensity, duration, 
density, etc. o f organisms, chemicals, structures, interactions, or processes. Whenever 
possible, the scientists reconstruct as best they can the historical presence, intensity, and 
frequency o f each known phenomenon in the hopes o f establishing an historical range of
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variability by which to interpret the meaning o f present conditions. However, with the 
exception of fire which can be traced back quite far, the oldest records available on 
insects and diseases in the Blue Mountains o f the Pacific Northwest, for example, date to 
the 1870s and are considerably less than comprehensive (e.g., USDA FS 1991, 
throughout). We do not exactly have a “thick description” (in terms o f  scientific data) of 
the historical forest, much less o f the pre-historicai (before stories) or mythical (before 
written record) forest that would enable us to reconstruct a rich and complex picture upon 
which to base a judgement o f ecosystem health today vis a vis the past in the Western 
U.S..
The numbers indicate that researchers in forestry “do science." They don 't do 
anthropology or ethnography (except in the most limited way. as in the protection o f 
cultural artifacts), they don’t do philosophy or even ethics, they don’t do literary analysis. 
In keeping with the expanded, holistic notion o f an ecosystem and the commitment to an 
"interdisciplinary” approach to managing them. Forest Service offices are now staffed by 
an impressive array o f highly educated and very competent scientists and technicians in 
diverse fields: hvdrologists, geologists, silviculturists, economists, wildlife biologists 
and/or ecologists, botanists, ecosystem analysts, systems analysts, GIS technicians, fish 
biologists, foresters, endangered and threatened species specialists, pathologists, 
entomologists, fire specialists, water quality specialists, etc.. There is also the occasional 
sociologist (usually o f the social science persuasion), archeologist, and lawyer, along with 
public relations officers, recreation managers, and law enforcement personnel. The Blue
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Mountains Forest Health Report (1991) is compiled by a team of research specialists: a 
forest entomologist, forest pathologist, silviculturist, watershed specialist, ecologist, 
wildlife biologist, and a fire and fuels specialist. The Forest Ecosystem Management: An 
Ecological, Economic, and Social Assessment (1993) is compiled by over 600 scientists 
and technical experts from a variety of (...scientific) disciplines (this number includes 
support personnel). Of the 600. there were six named contributors who were not (which 
number varies depending on whether you believe economics and sociology to be sciences 
or humanities) scientists or technicians. (The FS, incidentally, counts sociology and 
economics as sciences, not as humanities, as we can see from the language o f the 
National Forest Management Act (see next paragraph).)
Even at the level o f policy and management, the commitment to science and scientific 
knowledge and the faith in the expertise and eminence o f scientists is evident. The 
Strategic Plan 2000 “includes consideration o f  science-based information from recent 
resource based assessments” along with ideas, suggestions and other information (USDA 
FS 2000). Goal 3 o f the Strategic Plan is to “develop and use the best scientific 
information available to deliver technical and community assistance and to support 
ecological, economic, and social sustainability (USDA FS 2000). The National Forest 
Management Act o f 1976 (16 USCA 1660(6)) calls for the “integrated consideration of 
physical, biological, economic, and other sciences'’ in developing and maintaining forest 
plans (NFMA 1976, 16 USC 1604(b)). A 1994 report entitled Ecosystem Management: 
Principles and Applications, was compiled by 113 scientists and offered a “scientific
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evaluation o f the effects o f Forest Service management practices” (USDA FS 1994, Vol.
I: Executive Summary, 1). Ecosystem management is “based on sound science” and 
adaptive management (“the proactive approach of the FS to restore and maintain healthy 
ecosystems") is a “science-driven management experiment” that “applies scientific 
principles and methods to improve resource management....as new scientific findings and 
social changes demand”(USDA FS 1994. Vol. II, 368; USDA FS/Dahms and Geils •
1997). In a statement praising the Science Report on Forest Ecosystem Health in the U.S.
(1997), Congressman Don Young (R-AK) says that it “marks the beginning o f a more 
scientific, fact-based approach to some serious forest problems.” This three-step approach 
requires "understanding the science" and “examining the science” (produced and 
validated by a "pre-eminent group o f forest scientists”) so that members o f  the 
Congressional committee can "develop fact-based forestry laws that use the best scientific 
information" (and indeed, this language is incorporated in the recently finalized Planning 
Rules o f the Code of Federal Regulations ...). The scientific approach not only provides 
“better information” but also reduces the chance that "emotionally-based rhetoric will 
form the basis o f our forest management laws.” Young aims “to move away from rhetoric 
and towards fact-based forestry laws that allow management to improve the 
environment." Young goes on to add that “management using scientific information, not 
opinion, not rhetoric, and not a special interest agenda is what our forestry law must 
encourage" and thanks the Speaker (Gingrich) for his “call...to  build a case for change 
based on sound, quality SCIENCE” (R. Don Young, Press Release/Statement, 12-13- 
96(7). in Press Packet). Congressman R. Smith (R-OR) praises the R eport’s authors and
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those who have come to testify in congressional hearings on its behalf, as "highly 
regarded forest scientists” and "highly credible forestry experts” whose “conclusions are 
powerful” (R. Smith, News Release in Press Packet, 4-9-97).
Thus we see that forest and ecosystem health are almost invariably cast in scientific 
(biological, chemical, ecological (narrowly construed)) terms. The FS appears to assume 
that biology and ecology, despite being logoi, are “a-cultural” and that even management 
and policy are understood as quasi-scientific and technical endeavors. Forestry schools 
offer science degrees and are invariably located in the science section o f the university 
system rather than the humanities* section. And finally, we note that the FS' use of 
science is not limited to interrogation of the referent; it is also the preferred methodology 
when attempting to gain some insight into people's needs and desires. Inquiries into 
social values and economic concerns tend to take a social science (recall NFM A's 
mandate) approach, rather than, say a qualitative ethnographic or anthropological, or even 
a philosophical or linguistic, approach. As ’’sciences,” economics and sociology take 
tastes and preferences as givens and therefore subject to disinterested investigation and 
quantification via surveys, items bought and sold, travel costs expended, and other 
"revealed” preferences. The information— to even be considered as information— must 
be o f the sort that can be formulated into quantifiable objectives (USDA FS/Everett 1994. 
11) and reduced or formalized into some sort o f a “data base” in which information is 
most often (though not always) presented in numerical form.
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In short, the invocation o f science and scientists is meant to reassure us that the FS is 
giving us "information,” hard data, facts, not rhetoric or opinion; and that furthermore, 
these scientists are disinterested and have knowledge, they are not victims o f emotions or 
interests that might lead them into error or into the realm of unsubstantiated myth. It is for 
this reason that the definition o f forest health (as a scientifically formulated goal) is so 
important to the agency and why ambiguity o f the definitions so severely deconstructs 
and undermines the agency’s self-promoted mythology as simply “doing good science.”
Concluding remarks
So. we have inquired into forestry’s object (the ecosystem), (one of) it's objective(s) 
(forest health), and the preferred method and theoretical framework (science) by which 
both object and objective might be known. And in doing so we have encountered 
unexpected difficulties. The object or focus o f concern, the ecosystem, the thing we want 
to be heaithy. appears to lack any sort o f  “identity” because its all inclusive nature 
normalizes (or "ecosystematizes") everything; it is not a “self-defining unit o f analysis”
(Binkley 1998. 31). Neither o f the definitions that the USFS uses provides objective 
grounds for assigning any particular value (health or disease) to any one state, process, 
function, organism, relationship, interaction, or assemblage. The concept o f ecosystem 
health then cannot be derived from the ecosystem itself—either as a concept or as a 
referent. Despite FS efforts to define it as an objective, biophysical phenomena (with an 
unclear a posteriori relationship to human needs and desires...), health may ultimately be 
an inherently and ineluctably subjective a priori judgment that is then read back onto or
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mapped out on the biophysical world, and continually reevaluated for validity' and 
consistency with our empirical observations, our experiences, and/or our ideas thereof. 
Thus, specific arrangements or relationships, patterns or processes, functions, states, 
trends, or conditions (resiliency, renewal, robustness, productivity, etc.) are defined not 
discovered as healthy. In an effort to ground these criteria in something other than mere 
human choice, we select some (pre)historic ecosystem (pre-settlement, not pre-Jurassic. 
for example) as our model ecosystem and say “that ecosystem is healthy, that is the 
measure, because it does. has. or is this or that and we like (for whatever reason) this or 
that."
This step, the move from description to prescription, the application o f value judgements 
is concealed by the FS definition and moved to what appears to be a later stage: first we 
(the scientists of the FS) will determine the (objective) state o f health o f the ecosystem by 
using science, and then you (the public) can tell us what you want and need.20 But if we 
agree that the FS definitions o f an ecosystem lead to no necessary specific conditions, and 
if we further agree, based on this, that a determination o f health involves value judgments 
at the very outset, then we must also rethink the role o f science. If an ecosystem is what 
the USFS says it is (and we suggested above that it might be even more complex and 
manifold) then science may not be the best (or at the very least, the only) tool for knowing 
it. Even the most committed scientists admit that science is ill-equipped to deal well with 
large complex wholes (by “whole" here I do not mean some mystical, prediscursive.
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essentialist, reified "One,” I mean in the sense o f everything, all the details in their 
infinite, heterogeneous multiplicity); its methods and theoretical frameworks are better 
suited to reduction, to analyzing isolated variables under controlled conditions. The 
whole point of reductionist science is to ignore all "accidents” o f time and place, to 
abstract from the situation, from the particularity o f actually existing phenomena, to find 
the laws that govern all o f (abstract) nature. But we don’t live in abstract, well-behaved, 
clearly defined "ecosystems;” we live in an infinitely varied, constantly becoming flux 
that escapes our words (our definitions) even as we speak them .
And finally, if we accept the suggestion that the FS' attempt to define health by reference 
to an "objective" biophysical "real” conceals implicit value-judgements. we will also 
have to admit that the role o f science is somewhat different. Again, by its own contention, 
the realm o f science is the realm o f what is. not the realm o f what should be; as a 
normative declaration, ecosystem "health” is a prescriptive, not a descriptive concept, and 
it is not necessarily grounded in any one biophysical condition (there is no obligatory 
connection between sign and referent). Note too, that the problem is even more complex: 
the determination o f "what is”— the establishment o f something as something, as being—  
is ultimately grounded in linguistics: something doesn't exist until we say/think it does. 
And further, remember that science itself is inescapably linguistic, and is subject to the
;o The FS is not alone in its efforts to overcome the fact-value distinction: both J. B. Callicott and late E. O. 
Wilson (cf Consilience) struggle with and purport to make this same move without resorting to human
values.
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same sons o f ambiguities that any other discursive practice is . '1 Science, in all its 
variations and permutations, does and will continue to play a critical role in framing both 
the ecosystem concept and the forest health discourse. There is no question of not using 
science; rather, the more pressing questions are which (and whose) sciences do we use, 
what are their limits, and how can we make up for those by accessing other knowledge 
frameworks.
Kierkegaard might argue, that ecosystems, like humans and like life itself, consist in the 
accidents, the details, the contradictions, the situation, the myriad ever-changing 
particulars o f lived existence, many of which are not "law” abiding. If one abstracts from 
the heterogeneous multiplicity o f the situation, one abstracts from life itself. Flannery 
O 'Connor once said o f fiction, o f stories, that
When you can state the theme of a story, when you can separate it from the story 
itself, then you can be sure the story is not a very good one. The meaning o f a 
story has to be embodied in it. has to be made concrete in it. A story is a way to 
say something that can 't be said any other way, and it takes every word in the 
story to say what the meaning is. You tell a story because a statement would be 
inadequate. ... The meaning o f fiction is not abstract meaning but experienced 
m eaning,... (O'Connor. 147).
■' I would not go so far as Latour and Woolgar do in their highly controversial book Laboratory Life: The 
Social Construction o f  Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills, 1979) to say that science is nothing other than a 
power struggle with no reference to the outside world, but rather that it is a culturally determined practice, 
and a language, that is designed to help us make sense o f  what is out there.
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A judgement o f health— for both humans and for ecosystems—  will depend very much 
on all the particulars o f the circumstances, it depends as much on the past and the present 
as on what we expect o f ourselves or that ecosystem in the future. To tell the whole story, 
we have to keep all the parts. In Chapter Four, we will look at how changing conceptions 
of human identity have lead to changes in what it means to be healthy, and how these 
have in turn, affected medical practice and theory. In Chapter Five, we will revisit the 
forest health debate armed with knowledge gleaned from our examination o f the human 
health debate.
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Chapter Four 
Medicine
Thank god most o f  (hem get better on their own...!
-Overheard in the doctor's lounge
Medicine, and by association, human health and disease, is currently considered to be the 
domain o f physicians and other health professionals trained in scientific methodology and 
in the techniques o f bioscience (Cassell 1997). The hegemony o f the “biomedical" model 
of health is not a long standing tradition— it dates from about 200 years ago to the advent 
o f modem medicine and the professionalization of physicians and health care workers 
(see Foucault's The Birth o f  the Clinic. Cassell's Doctoring, Porter’s Health,
Civilization, and the State)— but it has been and continues to be the dominant force in the 
determination o f what it means to be healthy and in the character o f health care. Today 
the biomedical model o f health (and along with it. physician authority as the sole arbiter 
o f health ) is being challenged by Health Maintenance Organizations, hospital bureaucrats 
and administrators, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, and government 
agencies. For the most part, these organizations and institutions challenge only the 
exclusivity of the physicians' control o f diagnosis and patient care, not the structures of 
knowledge on which that control is predicated or the concept o f  health that it reifies. 
Perhaps the most formidable challenges to both physician authority and the dominance o f 
medical science in health care, however, are coming from two unlikely sources: patients 
and physicians themselves. Patients are questioning the categories p f thought by which
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physicians and the modem medical community as a whole construct disease and health, 
and formulate options for treatment— treatments that tend most often to address the 
disease (as a biological entity or process) not the illness (the disease as it manifests itself 
in situ, in the person) (Wright 1982, Engel 1979, Cassell 1997). That is, patients (or more 
generally, the public) are questioning the institutionalization o f the disease-oriented 
ideology o f modem biomedicine to the exclusion o f other experientially derived 
narratives o f health and illness. As we shall see, physicians too, increasingly dissatisfied 
with the objectivity requirements and technical nature o f  their profession and the 
limitations that it imposes, are also seeking alternative conceptual models that permit o f a 
wider range o f patient-physician interactions (e.g., more person directed relationships), 
diagnostic techniques (e.g.. the incorporation o f patient narratives, for example, in 
explaining etiology and vectors of disease), and treatment options (e.g.. exploring 
palliative care options as opposed to focussing on "cures'’ that treat "derangements o f 
biological function"). What we discover upon closer examination, is that at bottom, our 
ideas of health and illness are intimately tied to our ideas o f ourselves; that is, to our 
identity (Could it be that our notions o f forest health are also tied up with our identity?).
The praxis of modem western medicine has generated dozens o f sophisticated "meta­
medical" discourses in philosophy, sociology, history, anthropology, ethics, business, 
politics, geography, biology, economics, and law. The motive for developing these meta­
discourses is the premise that the concept o f health (especially as it is being reinterpreted 
in today's society), and the related ones o f disease and illness, have buried within them
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legal, biological, aesthetic, social, political, philosophical, historical, psychological, 
economic, and moral assumptions that are more or less problematic in contemporary 
culture. Perhaps the most telling example o f the multi-faceted nature o f “health” is the 
World Health Organization’s definition in which health is defined as “a state o f complete 
physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence o f disease or 
infirmity" (WHO 1976 ). Contrast this with the president o f the American Association of 
Physicians plea for a very narrow understanding o f medicine’s boundaries, and by 
association, for a very narrow understanding of health and illness in the medical model: 
"the central goal o f medicine may be defined as the relief of pain, the prevention of 
disability, and the postponement o f death by the application o f the theoretical knowledge 
incorporated in medical science to individual patients” (Seldin (JAMA), in Henderson 
1997. 251). And further, illness and disease are to be viewed only as “deranged 
biomedical function.” while “health is not synonymous with happiness or tranquility or a 
noble life or citizenship”—  all the things that the WHO definition seems to imply that it 
is (Seldin in Henderson 1997, 251, 252). Curiously, while Seldin is quick to define the 
parameters o f medicine and those o f disease, he refuses to offer a positive definition of 
health. As we shall see, he does not disagree with the W HO's definition o f health, but 
instead argues that the only aspects o f health with which medicine should be concerned 
are disease and infirmity, both o f which he understands as strictly biophysical conditions. 
These two radically opposed definitions capture the essence o f  the debate over health, and 
health care, in late twentieth-century America. They represent what Will Wright in The 
Social Logic o f  Health terms the basic dilemma between whether “health is a concept
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that can be defined objectively and technically by medical scientists or whether it is a 
concept that refers finally and decisively to a quality o f human experience that cannot be 
reduced to physiological processes” (Wright 1982, 12). Each formulation leads to entirely 
different sorts o f knowledges and practices. And as we shall see, understandings of 
human health are neither unambiguous nor uncontested; even when we do try to stick 
with the narrower biomedical model proposed by Seldin the ambiguity inherent in the 
terms themselves fosters internal contradictions and prevents complete control.
I will first examine the biophysical model o f health and its use o f  the ‘‘conceptual 
framework and tools o f biomedical science” (Seldin 1997. 251). This is the "medicine as 
a natural science" approach to health, disease, and health care or "health management.” I 
will then lay out the alternative "biopsvchosocial” (Engel 1979. Cassell 1997) model o f 
health and of health care. Generally, this is the “medicine as social science” (note that 
biology is included, but it's sociocultural roots or commitments are examined and 
questioned) approach to health and health care.22 Again, as with the forest health debate, I 
will examine how the different definitions o f health lead to potential contradictions, how 
these definitions support or necessitate the use o f particular types o f knowledge—  
among them science, and how the different understandings o f  health affect and/or are 
affected by how we identify ourselves as selves. Thus, once again, I will look at the object
:: Social science as it is used here includes research done using a quantitative approach that favors surveys, 
but incorporates a stronger qualitative component that favors ethnographic and anthropological approaches 
that produce thick descriptions in the form o f  narratives. In other words, many o f  the social science 
methodologies used in medical sociology tend toward those used in the humanities. One could say. then, 
that science in this instance is interpreted somewhat along the lines o f  its “original” Latin sense o f  “to 
know" by whatever method knowledge might be produced.
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(be it body or person), the objective (health), and the knowledge framework(s) within 
which we produce and reproduce both object and objective.
Medicine as natural science/Health as a biological condition
Within medicine there is a bifurcation between physicians who see themselves "narrowly 
as biomedical scientists” and physicians who see “the social problems o f their community 
as part o f the legitimate scope o f their medical practice” (Henderson et al. 1997. 244). In 
his presidential address to the American Association o f Physicians in 1981, Donald W. 
Seldin makes the case for the biological definition o f health and a concomitant narrowing 
o f the duties o f physicians in accordance with this definition. As noted above, Seldin 
argues that medicine is— or should be—  a very narrow discipline whose goals are "the 
relief o f pain, the prevention o f disability, and the postponement o f death by the 
application o f the theoretical knowledge incorporated in medical science to the individual 
patient" (Seldin in Henderson et al. 1997, 245). Seldin's stated intent is to forge a link 
between medicine and the biomedical sciences in order that “basic sciences ... such as 
biochemistry, physiology, cell biology are seen to furnish the theoretical framework of 
clinical medicine” (Seldin, 251). His goal is not only to achieve a higher level o f certainty 
when it comes to diagnosing and treating biophysical illnesses, but also— and perhaps 
most importantly—  to remove medicine once and for all from the dangerous realm o f 
social engineering. (He cites the use o f medicine—  medical knowledge and physician 
authority— by the Nazi regime in the service o f  racial cleansing as the most profound 
example o f what happens when medicine ventures beyond the bounds o f the strictly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
scientific into the realm o f politics and culture.) To Seldin, and for the many others who 
agree with him, a retreat to objective science offers the only secure, defensible footing for 
medical practice (Seldin in Henderson 1997; Cassell 1997). Ironically, for all his 
insistence upon medicine as a scientific enterprise, he admits (without further elaboration 
on his meaning) that medicine is a “comparatively weak scientific discipline”—  but one 
whose "powerful instrumentality” is conclusively demonstrated in the successful 
"mitigation o f biomedical derangements” (e.g., pain, disability, and premature death) 
(Seldin. 245). The success o f medicine then, is wholly dependent upon a very narrow 
construal of health that effectively limits its application (and thus its criteria o f success or 
failure) to biologic malfunction. Or, even if one wants to define health more broadly, as 
does the WHO. then the only "pertinent question” for the physician is which aspects of 
this more complex notion o f health fall under the purview o f medicine as a science 
(Seldin. 252).
Seldin and others who subscribe to this narrower view o f m edicine's function and o f its 
role in achieving health, do not like the World Health Organization’s definition o f health 
because it includes the possibility that everything from “personal maladjustments to 
social conflicts" will suddenly fall under the purview o f medicine. Physicians will be 
forced to consider not only the biophysical factors, but also the social, political, 
economic, and cultural institutions and relations that affect or potentially affect a person’s 
physical and mental health (Seldin. 252). This broad definition, Seldin argues— an 
argument echoed by many others, including Foucault, (cf Madness and Civilization, The
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Birth o f  the Clinic. Foucault, Health, and Medicine)— has the effect o f making everything 
a matter o f health, and thus by extension, every aspect o f human existence becomes a 
medical matter, and every social aberration or political deviation a pretext for medical 
intervention. This phenomenon is what some have called the “medicalization” of 
everyday life (Ben-Sira 1988, Shuval 1992, Seldin 1997, Wright 1982, Henderson et al. 
1997, Cassell 1997). Those who advocate a strict biophysical interpretation o f health, 
who limit scientific medicine’s application to the relief o f pain, the prevention of 
disability, and the postponement o f death— to biomedical derangements— fear that if 
health is defined too broadly, then medicine will have too great an access to areas of life 
that are best left to legislators, judges, educators, psychologists, priests, and parents. 
Simply put. for the supporters o f medicine as a natural science and health as a biophysical 
phenomena, beyond the narrow bounds o f biology (which is itself highly complex), 
medicine and physicians are out their depths. Any attempt to "medicalize" those aspects 
o f human experience that fall beyond biology (giving due notice to those who would 
argue that there is nothing that is not explainable by biology...) tends to result in an 
“enormous hypertrophy o f personnel and facilities, massive financial expenditures, and 
... frustration and disillusionment when medical intervention fails to eventuate in 
tranquility, quiescence, and happiness (Seldin, 245). For Seldin the only purview of a 
properly scientific medicine is the narrowly biophysical; these other aspects o f health—  
the social, economic, political, cultural, mental, etc.— even one might say, health itself, 
do not fall under the auspices o f biomedical science and must be dealt with by other 
conceptual frameworks, institutions, and practices.
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There is considerable merit in Seldin’s argument and the subtleties o f his concerns are 
not really in conflict with the WHO’s definition. He is committed to the project o f 
scientific medicine, and he is aware that his science works best when applied to clearly 
identified and well delimited, isolated things or conditions that have already been defined 
by other discourses or cultural traditions as derangements or dysfunctions. He pointedly 
refuses to ally medicine with the pursuit o f health, and instead is clear that the goal o f 
medicine is to treat only what appear to be objectively identifiable ’‘deranged” conditions 
with clear and unambiguous biological causes or roots. Medicine, as a science, can and 
should deal only with those biophysical things that it can clearly and unambiguously 
identify and define: those things that it can see and quantify: that it can manipulate and 
test repeatedly in controlled clinical or laboratory settings (Balshem in Henderson et al. 
1997. 39. and Cassell 1997). According to this view, the practice o f  medicine, when 
applied to patients must limit its interventions to alleviating pain .preventing  disability, 
and postponing death— but only insofar as these are biophysical conditions that have been 
identified by the patient and the cultural milieu as undesirable: and then, only in so far as 
they are manifested in the body. Naturally, despite even this very narrow 
conceptualization o f the role o f medicine and the physician, there is considerable 
disagreement about exactly what may or may not be done in pursuit o f these seemingly 
incontestable goals. The bottom line is that there may in fact be more to human health 
than biology. Seldin is silent on this point. But if there are, then those things are beyond 
the purview of medical science and beyond the expertise o f physicians.
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The whole point o f a narrow biophysical definition o f disease (and perhaps by silent 
association, health) is to carve out some sort of a territory within which the knowledge 
and the techniques o f medical science can be effective, and in which professional health 
care workers can enjoy a sense o f expertise and the prestige that comes along with it—  
not necessarily to produce all-round healthy people (Ben-Sira 1988, 1, Seldin in 
Henderson et al. 1997. 251-2). Under ideal circumstances, modem Western medicine 
would thus focus exclusively on the body, as separate from the person, and concentrate on 
mapping its individual functions and structures. Medicine, as biomedicine, would confine 
itself to a search for the ultimate chemical and biophysical— bacteria, viruses, genetic 
variations, injury, etc.— causes o f both health and disease, and would then develop 
material or technical treatments that address that particular organic metabolic or structural 
"derangement." It would be up to society to determine what health was. what disease was. 
and what treatments would be acceptable. For the moment, we will accept the narrow 
"objective" scientific approach to health— or more precisely, to disease, and see how 
medical science fares within these narrow confines. (As mentioned above in the 
discussion on forest health, almost invariably the discourse on health gives way to a 
discussion o f diseases or deviations from the norm. It may be because health is simply too 
ambiguous to "operationalize." We find it easier to speak of deviations from the norm 
than to define the norm.)
Even within the parameters o f  this very narrow understanding of disease— as some sort of 
biophysical or biochemical derangement— science has considerable difficulty establishing
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with complete certainty the etiology o f an embodied disease. Isolated microorganisms in 
controlled laboratory conditions behave well and predictably. Embodied things—  
microorganisms in bodies—  don’t. In his book How Scientists Explain Disease 
(1999)Paul Thagard chronicles the somewhat serendipitous discovery of an apparent 
correlation between the presence o f a bacteria (Helicobacter pylori) and ulcers. His object 
is to use the H. pylori case study to examine how science is used to change the beliefs of 
medical practitioners about diseases and their causes, but his account also offers some 
insight into the limitations o f science and the apparently unavoidable presence o f 
uncertainty when we are speaking o f  large complex organisms with limitless interactions. 
The discovery o f the correlation between H. pylori and some ulcers is significant because 
for decades ulcers were assumed to be caused solely by psychosocial factors such as 
stress or anxiety that produced chemical changes in the stomach which in turn caused the 
eruption o f ulcers. In the absence o f  any definitive evidence o f a biophysical material 
cause, clinicians were forced to locate the ultimate causes o f most types o f ulcers in 
psychological or environmental, i.e.. non-medical, factors. Biomedicine’s treatment o f 
ulcers was thus limited to mitigating the symptoms and suggesting lifestyle changes 
Thagard's account of how the connection was discovered, how the hypothesis was (not 
always successfully) tested and retested under both laboratory conditions and in clinical 
trials illuminates both the strengths and weaknesses o f the biophysical model o f disease 
(the theory that a biological entity or function can fully and exhaustively explain the 
presence o f illness or disease in persons). Early on it became clear to the researchers that 
there is not a necessary direct correlation between ulcers and the bacteria. The bacteria are
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not present in all cases o f ulceration; nor are ulcers always present when the bacteria are.
In other words, not all people that have the bacteria have ulcers and not all people that 
have ulcers have the bacteria. To further complicate matters, differing levels o f  bacterial 
"infection" do not correspond to different “ intensities” of ulceration. Moreover, treating 
the bacteria does not guarantee that either the bacteria or the ulcers will disappear, even 
though under controlled laboratory conditions, the bacteria does disappear when treated 
with appropriate antibiotics. And in some cases, the bacteria continue to reappear even 
after they have been eradicated. In the end, researchers have managed to persuade the 
medical community that there is a correlation between some ulcers and H. pylori, and that 
in some instances, eradicating the bacteria will indeed eradicate the ulcers, but neither 
physicians nor researchers can speak with absolute certainty on a cause-effect 
relationships between the bacteria and the disease. In this case, science has shed light 
upon yet another vector o f disease (bacteria as a potential, sometime, cause (used 
loosely) of some ulcers...) without necessarily increasing our level o f certainty or 
contributing to an increase in the health o f the person.
Similarly, because available technology permits us to visualize previously mvisible things 
we tend to believe that if  a certain microorganism (a pathogen) or condition 
(pathophysiology or pathoanoatomy) is present, a disease will also be present. But in his 
influential and provocative book Doctoring (1997), Eric J. Cassell, a practicing physician 
and Clinical Professor o f Public Health at Cornell University, presents evidence to the 
effect that, for example, the presence o f  blocked coronary arteries (atherosclerosis) does
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not necessarily mean that the person has coronary heart disease. As in the case of H. 
pylori, there is an observed correlation between the presence o f the one and the onset of 
the other, but blockages in and o f themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
account for disease. Furthermore, a patient who tests positive (based upon previously 
determined criteria) for blocked arteries but who is otherwise asymptomatic, who then 
undergoes various interventions and/or medical procedures (like angioplasty) to reduce 
the blockages, does "no better than patients who are not so treated.” From this Cassell 
concludes that there is "no good evidence that the outcome o f this chain o f events makes 
a positive difference in the life o f . . .  the patient” who underwent the procedure (Cassell 
1999. 68). Cassell is making several points here, one o f which is about the nature o f the 
relationship between medical technology and the practice o f medicine, but one of which 
is that the "relationship between what is considered good and bad in the test results and 
what is best for the patient is, at the very least, obscure, and at the worst, just plain 
wrong" (Cassell 1999, 68). One cannot infer from the empirically observed presence o f 
an organism (previously agreed upon as pathological) or from a structure or process or 
condition (also previously defined as abnormal or deviant) that a person -o r  even his or 
her body— is ill or unhealthy.
Medical literature is full o f case studies o f "the exceptions" to the rule, those patients in 
whom diseases (as objective entities) fail to manifest themselves in expected ways or who 
manifest biophysical symptoms with absolutely no identifiable biological cause or whose 
conditions respond in unexpected ways to conventional treatments. (It is worth restating
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that there is a “rule,” that many people do respond as expected to therapies and 
treatments, and are “healthier” as a result.) A patient complains of pain or o f experiencing 
certain symptoms, but neither the doctor nor the most sensitive diagnostic technology is 
able to detect a material condition that can account for the pain or the symptoms. Because 
no underlying biological condition can be detected (that is, the “tests come back 
negative") the patient is assured that there is nothing wrong. Similarly, there are instances 
in which coronary heart disease exists (the “tests come back positive”), but no underlying 
material cause— such as blocked arteries— can be found (Cassell 1999, 69-71). Cassell 
cites the case o f a diabetic who exhibits not only every single sign o f diabetes, but a host 
of other physical "derangements” that have nothing to do with the diabetes and for which 
the only cure seems to be her work (Cassell 1999. 53-4 ). The mechanisms of disease in 
humans tend to defy quantification and reduction; we don 't live life by the numbers that 
medical science assures us are indicators o f normal functioning. The precision and 
sensitiv ity o f our technology is such that it permits us to glimpse things we never saw- 
before. but we are not yet sure o f the significance o f our observations: we don 't know 
what these things mean. We can now detect, for example, an “abnormal” developmental 
condition in horses called osteochondrosis (OCD). Its discovery caused a ruckus. 
Suddenly every yearling had to be tested for this “defect.” Those found to possess it were 
immediately deemed unsaleable, doomed no doubt to chronic lameness. The forecasted 
mass lameness has not materialized. It seems that our technology outstripped our 
knowledge; we have no idea how to interpret this sign, how to fill the signifier (or more 
properly, what meaning to attach to the sign). For all we know, the “abnormality” is
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something that has always been there. That is, it may be “normal.” The attempt to explain 
the presence or absence o f health or disease in the human body (leaving aside for a 
moment the human being) by recourse only to the presence or absence o f particular 
microorganisms, genetic sequences, conditions, or structures has met brilliant, if  limited 
success. Think o f such diseases or conditions as post-traumatic stress syndrome, chronic 
fatigue syndrome, for which no apparent biological or chemical cause can be found. The 
strict bioscientification o f health and disease (or conversely, the medicalization of 
everyday life) is defied by the sheer number o f biological and non-biological contributing 
factors and the complexity o f the interrelationships between these factors that constrain 
and determine the possibility o f any one particular biophysical condition manifesting 
itself in some given, predetermined wholly predictable way in any one unique body. If we 
cannot hope for absolute success in applying scientific methodology to the benefit of 
something as well delineated and overly researched as the human body, one wonders 
what hope we might have of using that science to the benefit o f infinitely complex 
ecosystems composed o f  a countless numbers o f such bodies each occurring in a 
particular circumstance— the nexus o f countless biotic and abiotic relations in time and 
space.
We can assent, for the most part, to the marvels o f medical science at the close o f the 
tw entieth century. But if  patient dissatisfaction, declining physician morale, and the 
accounts o f medical ethicists, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists are to be given 
credence, we might be less optimistic o f  medical sciences' contributions to improvements
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in human health as a quality o f life or its ability to deal with the person as a whole. It is 
not even clear that it has done a good job o f alleviating pain, preventing disability, and 
postponing death— or that these things are unqualified goods to be pursued at all costs 
(Bill M oyer's Living With Dying, PBS, aired in Phoenix on 2-4-01). For all o f medical 
sciences' attempts to pretend otherwise, diseases, disabilities, pain, death— in short, 
biophysical derangements— are not objectively occurring phenomena, “objects that have 
somehow entered the body and made the person sick” (Cassell 1997, 85)'.
Microorganisms behave predictably in controlled laboratory conditions; they behave 
unexpectedly when introduced into living systems— that is, when in situ (one might speak 
here of "ecological validity”). A disability for one body (the loss o f a pinkie finger for a 
concert pianist) is not necessarily a disability for another (the loss o f the same digit for a 
longshoreman). And this doesn’t even begin to take into account the meaning of this 
"disability" for the person. Unfortunately for medical science, diseases are only diseases, 
disabilities disabilities, and pain pain when they are manifested in a living organism or 
system. Beyond the confines o f the human body, the small pox virus becomes an 
endangered species, not a disease. Physicians don’t treat disembodied diseases; they treat 
individual humans in whom biophysical conditions that we call diseases manifest 
themselves in unexpected ways and with differing consequences (Cassell 1999, 24). 
Uncertainty in medicine, like uncertainty in land management, is not simply a matter o f a 
lack o f knowledge, either at the personal level on the part o f the individual physician, or 
at the professional level on the part o f the whole medical field or discourse. Improving 
medicine, increasing survival rates or longevity are not simply matters o f improving or
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increasing scientific knowledge (see McKeown cite below). We are not unhealthy and we 
don 't die just because we lack good, scientific knowledge and advanced technology. The 
science o f medicine can and should continue to concern itself with the molecular 
biological causes of disease and to search for treatments at the molecular biological level 
(as well as at the macro level!); but the practice of medicine deals not with “objective” 
diseases or states o f health but with healthy or ill persons who constitute or construct 
themselves, their health and their diseases in non-scientific ways.
Thus, even in dealing with one fairly well-delimited biological organism (which is not the 
same as saying “person”) with which we are intimately familiar, we are unable to speak 
with absolute certainty on the precise nature o f the biological components o f either health 
or even the much smaller category' o f  disease. We have spent billions upon billions of 
dollars and hours, days, years, lifetimes beyond count on investigating and articulating the 
biology of human health and disease; i.e.. on collecting data. The financial, political, 
social, ethical, philosophical, scientific, technological, and intellectual resources brought 
to bear on the problems of human health far exceed those which have been or can be 
applied to the study of any other organism, much less to a community o f them. In the 
West, we have committed ourselves to the scientific model o f disease and medicine for 
nearly 200 years and this course o f study has yielded wondrous insights into molecular 
biology that have contributed to astounding technical successes in medicine. But as many 
historians o f medicine point out the success is limited, and the great advancements in 
scientific knowledge and in technology have not contributed substantially to increases in
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longevity (some estimates put it at five additional years), to the reduction o f pain and 
suffering (cf. Bill Moyer's PBS special on Living with Dying, Death and Dying, and 
Cassell's Doctoring for narrative accounts of how the medical community seems unable 
to deal effectively with pain and suffering) or to an increase in the quality o f .ife (there 
are studies that indicate that most increases in the quality o f life and decreases in the 
incidence o f epidemics are attributable to changes in social, economic, and political 
organizations rather than to advances in medical science) (McKeown et al 1975: Bunker 
et al. in Wilkinson 1993. 30-31; Mackenbach et al. 1990 in Wilkinson 1993. 31).23 Let 
me be precise here: historians, sociologists and physicians are not saying that scientific 
medicine has been of no value whatsoever. It has changed the lives o f  millions o f people, 
often, though not always, for the better: it has produced therapies that can alleviate pain: 
it has engineered procedures that prevent or at least minimize disability; and it has (not 
always happily) postponed death. What they are saying, however, is that neither the depth 
of knowledge acquired in molecular biology nor the advancements in medical technology 
correlate directly to equal advancements in human health. Many scientific advancements 
seem to create as many problems as solutions (Australian scientists in search of a way to 
control rat fertility through genetic manipulation inadvertently created a virus that totally
McKeown et al (1975) present evidence to the effect that modem medical science played only a minor 
role in the dramatic decline o f  death rates (from infectious diseases) since the last century if for no other 
reason than that immunizations were not yet developed or widely used. However, just because "medical 
science cannot explain most o f  the decline in mortality from the infections is not o f  course evidence that 
medical science is ineffective. ... estimates o f  the current contribution o f  modem medical care to the growth 
of life expectancy in the developed world do not suggest that it can explain very much o f  the continuing 
increase in life expectancy’’ In fact, the “most generous recent estimate...suggests that the whole modem  
medical effort adds no more than about five years’ difference to modem life expectancy (Bunker et al. in 
Wilkinson. 30-31). Wilkinson and others conclude that the social and economic determinants o f  health and 
mortality remain substantially more powerful (Mackenbach et al. 1990 in Wilkinson, 31).
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compromises the rats' immune systems; bypass surgery, one o f the crown jewels o f 
modem medicine, appears to have a strong correlation to substantially decreased 
cognitive functions in post-operative patients; chemotherapy is sometimes successful in 
slowing or stopping the advance o f cancer and other diseases, but almost invariably the 
quality' o f the person's life is radically reduced, etc.). Achieving health in the human body 
(or even just treating "biophysical malfunctions” as Seldin and other medical bioscientists 
would have us do) is not just a matter o f gathering more data or developing more 
sophisticated technologies. Every time we push back the frontiers o f ignorance at the 
molecular level, we add yet another level o f complexity at the macro or experienced level 
of health or illness; in many ways. then, science and scientific knowledge adds to 
uncertainty rather than reducing it. As the old adage cautions us. in an age o f  ever- 
increasing specialization, we know ever more about ever less until we eventually know 
everything there is to know about nothing at all. At some point one has to be able to put 
all the minutiae back together again and make a decision about what to do based on the 
bigger picture (the person)— a picture which is always incomplete and always changing.
At this point, it is important to point out three additional things. First. Seldin leaves his 
key concepts— pain, disability, death— undefined and unexamined. By way of 
clarification, he offers us the terms "biomedical derangement” (or "disturbance”), and” 
biophysical malfunction.” but they too are left unexamined and undefined. We are left, 
possibly intentionally, with the impression that their meanings are clear, their objectivity 
firmly established, and their acceptability as basic criteria o f (or as contributors to or
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inhibitors of) health unproblematic and uncontested. The impression is that these are 
scientifically verifiable conditions, or at least objective conditions to which scientific 
criteria and methods can be applied, that carry with them no hint o f normativity or 
subjectivity that would force medical science to retreat from its objectivity. This seems to 
me a huge lapse. Each term signifies a departure from some previous, presumably normal 
condition that is defined as good, or at least as not-bad, since we seek to prevent, 
postpone, and alleviate the deviations and to restore the body to its former conditions. 
Generally, we would probably all agree that having no pain is better than having pain, 
having an able-body is better than having a disability, being alive better than being dead, 
being biophysically functional or undisturbed better than its opposite. But in what 
precisely does "malfunction” consist? What is a "disturbance” and who gets to define it? 
At what point is death actually more desirable than life at any cost? And what constitutes 
"life” or "living”? What are the costs o f pain reduction (decreased cognitive function, 
limited mobility, etc.)? What exactly is a "disability”? None of these questions is 
answerable by recourse to science. Thus, the scientific model o f disease conceals a wealth 
of value judgements and is in fact premised upon non-scientific norms that will sooner or 
later require examination because their meanings and desirability will be contested. 
Second. Seldin and other biomedical scientists (like foresters and natural scientists) 
proceed as if  science itself were not a cultural phenomena. They are quick to distance 
themselves from definitions o f health that carry too much cultural baggage, but seem 
unaware that their conceptual framework itself, along with the tendency to value it above 
all others, arises out o f this same cultural environment. And finally, it is clear that even if
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we assent (with reservations) to a strictly biological interpretation o f “biophysical 
derangements.” (disease, disability, death, etc.) we are still left without an account of 
human health, scientific or otherwise, and with no way to explain physical manifestations 
of''psychosom atic'’ illnesses or diseases. And if we additionally assent to Seldin’s and 
other's claim that medicine is a narrow scientific discipline that is ill-equipped to deal 
with the larger issue of health, then we will also have to search elsewhere for a conceptual 
framework in which to understand health and another practice by which to achieve it. It 
would appear that if our enquiry is into health, then we must look elsewhere than medical 
science, perhaps to other social and cultural frameworks and activities in which both the 
body and the person are embedded and from which they derive their identity.
The social economy of health
Even as the demands o f a medicine based in natural sciences drives its practitioners 
toward ever greater scientification and specialization, there is a concomitant counter 
movement— both from within and without the medical field— to reconceptualize the 
objective, the object, the discourse and the practice as cultural entities and enterprises that 
accept both ambiguity and uncertainty as part o f the process, and broadens the sorts of 
knowledges brought to bear in the search for solutions to intractable health problems.
Even as some physicians and researchers attempt to constrain medicine and medical 
practice to a narrow, biological interpretation o f health (one defined primarily as freedom 
from disease, disability, pain, or death) and to make doctors into scientists, others are 
advocating the extension o f the concept o f health and the inclusion o f alternative forms of
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knowledge— some o f them derived from patient narratives—  that, while messy and not 
easily quantifiable, are nonetheless critical when treating people and not just organisms or 
diseases. In a system that treats the person holistically and not just the illness or the body, 
patients' ideas of illness and health are considered on a par with physicians’ (Henderson 
et al. 1997. 3). Medicine conceived in this way treats both the biophysical body and the 
person: health is still about achieving and maintaining certain biophysical structures, 
functions, and processes but the overriding goal is to maintain the person, and this goal 
opens the door to all manner o f different interpretations o f  health. This, of course, begins 
to sound more like the WHO definition o f health.
According to the World Health Organization, “health is a state of complete physical, 
mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence o f disease or infirmity." Other 
contemporary definitions of health include all of these aspects in some form or another, 
but sometimes with significant differences. For example, Dr. Eric Cassell, Clinical 
Professor o f Public Health at Cornell University Medical College, suggests that new 
definitions o f health have arisen that emphasize the “ability o f persons to reach social, 
emotional, and economic goals despite illness, impairment, and functional limitations” 
(Cassell 1997. 18). These reconceptualizations are, he says, based upon an “ecological 
theory" of health in which illness is seen as “arising from disturbances in the biological, 
psychological, and social relationships o f individuals with themselves and others” 
(Cassell 1997. 18-19). The WHO definition and Cassell's formulation are not exactly the 
same: in fact, they are quite different in at ieast one key aspect: Cassell’s formulation
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implies that illness, impairment, and functional limitations are not “unhealthy” per se 
unless they interfere with one's social, emotional, and economic goals, whereas the WHO 
definition considers health to be a matter not only o f freedom from disease/infirmity, but 
also a state o f complete mental, physical and social well-being.) Despite the radical 
differences, the one feature they do share is that health is not solely a m atter o f 
biophysicality. and in at least one case, a person may be deemed healthy despite the 
presence o f “illness, impairment, or functional limitations.” Clearly, we are well beyond 
the boundaries o f what biomedical science can hope to achieve, and well beyond the 
conception o f health as a condition o f the body. Thus, we either must retreat from the 
broader definition of health, or we must accept that science alone is inadequate to the task 
of achieving health, and maybe even to the task o f “alleviating pain, preventing disability, 
and postponing death.” Since this broader definition of health takes the person rather than 
the body as its focus, and since people tend to experience themselves as persons rather 
than only as bodies, advocates o f the “medicine as a social science/health as a 
psychosocial phenomenon” view suggest that it is more reasonable to accept the 
limitations of scientific medicine (some of which are inherent, others o f  which are due to 
social, economic, ethical, and political institutions) and make up for its deficiencies in 
promoting health by including other knowledge frameworks within the health discourse. 
This broader approach is also supported by the earlier observation that the reductionist 
approach to diagnosing and treating many chronic conditions (the “single disease - single 
risk factor" approach that has fueled much o f scientific medical advancement in the past
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(W ilkinson 1993. 2)) is yielding somewhat less spectacular results (even with the 
breakthroughs in bio- or gene-technology) in treating chronic, life-long conditions.
In the nineteenth century, scientific medicine was seen as an antidote to social ills caused 
by industrialization (Henderson et al 1997, ix; Porter 1999), but it was seen as a. social 
science not just a biophysical one (Virchow, in Henderson et al. 1997, ix). Today, as we 
saw above, many prefer to think o f medicine as a bioscience. But sociologists, etc. argue 
that because "biomedicine is produced, learned, and practiced” in a cultural context we 
must learn to "understand health, illness, and medical practice as both product and 
producer o f larger social and cultural domains” (Henderson et al 1997, 6, 7). As we shall 
see. the object or focus o f biomedicine (the person and even the body) is also "produced, 
learned, and practiced” in a network o f cultural and biophysical interrelations. There are 
several important points here. First, biology, like ecology or any other logos that is 
produced in the pursuit o f scientia is a conceptual framework— a product o f the human 
mind— used to make sense o f the sensory data that bombard us. Second, categories o f 
illness, like those o f health, are also thought categories that change over time and space 
(this is not to say that health and illness are only figments o f the mind, but that the 
categories we use to designate and know o f them are of the mind) (Henderson et al. 1997, 
8). And third, health is an ineluctably complex and normative concept that brings into 
play a variety o f critical frameworks -m any o f  which are non-scientific and whose 
"information" is difficult, if not impossible to quantify and/or reconcile with modem 
medical theory and practice. For medical sociologists, as well as for many physicians and
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patients, illness and health occur in particular people, not just bodies, people that live in 
particular times and places that demand different sorts o f structures, functions, and 
interactions of the persons that live within them. With this way of thinking, there is no 
such thing as an objective disease or an objective health; one cannot think o f health or 
disease in the abstract since in all cases they must be instantiated in the flesh o f a living 
being in order to be manifest. Definitions o f health that arise out o f this new way of 
thinking emphasize “the ability of persons to reach social, emotional, and economic goals 
despite illness, impairment, and functional limitations” (Cassell 1997. 18). Health, then, 
is not an "ideal state of well-being, achieved through the complete elimination of disease, 
but ... a modus vivendi enabling imperfect men to achieve a rewarding and not too 
painful existence while they cope with an imperfect world. In this light, health cannot be 
defined in the absolute, because different persons expect such different things from life 
(Dubos 1968. 88).24 In other words, health is understood as "ecological” or even 
"ecosystemic" involving as it does an intricate and inextricable interaction between body, 
mind, and environment, between the symbolic and the biophysical. Thus, for these people 
medicine is not an objective practice with an objectively determined objective and a value 
neutral, "formulaic” means o f achieving that objective, but a situated discourse and a 
practice embedded within a complex biological and symbolic (cultural) matrix that 
practices upon humans beings who are themselves embedded within biological and 
cultural matrices o f their own. Understanding disease, like understanding health, becomes 
an interdisciplinary endeavor in which there is room for the specialist with highly esoteric
14 Dr. Donald Seldin (in Henderson et al 1997) rejects this broad idea o f  health because it tends to equate
health with happiness.
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knowledge (be it o f philosophy, ethics, politics, psychology, or science), the generalist 
who is better able to see the many parts that contribute to the whole, and the Iay-person 
who brings to the table him- or herself and the unique knowledge o f  what it is to be ill or 
well. Achieving a healthy life— whatever that turns out to be— requires all forms of
knowledge.
One significant reason for the recent shift in understandings o f health and the 
disillusionment with modem medicine is the increasing prevalence o f chronic, life-long 
"diseases" or "biological derangements” that cannot be cured, and whose symptoms can 
only be "managed." In most instances, the biomedical approach works extraordinarily 
well for acute cases o f injury or illness. But these cases make up only a fraction o f the 
population who seeks medical attention or attempts self-care for some condition. A 
person who experiences a chronic “derangement” is not dying o f a disease— at least not 
any more than the rest of us are dying o f anything— but is instead living with it and 
through it. For this person, a state o f health is inextricably linked to the presence o f a 
biological derangement; they coexist. This coexistence creates considerable difficulties 
for the medical practitioner trained to treat the disease and not the person (Cassell 1997. 
18). This one fact changes everything. The challenge is to develop conceptual 
frameworks or knowledge systems that enable patients— as people—  to come to terms 
with their particular version o f health within their cultural context, and that enable the 
physician and the patient together to develop a therapy or care regime that mitigates as 
many undesirable symptoms (from the patient’s perspective) as possible without
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compromising the identity o f the person the patient believes him or herself to be. In this 
instance, we are no longer treating the disease, but the person, a person who wishes to 
retain some o f those basic features that they consider integral to their identity. If the 
physician is no longer treating a disease, but looking to help a person achieve health (as 
defined for example by the WHO) then a different approach may be needed.
In all cases, but particularly with respect to chronic health problems, the structural and 
cultural attributes of a society profoundly affect the practice o f medicine and perceptions 
o f health and illness (Shuval 1992. 171). In a book compiled for use in a course taught to 
first year medical students at the University o f North Carolina School o f Medicine, the 
editors/authors (professors and practitioners from a wide range of disciplines and 
professions) are intent upon introducing future doctors to the cultural, ethical, linguistic, 
philosophical, political, and economic roots o f the science o f medicine and our ideas of 
health. The authors contend that
modem science presumes the pursuit o f knowledge can and should be conducted 
with a minimal bias. Yet medical knowledge and practice, like all knowledge and 
practice, are shaped by political, cultural, and economic forces, within which 
doctors' ideas about disease— in fact, their very definitions o f  disease— depend on 
the role science plays in particular cultures, as w:ell as on the culture of science. ... 
[D iseases are not immutable; they are shaped by person, time, and place, and are 
identified and endowed with significance only within social and cultural contexts 
(Henderson et al. 1997, 3-4).
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Thus. Henderson et al.. see several ways in which the practice of medicine is dictated and 
constrained by the historical, social context in which the patient lives and the physician 
practices. It is their belief (shared by many others) that medicine must become aware of 
its own situatedness if it is to successfully treat not only embodied diseases, but situated 
persons. To that end. the book is filled with case studies— employing a variety o f 
theoretical and methodological techniques— , patient and physician narratives, and even 
poetry all o f which demonstrate the ways in which lived health has transgressed the 
bounds of the narrow biophysical model that has dominated modem medicine for more 
than a century.
I will look first at their contention that medical knowledge, even scientific medical 
knowledge, is not unbiased or objective. In our society, we have learned to value 
"objectivity" and thus tend to seek out "unbiased'’ knowledge; it is to science and 
scientists that we attribute objectivity and neutrality (see Cassell’s discussion o f this on 
pp. 43-53 for an elaboration). (I discuss some o f the critiques o f this notion o f objectivity 
in science in the section "On Doing Science in the Shadow of CP”). For our purposes, it 
is more important to note that neither physicians nor patients experience themselves or 
their health or diseases objectively and without bias. The medical community, and the 
physicians and health care workers who people that community, has long struggled with 
the imposed requirement o f distance and neutrality that they are told should govern the 
patient-doctor relationship. The physician is thought to be more effective if he or she
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avoids personal entanglement with the patient as a person and concerns him or herself 
only with the biophysical phenomena (Cassell 1997, 45-46). (This same logic is the 
partial impetus behind the FS’ efforts to avoid “ranger capture” by regularly moving their 
field personnel from forest to forest. It also has the effect o f maintaining loyalty to the 
center— Washington. D.C.).) Not only is such “objectivity” now consider impossible, but 
it is increasingly clear that it may not be desirable, and may even hinder the quality o f 
care that a physician can deliver and may hinder patient recovery. There are a variety o f 
diagnostic "tools” that become available to the physician if  he or she permits him or 
herself to acknowledge his or her own humanity, and to empathize— that is. to use his or 
her own embodied humanity as a diagnostic tool (Cassell 1997, 45). For better or worse, 
both physician and patient are situated beings. Thus, because the science o f  medicine, the 
scientists (physicians), and the objects (patients) are integrally informed by the political 
and cultural milieu in which they occur, the diseases themselves will also be culturally 
determined to some degree. In other words, not only is there a sociological component to 
the biological category o f disease, but disease itself as disease is a category o f thought 
that does not exist outside o f the cultural system that invests it with meaning and 
significance. To diagnose a condition o f “the real” (as in the body) as a disease or a 
derangement one must have a framework of thought that enables one to distinguish 
between different conditions, to identify one such condition as a disease, disability, 
derangement, or deviation and then one must have a normative framework that enables 
one to ascribe to this newly identified condition a value or meaning. It is the meaning and 
significance thus attributed to this condition that then determines the sorts o f  actions that
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we might take either to eliminate it, mitigate its effects, ignore it, or celebrate it. What we 
find when we view health and disease in this way is that '“the bodies we expect— and 
hope— to have." like the people that we hope to be, the things we hope to do, "are 
imagined within cultural parameters” that have a profound impact on what we define as 
disease or deviation and what w'e expect medicine and health care providers to do 
(Henderson et al. 1997, 9).
In yet another example o f the cultural nature o f disease and health, the authors present 
numerous case studies, some conducted over the course o f two decades, which detail the 
ways in which peoples’ lived histories—their material circumstances— determine not 
only the nature and course o f their illness, but also determine the sorts of knowledges that 
they will bring to bear in coming to terms with that illness and the sorts of therapies that 
they will deem acceptable. People who become sick produce "narratives o f  illness," 
"pathographies” (Ann Hunsaker Hawkins) that tell the story "about how and why they got 
sick, how and why they think they will get better or not, and what they feel when in pain 
or hope for in recovery'” (Henderson et al. 1997, 61). Generally, these narrative accounts 
bear no resemblance to the accounts produced by doctors or by medical science. And in 
many instances, researchers find that the narratives indicate a "resistance to medical 
authority, [based on] an assertion o f the validity o f local knowledge and experience” that 
stands over and against the medical knowledge of the professional care giver (Henderson 
et al. 1997. 12; Balshem in Henderson, 38-9). It is not that the patient does not understand 
the medical terminology, it is that the patient does not believe or accept the scientific
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explanation o f disease especially if it runs counter to their experience o f the illness 
(Balshem. 38). Patients may produce “indigenous etiologies” o f an illness often 
accompanied and supported by “ indigenous models o f health and disease” (Mathews, 
Lannin. and Mitchell in Henderson, 59, 44). (Forests, o f course, cannot produce 
"indigenous etiologies” or “indigenous narratives o f health.”) Treating these patients, if  at 
all possible, can happen only when the physician learns to listen to and understand the 
patients' account o f his or her condition, how that account will affect the person’s 
acceptance or rejection o f the biomedical model o f their disease, and how that condition 
affects his or her life and hopes for a future.
For example, a study begun in 1988 by the Department o f Surgery at the East Carolina 
University School of Medicine to determine the reasons w'hy black women tended to seek 
medical help only in the advanced stages o f breast cancer, is illustrative o f this point. 
Researchers found that the conceptual frameworks (stories) erected and employed by the 
women did not include the possibility o f  recourse to modem medicine either for 
explanatory purposes or treatment options. The professional physician was the last resort. 
Their stories were acts o f verbalization that functioned to organize the world and make 
sense o f the new experience o f illness, as well as to incorporate this illness or condition 
into their everyday lives. In other words, they were intent upon producing accounts o f 
their condition that normalized it. These women are not concerned with what science tells 
them about the pathology o f  the cancer because such an account is irrelevant to their lived 
experience and often to the decisions they will make about treatment.
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The act o f verbalization implies an attempt not only to conceptualize the 
experience, but also to define it so that the real work o f understanding can begin. 
... The narratives ... draw on multiple sources o f knowledge in order to come to 
terms with a diagnosis of advanced breast cancer—a biomedically-defmed disease 
entity that they [the narrators] often refuse to acknowledge or accept. The 
narratives represent a debate over whose terms will be used to label and describe a 
disease”(Matthews, Lannin, and Mitchell in Henderson et al., 44).
These women are not wrong (especially given the cost of health care), any more than they 
are stupid. This is how they choose to organize their world, to explain what is happening 
to them, and to cope with impending impairment, disability, and/or death.
Similar narratives are produced by people who “suffer’ from what in the past we called 
"disabilities" or "retardation.” What appears today to be an argument over semantics 
(differently-abled, impaired, disabled, challenged, special, etc.) is actually an attempt to 
rethink what it might mean to be "normal" or "healthy.” It could be that it is only within 
the dominant social, economic, ethical, and political arrangements— postulated as 
"normal"— that these peoples’ differences become disabilities, impairments, or 
derangements. One could imagine other arrangements that might produce entirely 
different types o f "disabilities" or illnesses. Take for example "deaf culture’s” resistance 
to cochlear implants, technological devices that would enable the deaf to hear the spoken
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word. In a PBS News Hour report, deaf students and professors at a university for the deaf 
overwhelmingly rejected the implants, citing them as threats not only to their culture, but 
to their very identity. They do not experience themselves as disabled, or even as different, 
but simply as they are, and they resent the implication that they need to be “fixed” in 
order to better fit the norms established by a speaking society (PBS, The News Hour, 
February' 19.2001).
It is not that people with various conditions are denying that they are different, and in 
many cases people even state outright that they have a disability or a disease or some sort 
of physical or mental limitation: that is. there is a real condition. But exactly what it is. 
what causes it. what it means to have it, the value we assign to it, and the sorts of things 
we will do with and/or about it are all culturally negotiated.
Echoing the conclusions o f other researchers. Henderson et al. also note that “despite the 
power of the biomedical model of disease and the increasing specificity o f molecular and 
genetic knowledge, social factors have always influenced the occurrence and course o f 
most diseases" (Henderson et al. 1997. 4). In this assertion they are supported by a not 
inconsiderable body o f literature that investigates the correlation between advances in 
biomedicine and advances in health. It is not a one-to-one correspondence (McKeown 
1976. Wilkinson 1996, Porter 1999, Peterson 1997, Cassell 1997). Increases in 
knowledge do not necessarily translate into increases in health. The lack o f correlation 
between bioscientific advances and health lead medical historians, sociologists,
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anthropologists, and even doctors themselves to investigate other causal factors, to 
propose other definitions o f health, and to seek out alternative treatments or therapies that 
may treat something other than the biophysical organism. Generally, they have found that 
"people's social and economically structured life processes remain the most powerful 
influences on health in the modem world” (Wilkinson 1996,13). This insight, they 
contend, “turns the exploration o f determinants o f health into a social science”
(Wilkinson 1996, 13). Medical science still plays an important role in so far as it can 
address the biological pathways involved in the production o f disease and develop 
appropriate treatments that attack those pathways. But many who favor the "psychosocial 
pathway" understanding of health claim that further advances in understandings o f health 
will only be made as a result o f research into the social and economic organizations and 
institutions that produce perceptions o f health, o f self, and the body, as well as producing 
the material conditions thereof (Wilkinson, 13-14). In keeping with this 
reconceptualization o f health, medical sociologists tend to focus "less on individuals' 
biological state, behavior, and attitudes [and more] on issues o f social organization, 
cultural assumptions, and political processes” in the belief that major gains to health are 
more likely to occur because o f changes in social and political processes and institutions 
than from advances in biotechnology and scientific medicine (Shuval 1992, 1).
Then too. the social and economic conditions o f people constrain the availability o f 
treatment options and determine the likelihood that a person might choose to access them 
(Henderson et al., 4). Biomedical technology has produced a wide array o f  possible
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"cures" or therapies, some of which are deemed socially unacceptable or at the very least 
problematic (genetic engineering, cloning, the use o f tissue and cells from aborted 
fetuses, the use of animal organs for human transplants, the use of artificial organs to 
replace "defective'’ organic ones, etc.). Economics plays a critical role here as well: if the 
cost of the treatment or procedure is prohibitively high, it isn’t used, no matter how good 
it is. or at least not by all o f those who may need it. Additionally, physicians, HMO’s. 
patient's, and hospital administrators question the therapeutic value o f  many high-cost 
medical interventions. Critics o f escalating costs associated with high-tech treatments and 
interventions note that even though "spending on health care in the U.S. has long 
outstripped that of other industrialized nations. ... that spending has not resuited in 
healthier populations" as measured by things like life expectancy, infant mortality, etc. 
(Henderson et al.. 4: Wilkinson 1996). In fact, physicians themselves consider many of 
the procedures and tests to be o f  limited or even dubious medical value, since we can do 
nothing with the information learned from them (Cassell. Good 1995. pers com. C. 
Carlson. M.D.).:5 In many instances, expensive diagnostic and monitoring equipment 
does not significantly alter the course o f  the disease, the patients’ life, or the physicians* 
treatment. It simply imparts knowledge about a biophysical condition that may or may not 
have any effect whatsoever on a person’s health.
The tests are nonetheless prescribed for several reasons, among them the “cover your ass” culture 
fostered by a litigious public and to pay the hefty cost o f  the machines.
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So what does all this mean and where are we? We have learned several things about the 
"medicine as a social science/health as a cultural, psychological, biophysical phenomena'’ 
model. Under this model, science itself is a culturally determined (or at least informed) 
enterprise; health and disease are biophysical conditions and cultural (or symbolic) 
categories o f thought (that is, health and disease appear to be complex phenomena that 
cannot be reduced to either culture or nature); and, the meaning and values o f various 
health conditions are culturally negotiated. Additionally, the material circumstances— 
economic, social, political, technological, etc.—  have profound impacts on the presence, 
course, quality, intensity, frequency, etc. o f health and/or diseases. Then too, insofar as 
health or disease is a condition o f a particular person (not just a body)— one with a history 
and with expectations of a future, a person who also has intimate knowledge o f what it 
means to live as this well or ill person—  the criteria by which we identify health and/or 
disease/impairment/ derangement, etc. will have to be modified to include accounts other 
than those proposed by medical science and disinterested physicians. And finally, we 
must consider the value and meaning of the sorts o f explanatory, diagnostic, and 
therapeutic options proffered by medical science, and compare them with options made 
available to people through other knowledge systems and health-care practices (Chinese 
herbal medicine, homeopathy, Ayurvedic medicine, chiropractic, naturopathy, 
aromatherapy, visualization, acupuncture and acupressure, etc.). Bioscience is ill- 
equipped to deal with any o f the non-biophysical aspects o f health, even if we limit 
ourselves to the narrow definition o f health as a biophysical phenomena for the simple
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reason that the biophysical state is intimately affected by and in turn affects the cultural 
and symbolic networks within which a person constructs his or her body and identity.
The critical point o f departure in the “medicine as social science'’ paradigm then seems to 
hinge on the reconceptualization o f the object or focus o f medicine. Essentially, the 
broader understandings o f health put forth by the social science/psychosocial model 
requires that we conceive o f the healthy person as a complex whole, not just as a healthy 
body. We began with an examination o f an expanded idea o f  health, and end by 
confronting the question o f identity. What I mean is this: the object or focus of modem 
medicine's gaze has been the body (or more properly, the disease in the body); the social 
science view of health shifts that focus from the body as object to the person as a 
participating subject in an ongoing construction or experience o f health (Cassell 1997, 
Peterson 1997. Wright 1982, Henderson et al. 1997. Foucault). This changes the level o f 
analysis which has the effect o f producing “different pictures o f the determinants o f 
health") Wilkinson 1996, 18; also cf. Foucault). Health so defined, encompasses the 
entirety o f one's being and existence, both through time and across space— physical as 
well as meta-phvsical. This shift necessitates, as one physician admits, a shift in the 
criteria o f health and illness:
Patients are the ones who tell us that doctors do not communicate well, that they 
do not really listen, that they seem insensitive to personal needs and individual 
differences, that they often neglect the person in their zeal to pursue diagnostic
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and treatment procedures. ... These complaints, and others, bespeak the public's 
aw areness o f  the grave deficiencies in the medicai establishment’s knowledge of 
and ability to handle rationally the human experience o f being ill.
A primary contributor to this gap between the medical profession and the public it 
is meant to serve is the fundamental difference between the patient’s criteria for 
health and well-being and those of the physician, a difference which exists even 
though culturally and intellectually both patient and physician share a cultural 
inheritance which includes the biomedical model o f disease. For the patient, the 
ultimate criteria are psychosocial, even when the complaint is physical. Patient's 
criteria have to do with how one feels, how one functions, how one relates with 
others: with the ability to love, to work, to struggle, to seek options and make 
choices. The physician, in contrast, while ostensibly attentive to such concerns, 
nonetheless is wont to consider such criteria as "merely subjective.” For the 
physician, the real criteria for status and outcome o f health and disease are 
physical measures, for whose determination increasingly elegant and sensitive 
instruments are available (Engel 1979, 261).
In other words, "the interests o f patients can be very different from physicians' 
judgements o f what is best for patients” (Henderson et al.,4). Essentially, then, what 
patients are requiring o f doctors and medicine, is that they recognize that health and 
illness are ineluctably subjective, social experiences and that the patient's criteria o f 
health, their experiences thereof, their expectations for a future, in short, their identity,
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must somehow be given due weight in the decision-making process— not as "ideas” or 
“opinions” or "feelings” but as knowledge.
The issue o f illness or impairment and it’s relationship to identity has always been 
problematic. Recall the euphemism for being ill: "I am not quite myself today.” Or 
Virginia W oolf s provocative metaphor in which the experience o f being ill is likened to 
being in an "undiscovered country.” The body, with which one’s identity is inextricably, 
intimately bound (but not limited), is suddenly foreign, unfamiliar, strange (Henderson et 
aL  61 ).One becomes a stranger to oneself when one is ill. Recall too, an even more 
provocative label: the person who is sick is an invalid. Illness makes one invalid, as in not 
valid, not sound. One cannot escape the connotative meanings: without force, strength, or 
power, indefensible, weak, deficient, void (OED 1475, 76). Ideas o f health are also 
intimately tied to ideas o f integrity; illness entails disintegration and the sense o f losing 
control o f one's self can be^profoundly disturbing (Cassell, in Henderson et al.. 15). What 
are we to make o f the meanings o f these terms when applied to humans? Each conveys a 
sense o f deviation from some predetermined norm that is somehow coincident with one's 
identity: that norm is assigned a higher value (as "good” or "better” or more “self-like”) 
than the deviant state. While we might readily assent to the idea o f acute illness or injury 
as a threat to or negation of our identity (defined as healthy by default), this experience or 
understanding o f illness as impending disintegration, as altered or negated identity 
becomes problematic when we begin to look at long term— as in life long—conditions 
that are defined by mainstream medicine as "deranged.” How can we justify (without
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becoming Nazis) calling invalid or unsound, deficient or void, the person whose whole 
self—as a biophysical and  a symbolic being—  is this “not-healthy” condition? When 
identity is intimately linked to health and health is defined by reference to a biophysical 
or cultural norm, a departure from full health can signal a departure from identity and 
from self.
Importantly, then, it is not only physicians or the medical establishment which is being 
asked to come to (new) terms with health, but society and individuals as well. “From a 
social perspective, illness entails 'deviance'— that is, discrepancies in behavior and 
appearance from what is expected or 'norm al’ (Henderson et al.. 76). We are surrounded 
by images o f what we ought to be. o f what our bodies and thoughts and behaviors ought 
to look like, be or do: we construct ourselves and our ideas o f self and health using the 
images supplied, we measure our health against the objective measures established for us 
by society and by the medical community, as well as by those internal measures that we 
establish for ourselves: who and what we hope to be now and in the future. Failure to 
achieve the norm can sometimes be as destructive to the person as the disease or 
derangement itself.
It is impossible to offer a pat and simple “definition” o f a person or o f an identity: what is 
clear though is that being a person, having an identity is more than just having a body, 
and that one's body is more than just an accident, a biophysical organism in which we 
schlep around the planet, a housing unit for a soul or a mind. We have a body, but we also 
have ideas o f that body: in the same way, we have an identity and we have ideas o f that
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identity-. The body and the identity (in large part inseparable— but not identical), like our 
ideas o f each are the result of a complex interaction between multiple discourses and 
multiple biophysicalities. Control o f the terms o f the discourses on health (like medicine), 
that shape and construct both body and identity are critical; patient narratives are often 
ways o f resisting "colonization” o f the (sick) body by physicians and the medical 
institution. It is an attempt to maintain some sort o f identity apart from that o f being a 
"patient in a [sick] body,”especiaIIy when the disease or impairment is a life-long 
condition (Arthur Frank, in Henderson et al., 62).
Concluding remarks
There is an inherent tension between the conceptual models that medical science 
constructs to frame issues of health and those that we as persons develop based upon 
lived experiences thereof. The differences at the conceptual level (informed in part by 
those at the level o f  experience) lead to significant differences at the practical level and 
are based upon different foci (the biophysical body vs. the biophysical and  cultural 
person). On the one hand, medicine interpreted as a science, seeks to closely limit the 
definition o f health and disease to bodily phenomena because physicians recognize 
immediately that medical science is ill-equipped to deal with the more amorphous, 
ambiguous cultural aspects o f "well-being” (which looks suspiciously like "happiness”) 
that are explicitly included in "ecological” theories o f health. These ecological theories o f 
health are themselves founded upon ecological theories o f persons— i.e., persons as
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"ecosystems" that are comprised not only o f biotic and abiotic elements but also of 
symbolic elements). The narrower the definition o f health, and the narrower the focus or 
object o f  health, the fewer the variables that go into “causing" any one particular 
condition, and the greater the illusion o f physician certainty. Within its narrow bounds 
modem medicine has been undeniably successful: it has done remarkable things for the 
human body. On the other hand, even as the successes o f modem medicine mount, there 
is a concomitant sense that advances in human health are not keeping pace; in other 
words, the science of medicine is advancing (along with the technologies), but health—  
even biophysical health— is not. Bodies are (arguably) kept in better condition (often this 
means treating or masking symptoms of chronic diseases that cannot be cured) and life is 
prolonged, but we would be disinclined, on the larger view of health, to say that this 
necessarily translates into healthier persons.
This sense that the biomedical model is somehow missing the boat is shared by the 
patient population as well as by a growing number o f  physicians: neither patients nor 
doctors are able to abstract themselves from the particularity o f  their "actually existing" 
selves or to reduce themselves to parts and pieces that can be dealt with in isolation 
(Cassell. Engel. Henderson). The bottom line is that the bodies we have and hope to have 
are shaped by nature as well as by our culture; that the criteria by which we judge health 
or disease are products of culture; that the conceptual frameworks o f the sciences we 
bring to bear in investigating disease and health are culturally determined; that the 
incidence, frequency, and intensity o f illnesses (spread across a population) are the results
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of social, economic, political, ethical, etc. arrangements; that because we live in our 
bodies and because these bodies constrain (or conversely enable) our experience o f life as 
actually living beings, our identity is deeply implicated in our ideas o f  health or illness; 
that because we identify ourselves with our bodies as well as with our and our culture's 
ideas about them, health is a highly complex, qualitative, contingent, variable 
biophysical-psychosocial experience that we make sense o f through symbolic or linguistic 
frameworks. The limitation o f health to considerations o f “biophysical derangment" fits 
well with the model o f medicine as a science. It does not however, fit well with the 
human experience o f health or of self or with a policy o f improving health generally. The 
push to redefine health as a state o f existence that happens sometimes in the midst o f a 
whole host o f "derangements” is rooted in an effort to assert the primacy o f the person as 
a whole and not just a body. If one accepts the "ecosystemic” non-reductive version of 
person then one must also accept the ecological version o f health. In other words, one 
must retreat from an exclusive focus on the biomedical model o f health which then 
necessitates a retreat from the exclusive use o f scientific methodology. Achieving or 
negotiating the health o f persons, not just bodies, requires the inclusion o f other 
discursive practices through which we make sense of and construct our social, political, 
moral, economic, and religious selves.
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Chapter Five 
Through the (Medical) Looking Glass
So what does all this have to do with forest health and with forestry (or ecosystem 
management) in general? In this section, I “reread” forest health through the refocused 
lens o f medical discourse. As with the management o f nature (or ecosystems), the 
management o f the person (or human body) is hotly contested and has generated 
countless counter-narratives and conceptual frameworks that privilege different types o f 
knowledge and ways o f knowing. Again, the comparison is not meant to indicate some 
essential connection based upon similarities between nature and body, but only to suggest 
that the discursive traditions or conceptual frameworks designed to deal with each share 
certain values as well as institutional, ontological, and epistemological commitments. 
With this qualification in mind, critiques of the modem medical discourse on health like 
the discourse itself, may offer new insights into forestry praxes, some o f which may not 
yet be readily apparent in the burgeoning field o f meta-forestry literature.
My enquiry into the discourse on health in the forestry and medical fields produced 
unexpected complications— contradictions even—  and took me in surprising directions. 
The contradictions arise at different levels, the most striking being between ontology 
(what is) and epistemology (how we know it). The problem of language, and meaning, its 
slipperiness and ambiguity, adds yet another layer o f complication to the entire enterprise; 
the gap between sign and referent, signifier and signified, the symbolic and
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the real, mind and matter. And therein lies the real problem for both medicine and 
forestry: in both cases we are trying to find the words, the concepts, that make sense (so 
to speak ...) o f the experiences we have of/in the real so that we can intervene effectively 
in whatever it is that is going on out there (or in the case of the body, “ in there.”) What 
makes both forestry and medicine so interesting and so incredibly complex is that their 
object ( forest or person) and their objective (health) straddle the divide between the real 
and the symbolic: they partake o f both worlds simultaneously. What we say about each is 
absolutely critical because our words determine what we will do in or with each.
So what have we said about each? Simply put, forest managers wish to produce healthy 
forests or ecosystems. They wish to use science as the predominant conceptual framework 
for knowing both the object (forests) and the objective (forest health). Similarly, 
physicians wish to produce healthy bodies, and science is the preferred conceptual 
framework through which the object and the objective are identified and known.
However, both forestry and medicine are confronting challenges on multiple fronts: 
challenges posed by new broader understandings o f their objects— ecosystems, rather 
than just “cutting units.” trees, or particular wildlife species, persons, rather than just 
bodies, organs, or tissues; challenges posed by the ineluctably normative, and thus 
perhaps ultimately non-scientific, character o f “health;” challenges posed by competing 
theories o f knowledge (theories that include critiques o f  science) and o f  language that 
have profoundly impacted conceptions o f self and other; and finally, challenges posed by 
the dispersion o f knowledge throughout society via a variety o f  technologies and media.
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The focus o f both forest management and medicine shifts from a well-delimited, strictly 
biophysical (albeit ideal and abstract) entity that dutifully follows the “ laws o f nature,” to 
an ambiguous, unbounded, ’‘cybernetic organism” that exists (or is constituted) at the 
always shifting nexus o f countless biophysical and symbolic networks. As we have seen, 
there are several provocative complications that arise from this “ecosystemic” 
understanding o f self and forests, the first o f which is that a broadening o f the identity o f 
the object or focus of the practice necessitates a more ecological understanding o f health. 
But health itself also appears to require the explicit establishment and articulation o f 
norms, or prescriptions. And since, especially in the case o f forest ecosystems, absolutely 
no structural, functional, or relational limitations are identified (that is, an ecosystem has 
no identity from which it might be perceived to “deviate”), then the definition o f a healthy 
forest becomes an almost exclusively symbolic enterprise that is then mapped back out on 
the real and "tested.” Peoples' needs and desires are no longer adjuncts, qualifiers, or 
secondary to some primary or a priori objective “health;” instead, these human desires -  
articulated in terms like capability, productivity, renewal, robustness, resiliency— are the 
essence o f  forest health. These terms are prescriptive not descriptive. Thought o f  in this 
way. the definition o f forest health is looking more like those conceived under the “social 
science" version o f human health....and we have seen that if  one accepts these 
"ecological” definitions o f health as more in keeping with our experience thereof, then 
one must also accede to the limitations o f the scientific methodology and approach and 
accept as necessary the admission o f  other knowledge frameworks. The exclusive reliance 
on science (be it o f the social or the natural version) is also limited by the
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reconceptualization o f the object itself: scientific methodology does not deal well with 
large complex wholes, nor with ambiguity at the level of language or with the fuzziness 
o f the “out there."’
The object
We begin with a reexamination o f the object or focus o f forest management in light o f a 
similar refocusing which occurred in medicine. The USFS made a deliberate choice to 
reconceptualize the unit o f concern to an ecosystem; the appearances and the failure to 
achieve certain management goals, among other things, seem to warrant the change. Our 
focus is now on "a unit comprising interacting organisms considered together with their 
environment" (USDA FS/FEMAT 1993, IX-10); “all the organisms in a given place 
interacting with their nonliving environment” (USDA FS 1994. Vol: II, 369); or. “an 
arrangement o f living and non-living things and the forces that move among them"’
(USDA FS 2000. www.fs.fed.us/land/emterms. html). Clearly, at the level o f ontology, 
we are given carte blanche, so to speak, in conceptualizing ecosystems; and herein lies the 
problem. Basically, we have a unit o f concern that includes everything: all processes, all 
structures, all things, all happenings or events. All is ecosystemic, even, we might venture 
to speculate, the non-systemic, the chaotic and unpredictable, the pathogenic and 
pathological, the much maligned disturbance and diseased.... As noted earlier, it is o f 
course, hard to establish an identity if  there is nothing with which something is non- 
identical; there is no outside, no other, no difference, no defer-ence (as in delayed in time) 
from which to get a perspective on the thing itself. And if there is no identity, there is no
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“normal state" from which something might deviate, no predetermined course from 
which it might be deterred, no disturbance that is not essential to the system. In other 
words, we would not be able to say o f an ecosystem that it is “not itself.”
But there are other potential interpretations that come along with this broad idea o f the 
object. Land managers have candidly admitted that ecosystems include humans and 
human artifacts— things like cities, farms, ranches, etc. But if ecosystems include humans 
and human artifacts, we might venture to speculate that they will also include human 
systems o f knowledge; cultural systems; social, economic, and political institutions and 
systems; even symbolic and linguistic systems. This o f course complicates things 
tremendously. Following this line o f thinking, everything becomes ecosystemic and we 
run the risk o f the “ecologization" o f everyday life and thought. One could offer as 
evidence o f this phenomenon the dispersion of ecology throughout every facet o f Western 
culture. The prefix “eco-" is affixed to every conceivable root, and the term “ecology" 
seems sufficiently ambiguous that it can be conjoined to pretty much any sort o f endeavor 
or discipline (see Ecology list on next page). Not only has the Forest Service lost control 
of the ecosystem signifier (or conversely, I suppose, one could say that it has actually 
sought to gain control o f the world by virtue o f having left the ecosystem term undefined) 
but it has lost control o f the discourse (and perhaps the practice?) of ecology.
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Ecology list
deep ecology 
radical ecology 
social ecology 
political ecology 
human ecology 
landscape ecology 
industrial ecology 
transpersonal ecology 
evolutionary ecology 
natural ecology 
cultural ecology 
feminist ecology 
ecosystem ecology 
population ecology 
community ecology 
forest ecology 
plant ecology 
plant ecophysiology 
avian ecology
(and all those other “ecological 
sciences....)
ecological physics 
environmental ecology 
ecology of hope 
ecology of mind 
ecology o f spirit 
liberation ecologies 
ecological geology 
ecological chemistry 
centralized ecological planning 
global ecological zoning
ecological self
ecological consciousness
ecological humanism
ecological feminism
ecological economics
eco(logical) municipality
ecological science
ecological sensibility
ecological literacy
ecological history
ecochallenge
ecosocialism
ecology
ecopolitics
ecotopia
ecothon
ecotourism
ecoterrorism
ecofeminism
ecophilosophy
ecocosm
ecofascism
ecocentrism
ecosophy
ecosystem
ecotage
ecovillage
ecopsychology
economics
ecocide
ecofreak
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The ecologization o f  everyday life takes the Forest Service well beyond the forest and 
foresters well beyond the realm o f their present expertise. This notion sounds somewhat 
farfetched but physicians and other individuals involved in the medical field have noted, 
not always positively, what they call the increasing medicalization o f every day life 
(Seldin. Cassell. Wright. Ben-Sira, etc.). By this they mean that there is a growing 
tendency to interpret a host o f widely varied biophysical and psychosocial conditions as 
medical conditions with medical solutions. If you doubt the veracity o f this 
characterization, spend an evening cruising channels for commercials; you will be 
astounded by the number o f advertisements for drugs that treat everything from shyness 
and obesity to impotence and unhappiness. You are. o f course, advised to "Ask your 
doctor..." But it goes beyond even this; the dispersion o f  the medical discourse and 
medical terminology throughout popular culture, via books, journals, popular magazines. 
TV. the internet (index medicus. webmd. etc.), enables and encourages people to frame 
perceived problems or conditions in medical terminology and to seek solutions within the 
medical field. This trend is supported in part by the tendency to attribute all facets o f 
humanity to the gene and the genetic code, but also by the extension o f the meaning o f 
health to all aspects o f  being, as is done with the WHO definition o f  health. The trend 
toward medicalization is thus supported by two complementary, if contradictory moves: 
the reduction o f all aspects o f  human life to the body (in the ultimate form o f the gene, the 
code) and the simultaneous extension o f  the body (again in the form o f the gene) to all 
aspects of life or personhood. Everything about the person is a matter for medicine. This.
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as Seldin sees it. is hugely problematic and is precisely why he argues against the broader 
understanding of health. But I am getting ahead o f myself.
There is one other point with respect to identity that I wish to investigate. In issues of 
human health, the physician has the advantage (or some might call it a disadvantage) o f 
being able to interrogate the referent and have it answer in a language the physician 
understands. (We are speaking here not o f a strict interrogation o f the body, which can 
answer only in the words we supply, and always with tremendous ambiguity, but o f the 
interrogation o f the person in the body who can report experiences and feelings to which 
the physician can relate because he or she is also embodied.) With respect to humans, we 
can frame questions o f health in terms of identity and departures there from because a 
person can tell the physician who they are. or who they believe themselves to be. or who 
they wish to be. This o f course, does not always mean that there are clear solutions— in 
fact, more often than not the patient's understandings o f his or her identity and the 
patient's understanding o f the impacts o f various conditions upon that identity tend to 
make health care immeasurably complex— but at least the physician as a human being 
him or herself has some frame o f reference by which to evaluate the meanings o f the 
signs. Foresters interrogating forests or ecosystems have no such luxury—  unless we 
invent or assign to the forest an identity o f  our own making, or recognize a different mode 
of responding or knowing. What we know o f the object o f concern is inferred; we have 
experiences and sensations the meanings o f  which we then interpret based upon a value 
scale that we ourselves invent with reference to ourselves.
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Yei another possible outcome o f the ecologization o f everyday life, one that adds a whole 
new dimension, we could conceive o f a situation in which foresters are forced into the 
realm o f medicine, doctors into ecology, and both into society because there are people 
whose identities are intimately informed by— even inextricably intertwined with— forests 
or ecosystems. Not. actually, a very farfetched notion if  one recalls that a person is a 
physical, social, and psychological being and that a forest (or ecosystem) is a social, 
symbolic, and physical ‘"unit'’ or “arrangement/’ What then to do when the identity o f a 
person—  who constitutes him- or herself through a myriad different, sometimes 
conflicting, discursive practices— is threatened by particular land management practices? 
It isn 't just that his or her livelihood is threatened— the material circumstances, or that the 
person's body is threatened (by air quality, holes in the ozone, water quality, etc.). or even 
that his or her sense o f aesthetics or ethics is compromised: it is that the person's identity, 
as a person, is compromised in some important way by that management activity. (This 
"identification" with or essential “relationship” to the out there is reminiscent o f (though 
not necessarily coincident with) the ontology of some deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and 
others who conceive o f identify as something that doesn’t stop at the skin or even at the 
end o f culture, but extends all the way to the ends o f the universe). We can even retreat 
from this metaphysical conception o f the self and instead think on more direct, material 
terms: the logger, the miner, the hiker, the river guide, the naturalist, the farmer, the 
watcher o f \a tu re  all constitute themselves in relation to some idea o f the “out there”—  
some more essentially than others (recall Roderick N ash’s suggestion that American 
identity is inextricably bound up with the landscape in his influential book Wilderness
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and the American Mind). And if we accept that human health is as the WHO and others 
argue it is. then human health is deeply implicated in forest health for the simple reason 
that human identity is in some way, at some level, intimately tied to that o f the forest. The 
obvious problem is that as humans we each tend to construct, to the extent we are able, a 
unique identity, something that makes us non-identical with others, and this means that 
our identities may be tied to radically different ideas of what a forest is or does.
Understanding ecosystems broadly, like understanding persons broadly seems to be the 
"right" thing to do. We sense that there is a problem when we abstract from the particular 
material, historic, or symbolic circumstances or when we reduce a complex organism, 
system, or situation to its simplest parts: we wish to deal, in so far as possible, in complex 
wholes, because we tend to live in complex wholes. At the same time, our minds and our 
language and our knowledge systems, to say nothing o f our social, economic, and 
political institutions, don 't seem well equipped to deal in undifferentiated, unmediated 
"ecosystemic" wholes: we tend to break them down into manageable parts. Where do we 
draw the lines, and more importantly, how do we justify having drawn them at that place 
rather than another? These are the very difficult questions that science alone cannot 
answer and these are precisely the questions that the USFS has implicitly answered for 
itself, without benefit o f public input, and upon which the USFS has built its forest health 
discourse.
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The USFS defines forest health in several different ways, as does the medical community. 
We have noted that in both instances, but more so in forestry than in medicine, conflicts 
arise when we move from our understandings of the object to our definitions o f the 
objective— health. Medical practitioners and philosophers are acutely aware that if  they 
are going to expand the concept o f what it.means to be human, then they are going to 
have to expand the concept o f health (or vice versa...). They also realize that by doing so 
they have catapulted themselves right out o f the deceptively transparent world o f natural 
science and into the quagmire o f culture and the symbolic. Foresters have not fully 
grasped the nature o f their dilemma, nor noticed (at least not publicly) that they have 
glossed over some fundamental issues, like how one gets from an ecosystem to a healthy 
ecosystem without committing inconceivable acts o f violence that while perhaps 
necessary, are neither sanctioned nor legitimated by the ecosystem concept or by the thing 
we are referring to when we use the word. Recall that, according to the USFS, forest 
health is
a condition wherein a forest has the capacity across the landscape for renewal, for 
recovery’ from a wide range o f  disturbances, and for retention o f  its ecological 
resiliency while meeting current and future needs o f people for desired levels o f  
values, uses, products, and services (emphasis added, USDA FS 1997).
Or if you prefer, forest health is
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a measure o f the robustness o f forest ecosystems. Aspects of forest health include 
biological diversity, soil, air, and water productivity, natural disturbances', and the 
capacity of the forest to provide a sustaining flow  o f  goods and sendees fo r  
people (emphasis added, USDA FS National HQ web site).
Now recall our definitions o f an ecosystem. It is impossible to get from an ecosystem to 
ecosystem health without the intervention o f human desires. There is nothing in our 
ecosystem concept that indicates it is essentially resilient, diverse, productive, or robust; 
no indication that it must be able to recover or renew itself, that it must retain any 
particular thing, that it must have some capacity, in and of itself in order to be an 
ecosystem; that is. in order to have an identity.
Lost or buried within the apparently objective signifiers o f health and disease are the 
critical value judgements that define one thing or state or process as valuable and 
desirable and healthful— as in contributing to or sustaining the identity o f a forest 
ecosystem, and another as valueless (or destructive o f value), undesirable, and 
unhealthful. One might wonder why "these things'’ (and not "those things") are 
considered indicators o f health (or illness) and why one state, process, structure, or 
function is healthy (and by association, desirable) and another not. By what criteria are 
the criteria by which health is judged chosen? Devastation, catastrophe, deterioration, 
disease, malaise, decline, pests, tragedy, mortality', morbidity, unproductive, infestation.
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vulnerability...all o f  these terms are used frequently in the FS discourse on health and all 
o f them cam - a negative value; they are all meant to indicate undesirable occurrences or 
states or organisms. Using these terms rather than others betrays an implied commitment 
to some already identified preferred state or norm from which things have deviated. The 
words are used deliberately, but without much explicit analysis o f why the USFS (or we 
as a society) use them. Why for example, do we use these terms to refer to certain insects 
(like bark beetles) and not to ponderosa pine trees? We speak of pest infestation, even of 
Douglas fir infestation, but rarely if ever o f Ponderosa pine infestation. What is the 
difference between a population that is flourishing and one that constitutes an infestation? 
Why are some species considered pathogenic and others necessary and desirable? (Recall 
the socially unacceptable metaphor employed by some environmentalists o f likening 
humans to roaches or rats and our population as constituting an infestation...) And even 
more perplexing, when does one become the other? Why are fires no longer the '''’enemy.' 
but the ecological 'friend’ o f a healthy, vital forested ecosystem” (USDA FS 1991. IV-11) 
and when does a "friendly” fire become an “enemy”? Why is a fire or wind event that 
levels thousands o f acres o f forest, a water event that carries away tons of soil and 
reshapes the landscape, considered a catastrophe, a "disturbance,” rather than something 
that just happens, one o f those “forces that moves among” the biotic and abiotic 
"arrangements.” neither positive nor negative? Why do we speak of catastrophic fires or 
devastating winds or ravaging pests? Why are these events or states considered 
destructive (abnormal) rather than “normal” or as part and parcel o f the ecosystem? (c f  
Holling (1992). and in Clark and Munn (1986)). (Cassell contends, for example, that “an
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illness is not an event, but pan o f a process" (1997, 37).) And why do we cast our own 
actions against these events in terms o f prevention, protection, restoration?
At this point it is worth quoting at length a passage from the Blue Mountains Forest 
Health Report because it speaks to exactly this issue.
It is important to note that not all damage or mortality resulting from insect 
infestations is bad, nor is it always undesirable. Insects play a key role in 
providing natural diversity in riparian areas and oid-growth stands through the 
creation o f dead and dying woody material which serves to enhance site 
productivity and promote species diversity and richness by providing new habitats 
for animals. Insects also help to increase the standing dead tree component of 
these stands which are important as habitat for snag-dependent wildlife species. 
Similarly, streams and creeks are enhanced by the formation o f  new pools, ripples, 
and habitat for aquatic vertebrate and invertebrate species as insect-killed trees 
eventually fall over into these water courses. The level o f insect-related tree 
mortality which occurs under these circumstances is both acceptable and 
desirable, and in fact is a good indicator (and progenitor) o f healthy riparian and 
old growth ecosystems.
On the other hand, concern regarding insects arises when they increase to outbreak 
numbers, or when stands have developed to a state in which they are predisposed
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to potentially catastrophic insect damage. Both situations significantly threaten 
our ability to manage the resource in a way that is consistent with the Forest 
Plans'5 (USDA FS 1991,11-1).
The passage indicates that the Forest Service believes that forest health is in some 
essential way connected to the presence o f disease and death, that is to “unhealth.” The 
problem is that we move from the good, the desirable, the acceptable, the healthy level o f 
disease to the bad. the catastrophic, the threatening, the outbreak, and the unhealthy 
without benefit o f an objective mechanism or a marker that might enable us to distinguish 
between the two. How do we know' when we cross the line?
Forest health in essence is defined by those conditions that make life (as we humans 
know it) possible. That is. we would consider as “unhealthy” any forest (or ecosystem) 
condition that presents a threat to the continued existence of the human race; a judgement 
of "forest health55 is motivated solely by human self-interest, not that o f the forest itself. 
Other conditions, conditions that exist beyond what scientists call ecological limits, may 
or may not permit o f human existence, and would at the very least change our existence 
in ways we cannot predict. Ecological limits are really knowledge (and perhaps desire?) 
limits; when our conceptual system (the ecosystem) exceeds the boundaries we establish 
for it. when it goes beyond the categorical restraints we posit (those things that make it 
systematic), we can no longer hope to predict or control its trajectory because we cannot 
think what is beyond thought. The reflexive and backward looking tenor o f  “health” is
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indicative o f our fear o f the unknown that is the future, our resistance to mortality (be it 
our own or that of nature). It is an implicit rejection of the irreducible ignorance that lies 
at the limits o f knowledge, it is what drives the collection o f data, all of which is always 
already obsolete— markers o f a never to be returned to historical state— before it is even 
turned into information or knowledge.
The comparison to ideas o f  human health from the social science perspective is 
instructive, even if it does not necessarily resolve anything. Recall that in one case being 
healthy meant that one enjoyed a "state o f complete physical, mental, and social well- 
being" (not merely the absence o f disease or infirmity) and that in another, health was 
conceived o f as the "ability ... to reach social, emotional, and economic goals despite 
illness, impairment, or functional limitations." The health described in the first definition 
is really more of an ideal, and a highly subjective and ambiguous one at that. The second 
definition, however, seems much more workable, and to coincide more closely with how 
it is that we ourselves might experience health. Though considerably less ideal than the 
one offered by the WHO. it is equally subjective (or situated) and highly ambiguous. As 
noted above, what is most provocative about this idea o f health is that it does not by 
definition exclude those things or conditions that we have traditionally learned to 
consider as attributes or signs o f “ ill health." It normalizes all those aspects, states, or 
qualities that we have learned to think o f as deviant; it suggests that disease, dysfunction, 
and impairment are not signs o f ill health in and o f themselves, but are only considered as 
detracting from health when they prevent a person from realizing some goal. This means
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that one cannot establish fully objective criteria for evaluating human health because the 
impact o f  particular diseases, impairments, or dysfunctions is differently assimilated by 
each person depending upon their goals, their hopes and expectations, and how closely 
these goals are tied to their identity. A discourse developed around this definition of 
health would have to confront the difficult questions about how it is that we continue to 
live as healthy, goal driven people in the presence of those conditions that we label as 
sickness, disease, impairment, or derangement. Under this rubric, one gets to entertain, 
for example, the presently politically incorrect thought that aging and death are pan of, 
even the essence of. a “healthy" life; to ask the question. “When is dying the best way to 
live?"
These questions are even more central— and their answers even less obvious—  in the 
discourse o f forest health because we are dealing with countless organisms that will live 
either as "diseases” themselves or with disease, organisms that will age and die. and do so 
in environments that will be disturbing and eventful. Unlike in the case o f human health 
in which we are concerned not only with population health (the health of the species), but 
also with the health o f the individual, in forestry, too great a concern for the health o f the 
individual can produce an unhealthy forest: “we have protected trees at the expense of the 
forest and its long term health" (USDA FS/Monnig and Bvler, 1992).26 Both the passage 
from the Blue Mountains Report and the definition of health offered on the USFS 
National Headquarters web site (w'hich includes natural disturbances as healthy).
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internalize the contradiction, embrace the irreducible tension o f the either-or, construct 
health in terms o f its no-longer opposite “unhealth.” What is most remarkable about these 
passages and definitions is that, having made the statement, the Forest Service then 
proceeds to identify, measure, analyze, and interpret baseline conditions o f forest health 
as if  they were somehow given. In other words, having said that insects, for example, can 
be good, healthy, they then list them under the category o f “threats” to forest health as if 
doing so did not require overcoming a tremendous cognitive gulf.
In spite o f Leopold’s wish to the contrary, we do not have a science o f forest health; “art" 
intervenes at every stage in the process. The language we use to describe disease (like the 
term “disease" itself), is not scientific, at least not in the objective, value neutral sense 
that scientists generally prefer or require. Like health, our perception o f disease as disease 
is always already colored by value judgments: decline, catastrophe, disturbance, etc. these 
are not objective states: they are weighted concepts or categories o f thought that we use to 
interpret designated external conditions, signifiers whose meanings and values are 
constantly renegotiated within the social contexts and discursive networks within which 
they are circulated and reified. The value o f the terms is relational, just as the conditions 
signified are relational (i.e.. to say something is damaged presumes some prior condition 
that was defined as undamaged). The criteria we use to distinguish between a pest and an 
insect, a flourishing population and an infestation, a function and a catastrophe, a process
:b It is not politically correct, but one could conceivably argue that too much concern for individual human 
health has in fact contributed toa decrease in population health (depending on how you define health, o f  
course) and this in turn has led to decreases in individual health.
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and a disturbance are mutable, subject to change across time and space, and are rarely 
exhausted by an exclusively scientific epistemology. Neither, however, are they reducible 
to mere mental constructs. But he who gets to decide what to call the item (flourishing or 
infestation) controls the discourse— at least temporarily!
The mere presence or absence o f a particular entity or phenomena is in and o f itself not 
an indicator o f health or disease. Even a measurement of the frequency or intensity o f an 
event or an entity is not sufficient to differentiate between disease or health. Western 
dw arf mistletoe and rust red stringy rot are not objectively speaking, diseases; they are 
distinguishable differences from the not-mistletoe and the not-rust red stringy rot. but 
they only become diseases when they get in the way o f what we want the forest to look 
like or how we want an ecosystem to perform. Disease and/or health are time and place 
specific, but are also fully dependent upon human desires: they are contingent, emergent, 
relational, situated, particular, and premised upon some (often unstated) notion of 
teleology. An ecosystem is only unhealthy if  it cannot reach some state or goal— one that 
is not essential or integral to the ecosystem itself (or at least not in the way the FS has 
presently defined an ecosystem ....) but only to the ideas and desires that humans have of 
or for that ecosystem.
One begins to get the uncomfortable feeling that pursuing a program designed to promote 
ecosystem health might require acts o f violence: we will be required to make value-laden 
distinctions where none seem to exist at the ontological level— or the presumed level o f
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the real. We will have to exclude, to eradicate, to manipulate, to perform some sort o f 
"-ectomy," in order to produce a “healthy” ecosystem. Health is an undeniably normative 
term in both human medicine and forestry'; we choose those conditions or states or 
functions that we like and we define them as healthy. The rest we define as aberrant, 
deviant, unhealthy. This is what frightens doctors like Seldin who believe that if  
conceived o f in this way. and extended to all aspects o f human life, health as a norm can 
lead to medically sanctioned fascism; and it is what frightens humanists when they accuse 
environmentalists of eco-fascism (Zimmerman 1994). This is probably the impetus 
behind appending the human needs and desires clause to the “objective” biophysical 
clause in health definition. But if it is true that health is a normative (not just an 
objective) concept from the outset, then it becomes a matter o f competing desires, or if 
you prefer competing identities, from the very beginning; that is, it's turtles all the way 
dow n.2' Unless the Forest Service can produce an unambiguous and incontestable 
definition o f an ecosystem and  can irrevocably bind that definition (those words) to some 
specific condition in the real that will sanction and validate that norm as an objectively 
healthy state, then it, like the rest o f us. will be forced to play language games.
We have now encountered problems at multiple levels: it seems our object (the forest) as 
presently defined, gives us no objective grounds for establishing “health.” Furthermore, 
our definition o f health, despite grammatical gymnastics to make it appear otherwise, is 
suspiciously dependent upon unexamined ideas (human ideas) o f  what a forest ought to
■ I don't know the origins o f  the anecdote, but as the story goes, “it’s turtles all the way down’’ is the 
answer given by an Indian (?) woman to the query o f  “what holds the world up?” She said the world sat on 
the back o f  a great turtle. And what does that turtle stand upon? Upon the back o f  another turtle. And that 
one11 It's turtles all the way down. The deeper you look, you just get more o f  the same.
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be or do— that is. it begins to look as though we have framed forest health in terms o f 
human desires, not appended them afterwards as qualifiers. Along the way we have also 
encountered other intractable difficulties, those o f knowledge, language, and meaning. In 
forestry, as in medicine, we have chosen the “out there” as our focus o f  concern, yet we 
can only know it through our logoi, our conceptual structures, which are, for better or 
worse, linguistically bound and determined. As concrete actually existing beings we live 
in "the flux,” "the real.” But as knowing beings, we live in the symbolic; we know o f  
ourselves as selves and o f  the real as the other by virtue o f concepts that enable us to 
make sense o f the barrage o f sensory perceptions with which we are bombarded at every 
moment; that is, by “the posterior reconstruction o f existence by the process o f 
conceptualization” (Einstein 1994, 47). Science and the natural sciences in particular are 
but one o f the conceptual structures that we use to make sense of. to interpret “our 
interactions with the flux” not with the flux itself (Hayles in Soule 1995 , 53). This is a 
critical point o f departure for those who do science in the shadow of continental 
philosophy; it is not clear, however, that forestry has fully understood or internalized the 
impact o f this alternative conceptualization o f  what we do when we do science.
On Doing Science in the Shadow o f  CP
In a correspondence conducted in 1932 at the suggestion o f the League o f Nations 
between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, Freud defends the theoretical nature o f  his 
work (psychoanalysis) with this argument:
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It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories are a kind o f mythology and. in 
the present case [an examination o f the causes o f war], not even an agreeable one. 
But does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology like this? 
Cannot the same be said today of your own Physics? (Freud, 15)
The question for us is. at least in part. "Can it be said o f science that it does, in the end. 
come a kind of mythology?'’ Or, alternatively, can it be said o f science that it does not 
carry within it the terms or conditions o f its own legitimation? Does it require an outside 
source, a narrative account, o f how and why it is that we accept its findings and methods 
as knowledge? To these questions, scientists themselves as well as philosophers of 
science and more recently critical theorists, anthropologists, sociologists, and multi- 
culturalists have responded yes. The works o f Thomas Kuhn. Albert Einstein. Karl 
Popper. David Bohm. Stuart Kauffman. Paul Feverabend. W.V.O.Quine. Jean-Francois 
Lyotard. Godei. Michael Polanyi. and Richard Rortv (to name but a very few) all engage 
with this problem o f legitimation, and invariably it is admitted that one must go beyond 
or outside o f science itself, to culture or language or religion or some account o f 
psychology or cognition or perception, to seek the explanation for science itself.
I will not here investigate to any depth the intricacies and subtleties o f the science 
question. For my purposes. I am interested only in briefly stating the arguments that 
support the contention that science is not an uncontested or unproblematic methodology
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or framework that the FS or the medical establishment can use as an ultimate and 
unassailable defense against criticism.
The “fate" o f science and the role o f scientific knowledge in a post modem world has 
been thoroughly evaluated and critiqued (and those evaluations and critiques have 
themselves been evaluated and critiqued...) by numerous scholars and practitioners in 
numerous fields, including the sciences themselves. In addition to the “classic’' texts 
mentioned above there are contemporary texts that engage with the problem o f science, 
language, gender, race, power, knowledge, etc.: Levins and Lewontin in biology and 
ecology: Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and other feminists and ecofeminists in 
biology and medicine: Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers in physics and chemistry. Tom 
Sorrell. N. Kathryn Hayles. Evelyn Fox Keller, Will Wright. Robert Almeder, Larry 
Laudin. A.F. Chalmers. J. Marchessault et al., etc.. Therefore, I will sketch out only the 
bare bones o f how some of the insights o f CP into knowledge, language and the self 
affect the modem scientific project as they apply to this particular project. For the most 
pan. I am interested in only two specific points: first, how the redefinition o f the object 
makes applying rigorous scientific methodology virtually impossible; and second, how 
the new understanding of the ultimately normative or prescriptive character o f  the 
objective (forest health) suggested above pushes back the point at which we may 
legitimately invoke the name o f science in defense o f  any one particular analysis or 
evaluation o f forest conditions.
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As discussed above in Chapter Two, continental philosophy rejects the idea o f an all 
knowing subject that can stand outside o f  not only his or her own body, but outside o f his 
or her own time and place, culture and history. Generally, the subject in continental 
philosophy is inescapably embodied, historical, and situated: we are, at least in part, a 
product of our culture and our language. This subject is never fully present 
(omnipresent)— either to or for him or herself, or to or for the flux— ; it is always 
emergent, differed and deferred because it does not experience itself in the real (without 
recourse to symbolic structures), but only experiences itself experiencing itself as a ‘‘self." 
The same is true for how it relates to the real. Because presence is not perfect 
(transparent), knowledge is not perfect (omniscient); like the knowing subject knowledge 
is partial, contingent, fissured, fragmented, and mediated; it is historically and culturally 
dependent, just as the knowing subject is. Knowledge— even scientific knowledge—  is 
inextricably bound to language, and to logos, to the organizing conceptual frameworks of 
the human mind. But words are slippery; meaning is not fixed and cannot be controlled 
because every discourse is fissured, open; there is no obligatory or temporally stable 
connection between the words we use and the meanings conveyed, no necessary 
connection between the images and meanings produced and circulated in the symbolic 
and their referents in the real. '‘What we know" then, seems to tell us at least as much 
about how our minds work (which we can’t know directly...), about how our sensory 
organs work, about where and what we are in time and space, about our relations to other 
humans, and about how our language works (grammar, syntax, logic) as about what is 
"out there." Because we are embodied, however, we are saved from the "aristocratic
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illusion'' o f pure thought, of abstraction, or radical constructivism; and, because we think, 
we are (supposedly) saved from the "the plebian illusion o f  naive realism, according to 
which things ‘are* as they are perceived by us through our senses” (Einstein 1994, 21). 
This latter "illusion,” however, "dominates the daily life o f men and o f animals; it is also 
the point o f  departure in all o f  the sciences, especially o f  the natural sciences (emphasis 
added. Einstein 1994, 21). Despite the convenience o f this "short cut” (assumed 
transparency), it is perhaps time to change this point o f departure.
We can say o f science that it yields invaluable, useful, and unique, if contingent and 
partial, insights into what we think is "out there.” We test these (scientific) ideas o f the 
real (hypotheses) not against the real itself but against our gathered experiences thereof. 
We articulate our discoveries, our findings, in language that is inherently ambiguous and 
ineluctably slippery. Not unexpectedly, many scientists are themselves keenly aware o f 
the limitations o f  their endeavor if for no other reason than science itself has discovered 
them. Bertrand Russell, according to Einstein, articulates the inherent contradiction 
nicely:
We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But 
physics assures us that the greenness o f  the grass, the hardness o f  the stones, and 
the coldness o f snow are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know 
in our own experience, but something very different. The observer, when he 
seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if  physics is to be believed,
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observ ing the effects o f the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war 
with itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into 
subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, 
shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; 
therefore it is false (Russell quoted in Einstein 1994, 21-23).
Einstein also grapples with the problems of language— its slipperiness, its ambiguity, and 
its apparent lack of obligatory correspondence to some definitive referent— which for 
better or worse is the primary vehicle by which we know of ourselves and o f the out
there:
...the concepts which arise in our thoughts and in our linguistic expressions are 
all— when viewed logically— the free creations of thought which cannot 
inductively be gained from sense experiences. This is not so easily noticed only 
because we have the habit o f combining certain concepts and conceptual relations 
(propositions) so definitely with certain sense experiences that we do not become 
conscious o f the gulf—logically unbridgeable— which separates the world of 
sensory experiences from the world o f concepts and propositions (Einstein 1994. 
24).
Concealing, or at least "forgetting,” this “unbridgeable gu lf’ is one o f the things that 
science (and/or reports o f scientific discoveries in the media) does so well, and one o f  the
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ways it does so is by defining its terms. But. recall if you will the Forest Health Science 
Panel's refusal to define forest health because o f its inherent ambiguity and instability; 
remember the prescriptive terms (masquerading as descriptive terms) that appeared in 
USFS definitions o f health; recall too that we define terms by recourse to other terms, and 
those by recourse to others and so on and so on— we thus never get out o f language or 
escape ambiguity; and finally, recall that in one definition (the USDA FS N at’l HQ web 
site) and in more than one text (USDA FS/Monnig and Byler 1992; USDA FS 1991.
Blue Mountains Report) health was inextricably linked to “unhealthy." Remember too. 
the USFS definition o f an ecosystem: “an arrangement o f living and non-living things and 
the forces that move among them." The signifier is so full— perfectly so. in fact—  as to 
signify nothing. It is perfectly meaningless. We are having trouble developing new 
"habits of combining certain concepts [ecosystems] and conceptual relations [forest 
health]" ... "with certain sense experiences" and we are thus painfully “conscious o f the 
gulf—logically unbridgeable— which separates the world o f sensory experiences from the 
world o f concepts and propositions." This is as true o f medicine as it is o f forestry and it 
bodes ill for the exclusive use o f science in either one.
The basic methods o f positivist/reductive science— testability (or falsifiability) based 
upon repeatability and absolute control o f all variables—  work well for isolated, well- 
defined. thoroughly controlled entities or conditions. Scientists admit that they work 
considerably less well with large, complex, multivariable, uncontrollable open entities or 
processes. As Einstein puts it: “when the number o f factors coming into play in a
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phenomenological complex is too large, scientific method in most cases fails us”
(Einstein 1994. 51). A person is just such a multi-factorial phenomenological complex— a 
"complex” which is complicated many times over by the addition o f a “noumenological” 
complex. The definition of an ecosystem also fits Einstein’s description o f a too-large, 
multi-factorial phenomenological complex that exceeds scientific method. Neither 
persons nor ecosystems are well-defined, isolated entities that exist in controlled 
conditions. Just as physicians are learning to incorporate other forms o f  knowledge into 
their diagnostic and therapeutic regimes, so foresters will likely have to do the same; 
different discursive practices (as knowledge practices, not as mere opinion) account for 
different variables in the complex.
And finally, it is commonly accepted that science deals as well as anything can with 
questions of what is (or what we think is), but is not at all well suited to dealing with 
questions o f what should be (both Hume’s is-ought dichotomy and Moore's “naturalistic 
fallacy"). The problem is, that since ecosystems, like persons, seem to come with no 
definitive objectively “healthy” conditions, arrangements, processes, or functions— at 
least not according to our definitions— then forest health, like human health, turns out to 
be a normative, highly subjective, easily contested signifier that gets filled differently by 
different persons with different agendas and a different set o f criteria. And this is 
important: people fill the forest health signifier by referring to their sometimes different 
experiences o f different ecosystems. Unlike persons (as patients), ecosystems do not get 
to fill their own signifier, any more than they get to fill the “forest health” signifier.
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Patients get to speak, to at least contend with the physicians professional account, for the 
right to define the terms o f own health. Such is not the case for ecosystems.
The debates over what constitutes forest health are keen, and in part, the debate centers on 
the role o f science as well as whose science. One m an’s forest health is another man's 
forest disaster: The cover o f the Summer 1996 issue o f Defender's magazine sported the 
provocative title “Lawless Logging: The ’Forest Health’ Scam” accompanied by an aerial 
view o f a clearcut. The article claims that the FS is using its “phony” version o f “forest 
health" as a means to log more heavily (Durbin 1996, 15-24). Then too. one man’s good 
science is another's bad science (“Science and Community Knowledge” Forest Trust 21: 
January 2000. "Rep. Charles Taylor's Bogus Forest Health Science Report." a “memo" 
published by the Western Ancient Forest Campaign. April 9. 1997). Part o f the problem 
stems from the fact that neither the questions asked nor the criteria chosen, the variables 
excluded or included, or the interpretations o f collected data are obligatory (and are often 
concealed). Change the values that drive the observations, alter the technology that 
permits access— that enhances one’s sensory capacities or in turn makes one “blind” to 
other possibilities—and the outcomes o f science change. Change the questions, propose 
new criteria, select different variables, choose another interpretation: one gets different 
answers.28 Awareness o f this prompted the Forest Health Science Panel to state at the 
outset that “as with any analytical and scientific study, differences in grouping, averaging, 
analyzing, and interpreting data lead to variations. Each condition, effect, and number
:s For example. Lee. R.G. (1994) reports that "FEMAT did not want or would not use any information that 
would not support the long-term goal o f  restoring forests to their pre-settlement conditions" (31).
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reported could be contested and refined" (FHSP 1997, Preface, 1). And it is, by other 
scientists with other interests and by other interests with other knowledges. The 
limitations o f science and of expertise in resolving these larger issues o f  forests and forest 
health is due in part to the complexity o f the real, in part to the "unbridgeable g u lf’ 
between our knowledge o f it and it itself, in part to the unbridgeable gulf between our 
sensory data and our concepts/ideas (that constitute knowledge) (Einstein), and in part to 
the fact that we know o f forests and o f forest health through different conceptual 
frameworks, many o f which are non-scientific.
The Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, an interdisciplinary group o f 
scientists and experts (weighted heavily toward the natural sciences) responsible for 
preparing an ecological, economic, and social assessment o f EM for the Forest Service 
notes that
in the past 5 years, four major scientific task forces have attempted to resolve 
issues o f old-growth forests and endangered species protection. Yet. despite 
unprecedented levels o f expertise and effort brought to bear on these issues, their 
resolution seems as far away as ever. Moreover, despite the profound 
consequences these issues hold for people, both in the region and elsewhere, only 
limited attention has been given to their human aspects, at least in any explicit and 
systematic fashion (FEMAT 1993. VII-3-4).
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Which brings us to one final point that must be touched upon before leaving this section: 
the relationship between knowledge, expertise, and power. Knowledge is power, and in 
our culture, scientific knowledge is still one o f the most powerful totems that one can 
invoke in defense of a point or a position, particularly when one wishes to give the 
impression of disinterestedness and objectivity. For example, when queried on the role he 
envisions for the federal government in setting the environmental agenda in the October 
11. 2000 presidential debate. G. W. Bush responded that he was perfectly willing to 
endorse various environmentally friendly policies and practices “so long as they’re based 
on science and they're reasonable." He went on to say that there “are a lot o f  different 
opinions [presumably about what we ought to do “about the environment”]. We need a 
full accounting before we make decisions." Similarly, when Dr. Jane Henney. 
Commissioner o f Food and Drugs, was asked to defend her decision to allow the use o f 
RU-486 (the abortion pill or mifepristine) in the United States she responds that “the 
approval of mifepristine is the result o f the FDA’s careful evaluation o f the scientific 
evidence related to the safe and effective use o f this drug. ... The FDA’s review and 
approval of this drug has adhered strictly to our legal mandate and mission as a science- 
based public health regulatory agency” (http://www.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH 
women/09/2 8/abortion .pill/index.html). In an interview on the ABC Evening News 
with Peter Jennings she reiterates once more that the decision was based “purely on 
science" and had nothing to do with politics (ABC, 9-28-00). The impression conveyed is 
that the science is unassailable, that it’s findings are (or will be) unanimous and
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incontestable, and that the data will tell us unequivocally what to do. Science, therefore, 
is a politically powerful instrument provided one can conceal its political and cultural 
connections. Philosophers and sociologists contend that the some political and social 
forces that operate outside of the community of scientists to reify it also operate within 
the community of researchers to effectively constrain research agendas (cf. Latour and 
Woolgar (1979). Thagard (1999), Klee (1997), etc.).
Ultimately, the power of scientific knowledge accrues to those who can use its tools and 
speak its language. Science fosters a culture o f expertise, and this expertise tends to 
exclude other sorts o f knowledges in an effort to maintain authority and to control the 
terms o f the discourse.
It is perhaps even deeper than this, however, in a culture such as ours that venerates 
science. Medical anthropologists and sociologists have noted that “members o f a 
dominant culture are inclined to view their own ways as logical and natural, to see culture 
as something that others have. In this case, we have science and knowledge, they have 
traditions and myths” (Henderson 1997. 7). This attitude permeates both forest culture 
and medical culture; scientific knowledge is naturalized or “canonized” in ways that 
marginalize other conceptual frameworks, and effectively disempower those that use 
them. In both medicine and forestry, the public is invited to the table (as patient or as 
stake holder) but in neither case is it given a voice with which to speak— at least, not a 
voice that can speak with the power o f scientific knowledge. Take for example, a 
sampling o f a text dealing specifically with the social aspects o f forest health issues in the
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USDA Forest Service’s Blue Mountains report. The authors state that “just how these 
Forest Health questions [insects, diseases, fires] affect the public is a matter for 
sociological inquiry. What are the attitudes, the beliefs, the values society holds toward 
management o f these resources?...” (USDA FS 1991, iii). The authors go on to state that 
the public suffers from “a general misunderstanding o f multiple-use concepts and 
integrated resource planning” (USDA FS 1991,1-1), as well as “a general 
misunderstanding o f how forest health relates to all forest resources” (USDA FS 1991,1- 
2): and again "the general public does not understand forest ecosystem dynamics ... and 
is further confused by the differing opinions o f experts” (USDA FS 1991.11-146). The 
job of the FS is to "disseminate information that will help to develop an 
understanding...:” "to undertake a proactive campaign to share our understanding of 
forest heal th. . to engage in "community outreach and education” in order "to promote 
an understanding...:” “to inform the public...;” to provide information to ‘our publics' 
that “can serve to foster a better understanding...;” "to communicate to the public the 
nature and scope o f the problem and the realities of continuing forest ecosystem 
decline..."(e.g.. USDA FS 1991, throughout). The implication is that while public 
attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and perceptions o f forest health are a matter for sociological 
investigations and are incorrect (that is, as beliefs, attitudes and values they are subjective 
and messy with little in the way o f knowledge content), the Forest Service itself is 
immune to such subjective pressures and is in possession o f knowledge regarding forest 
health and disease. The public is an appropriate curious object for sociological study; the 
scientific Forest Service is not.
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The more esoteric the terminology, the more specialized the requisite knowledge, the 
more narrowly delimited the object and the objective^ the more control one ought to be 
able to exert over the discourse and the practice. The Forest Service’s efforts to articulate 
a strictly biophysical (ecological) model o f health and the medical communities’ efforts to 
narrowly define human health as bodily health, and their subsequent attempts to privilege 
scientific discourse and methodology as the predominant conceptual framework could be 
(and have been) interpreted as an effort to retain power (cf. Foucault M adness.... and 
Birth o f  the Clinic; Cassell 1997; Feverabend 1993, 130; Ben-Sira 1988; Shuval 1992; 
Seldin 1997: etc.). However, as we have noted, both foresters and physicians are fighting 
a battle that is increasingly harder to win, if for no other reason than that their objects 
defy reduction and circumscription within the constraints o f a single, narrow conceptual 
framework. There are, however, other reasons, and those we have noted above. We will 
only mention one final factor that works against FS and the medical establishment's 
efforts to control the terms: dispersion. We live in an age when knowledge— even the 
most esoteric knowledge—  is available through a variety o f discursive venues. As a 
result, control o f the terms is more tenuous than ever. One can access health information, 
even scientific medical information, directly from books and the world wide web. The 
same is true for environmental knowledge. Interested parties have access to the 
terminology, to the science(s), the critiques o f  the science(s), and to other knowledge 
frameworks that pose different questions, propose different categories, and privilege 
different perspectives. The terms o f  the discourses, like the discourses o f forest and 
human health themselves, are produced and reproduced, read and reread in the public
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domain. If knowledge is power, and knowledge is dispersed, then power too is 
dispersed— unless there is some other way to protect power— like a guild or some 
authority that confers the label '‘expert.”
In closing. I would add that the same critique that is here leveled against science could 
also be leveled against other disciplines, discursive frameworks, or institutions. The 
humanities are no more immune to power struggles and tendencies toward reification by 
virtue of being humanities than the sciences are.29 The point o f this discussion on the 
cultural roots of science is not to lay grounds for its rejection but simply to say that those 
who use science can no longer hide their findings behind the mask o f objectivity, and can 
no longer assert authority based on some privileged access to the real that science 
supposedly grants them.
The university system in the U.S. is conventionally divided into the humanities and the sciences. I have 
reproduced that bifurcation here.
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion
It was clear what the survey results said, but not what they meant.
-Martha Balshem 
Cancer, Control, and Causality
After you have finished your true stories sometime, why don't you make up a story and 
the people to go with it? Only then will you understand what happened and why.
-Norman MacLean 
A River Runs Through It
The tit between forest health and human health, between forestry and medicine is not 
exact, but it is instructive even in its differences. They are both social endeavors in the 
usual, obvious material ways: funding constraints, organizational and knowledge 
structures that create or constrain opportunities and dictate information flow and 
communication, political and legal restraints, technological limitations (or opportunities), 
the weight o f public opinion, etc. Additionally, within forestry as in medicine, there is a 
palpable and as yet unresolved tension between those who consider the object as “given." 
a pre-discursive, value-neutral site o f investigation and activity (the body or the forest) 
and those who see it as “constructed,” as value-laden and contested. Accordingly, these 
two camps differentiate between the appropriate objectives and activities: those who see 
forestry as a natural science with objectives that are “given” (as in the case o f “health” as 
an objective condition o f  the forest) and those who see it as a cultural endeavor that 
includes scientific knowledge with explicitly culturally produced objectives. These
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aspects are important: but there are other more subtle differences and similarities that are 
equally important and interesting, if  considerably less tractable and amenable to solution
As individual humans, we expect to age, to become “infirm,” to die (even though as a 
species we hope to persist). Most o f our life is spent coming to terms with the changes in 
our physical and mental capacities and constructing narratives for assimilating and 
normalizing those changes; i.e., we attempt to sustain an identity in the face o f sometimes 
dramatic flux. We have the advantage o f being a single organism that is (deceptively) 
well-bounded (deceptive, because not only are we dependent upon our environment for 
our very lives, but because we are a symbolic species whose limitless mental and/or 
spiritual life appears to have a profound effect on our physical existence and on our 
perceptions thereof). Ecosystems, or forests, are (obviously) not like humans: we expect 
them to persist despite the loss o f particular species or individuals, structures, processes, 
functions, or events. And herein lies the problem: how' does one establish a "norm.” a 
"baseline condition” for such an amorphous, unbounded, infinitely complex, “out there" 
(that is organic but is not an organism) that is not only constantly changing itself but 
about which our ideas are also constantly changing in accordance with our changing 
perspectives, our science, and our expectations? What is the “identity” o f  this ecosystem 
that we wish to sustain and does it (the identity, or “ecosystem”) exist independently o f 
our thought categories? In the same way that our knowledge o f our bodies and our ideas 
o f health and illness are constructed and described through cultural networks, through 
narratives, so too are our knowledge o f  the biophysical forest and our ideas o f forest
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health and disease. Forestry, like medicine, becomes an exercise not just in the collection 
o f material data or in the manipulation o f physical features, but in a negotiation or quest 
for meaning, for explanation— not in any essential or foundational sense, but rather in 
the provisional and contingent sense o f Lyotard’s language games (Lyotard 1984, 9-10). 
Foresters must also be able to build “stories” around, about, and with (and even before) 
the data, stories that make sense of, that lend significance, to “facts” (the signs) and 
thereby give the FS a purpose. In the same way, the stories that are necessary to legitimate 
certain types o f knowledge (science) and power structures (the FS, for example) and to 
invest persons or managerial bodies with authority are not found within the knowledge, 
the structure, or the persons and institutions themselves, but rather in narratives 
constructed outside o f them (Lyotard 1984. 10. 30-1). The skills and the tools necessary 
to build stories, to interpret data (as data and not noise), to invest signs with meaning are 
found in the humanities.
Humans tend to measure health in terms o f what we hope to be able to do; that is, 
judgements o f health tend to be cast against some hoped for future condition or ability 
(recall the "old” subjective USFS definition (#1) o f health). To judge our present health 
against our past health would doom most o f us to “unhealthy” lives in perpetuity (this 
assumes, perhaps not correctly, that health is often associated with youth....!). For our 
forests on the other hand, we look toward history— or prehistory— for our measure of 
health at the same time that we expect it to meet (not entirely clear) future needs and 
desires. Current FS definitions o f  health produce and reify a tension between a mythical.
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supposedly objective, past forest (our knowledge o f which is very far from perfect) and 
unknown, subjective, future needs and desires. But in the same way that we are 
apparently morally opposed to the possibility that advancements in medical knowledge 
and techniques might enable us to produce a super-human race— a race o f physically (and 
mentally) "perfect" beings, so too might we find ourselves opposed to such a “healthy” 
forest that it would entail the extermination o f humans. The “pre-European” forest that 
w e like to use as our "gold standard” o f health is pre-European, pre-contact, and perhaps 
even "pre-lapsean” (i.e., Edenic). We live in a post-European, post-contact America; we 
have lost our innocence. As humans, our ideas o f health are adaptive, progressive, and 
highly situational or subjective; they have more to do with our hopes and dreams than 
with our past. We go to great lengths to accommodate and normalize "differences.” It is 
likely that our ideas o f forest health, despite the rhetoric and the claim to objectivity, are 
also more firmly anchored in human desires and cultural constructs than is readily 
apparent, and it is equally likely that a significant portion o f  the population will go to 
great lengths to protect those differences that for others represent “disease.”
In the same way that physicians are learning to “speak many languages” in order to 
negotiate a meaning o f “health” that is acceptable to the individual patient, so too must 
foresters learn to speak many languages in order to negotiate a meaning o f health that 
takes into consideration the multiple and often conflicting identities that people assign to 
forests. The language o f bioscience is as inadequate to address the totality' o f the human 
being as the language o f  the natural sciences is to address the totality o f the forest. For
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better or worse . the forest, like our bodies, are not only things out there, but things about 
which we have ideas and emotions, and in which we have invested meanings. Our 
understandings and experiences of the objects in question in each field exceed the bounds 
of one knowledge system or practice; it is thus inevitable that our judgements o f health 
will also exceed the bounds o f one praxis.
Like medicine, forestry must deal with the loss of control of the object, its objective, and 
the terms o f its discourse on both. The loss is attributable at bottom to the inherent and 
inescapable slipperiness o f language (which all the science and knowledge in the world 
will not reduce), to the dispersion o f the medical and forestry discourses in the culture at 
large and the concomitant production o f alternative discourses, and to the appropriation 
and redeployment o f the terms o f the discourses in other frameworks that construct 
different meanings and interpretations. Insofar as forestry and medicine are both language 
based practices— praxes— they cannot escape these problems.
But the broader understandings— the “ecologization"— of both the Forest Services' and 
the medical communities' objects— ecosystems and persons— also impose significant 
limitations on the possibility that one organization, one theory or methodology, or one 
praxis can fully control the knowledge that is produced about either one. The same holds 
true for our judgements o f health: the more multi-faceted and complex the entity under 
consideration, the more difficult it is to establish definitive, stable criteria for measuring 
the health o f that entity. This does not mean that nothing can be done, that nothing can be
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said, but only that one must develop new (or maybe just other?) words, new categories 
and habits o f thought that permit one to think and to speak across the multiple discursive 
boundaries that constitute an “ecosystem.”
Foresters are not alone in this endeavor. Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist who tackles 
the unenviable task o f rethinking anthropology— its justification, mission, and 
assumptions— in an age in which the explanatory power o f the grand narrative o f human 
progress has failed and along with it the authority that this conceptual framework grants 
to the objective anthropologist, suggests that anthropology must move from “structure 
and causality" toward “meaning and interpretation” (Geertz 1973.5). This modem day 
anthropologist sees “man [a]s an animal suspended in webs o f significance he him self has 
spun" and anthropology is thus no longer “an experimental science in search o f a law but 
an interpretive one in search o f a meaning" (Geertz 1973.5). Foresters might consider 
doing something similar: we can consider forests as real “things.” but things that are also 
"suspended in webs o f significance.” Forestry would thus be not ju st “an experimental 
science" in search o f structure, causality, and the laws o f nature, but also an interpretive 
exercise in which foresters fully and directly engage in the difficult, never-ending task of 
interpreting and assigning meaning to the myriad and conflicting sense data that we “get” 
from these forests and ecosystems.
This means going beyond “adaptive management” to adaptive interpretation—  to 
adaptive knowledge systems and discursive networks that permit o f multiple ontologies.
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epistemologies, and axiologies. Under this rubric, simply defining a term, or eradicating 
the variables or accidents o f time and place, will no longer suffice. Ambiguity at the level 
o f  language is as inescapable as uncertainty at the level o f “the real:” it is not something 
to be defined permanently away, but is the fundamental condition o f knowing (as an 
ongoing action rather than a fa it accompli). Thus, in addition to trying to define its terms, 
the Forest Service might do well to unpack them, to examine them not just in so far as 
they are meant to point to some extralinguistic biophysical state, function, relationship, or 
process, but also, and more importantly, to see how the same terms are deployed and 
negotiated in the network o f signification that we call culture. As these networks shift— 
and they do with each new speech or writing act— meaning slips, new values are 
suggested and old associations revealed. Words are markers, nodes o f  meaning— 
constantly shifting nexi in a dispersed web of information. In a postmodern world, one 
informed by the precepts o f Continental philosophy, no single person or power structure 
can ever completely control the terms o f its own discourse: something always escapes, 
there is always a remainder, always an outside that disrupts the internal unity o f  the 
inside. Terms, especially in the natural science discourses, do refer outward but they are 
also situated within a discourse which itself is situated within (and permeated by) 
countless other discourses. In the post modem world, it is no longer the case that 
"undefined" terms or axioms— inevitable in any theory, scientific or otherwise— sit there 
“quietly" and unobtrusively; instead they disrupt the theory (or theorem),— like an 
irritating itch or sneezing fit (cf. G odefs theorem).
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Traditional forestry education has done a fine job o f teaching potential foresters to 
interrogate the referent (the forest, the species, etc.). It teaches them to do field research, 
to collect and manipulate data, to use the technologies, and even to interpret that data in 
some limited way; in short, forestry education teaches foresters to do science. It says little 
if anything at all, o f the assumptions about knowledge, language, and self that are 
concealed within the theories and methods o f science. It does even less to teach future 
foresters to speak in other languages, to know in other ways, and to value these other 
knowledges and discursive formations as legitimate. It is perhaps time for forestry to 
become self-reflexive: to investigate the conditions o f its own possibility, the meanings o f 
its terms, and the real complexity (symbolically speaking) o f its object. To do this, it will 
need to step out o f itself and use the tools provided by other disciplines and other 
persepctives. More than 300 years ago, John Locke suggested that there are three faults 
that inhibit our thinking, the third o f which is committed by
those who readily and sincerely follow reason, but for want o f having that which 
one may call large, sound, round-about sense have not the full view o f all that 
relates to the question ... We are all short-sighted and often see but one side o f a 
matter; our views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this 
defect I think no man is free (Locke, 56).
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In attempting to free ourselves from this defect (or at least minimize it!) we may take 
another page from the book of medicine. Nearly two decades ago the University o f North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill began to require a year-long course for all first-year medical 
students taught by humanities scholars, social scientists, and practicing physicians. The 
rationale for the expansion and for making the course a requirement was the recognition 
on the part o f physicians and health care workers (to say nothing o f patients) that 
medicine, for better or worse, was about more than just restoring biophysical health, and 
furthermore that achieving health itself involved more than just treating the body in 
isolation (Henderson et al. 1997, 1). But even more compelling was the realization on the 
part o f practitioners that even the most "technical" medical sciences, like genetics or 
molecular biology, are inextricably bound to politics and culture (Henderson, x). 
Resistance to these courses on the part o f students is high: like the rest o f us, medical 
students "seek certainty and avoid ambiguity." and professors find it difficult to make 
"poetry compete with pathology" and “social issues as important as anatomy"— to make 
"soft, subjective" knowledge compete with “hard, objective science" (Henderson ix. 1). 
But neither the ambiguity nor the uncertainty are caused by the inclusion of these other 
disciplines or ways o f knowing; it is rather, because doctors and patients (and scientists) 
experience ambiguity and uncertainty, because knowledge is always incomplete, and 
because the choices one makes about treatments cannot be based solely on the best 
available science, that the inclusion o f non-scientific knowledges are essential.
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Thus, one way to better prepare future foresters for the inherently symbolic nature of their 
work is to broaden the curriculum so that forestry students take courses in the philosophy 
o f science as well as in science; courses in political studies as well as in policy; in 
linguistics, anthropology, literature, art, philosophy, and history as well as in social 
science and economics. The social sciences are well represented in forestry; the 
humanities, however, are largely absent.
At the level o f practice, the USFS might reconsider its exclusive commitment (at least at 
the level o f rhetoric) to a scientific explication o f forests and ecosystems. It might instead 
"diversity " its rhetorical and knowledge “portfolio” and invest in other languages and 
ways of knowing that permit o f a wider access to its diverse and heterogeneous public(s). 
It might consider, for example, hiring specialists in other fields— i.e., becoming really 
interdisciplinary by hiring philosophers, artists, and people versed in literature and 
anthropology, etc.. But in an effort to avoid the problem of excessive specialization in 
which "the craft improves, [but] the craftsman [and perhaps his creation?] slips back” (de 
Tocqueville), the USFS might consider hiring generalists— people who can speak many 
languages and thus can communicate across discursive and conceptual boundaries. 
Forestry does and should apply science; but forestry itself is not a science, either pure or 
applied.
Ultimately, the contest over forest management is a contest over meaning: who dictates 
the terms o f  the discourse and who defines those terms. One cannot dismiss the terms o f
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the debate over forest health as mere rhetoric or scoff at the arguments over the 
definitions as quibbling over semantics. The fact is that the person or group who comes 
closest to ‘■controlling” (if only temporarily and tenuously) the language controls the 
action in forests, if  health, for example, is defined exclusively in scientific biophysical 
terms, only those conversant in the applicable scientific discourses will have a say in the 
way we conduct business on the forests [which will not stop the others from “squealing”]. 
Language, like knowledge, is power, and the argument over definition is a contest o f 
power. Managers would prefer to see the terms expressed in managerial or administrative 
language; policymakers prefer language that sustains their own interests and furthers their 
agendas. Scientists prefer the debate to be expressed in clearly and rigorously defined 
scientific terminology. Ethicists argue that the terms, be they political or scientific, are 
ultimately value laden in a moral sense. Sociologists (of both the scientific and the 
philosophical bent) insist upon the social character or use-value o f terms and the primacy 
o f popular understandings and participation in crafting forest plans.
In all cases, the goal is to attempt to control the terms o f  the debate so as to control the 
decision making power. The average lay person, the “public” that the USFS is so keen on 
bringing to the negotiation and planning table, while not naive is nonetheless unversed in 
the academic, political, or scientific esoterica necessary to weigh in as a serious contender 
for decision making and consequently can add little to the discussion in its current milieu. 
The public is given a seat at the table, but given no words with which to speak. 
Consequently, it speaks elsewhere— in the Congress, the courts, and the media— both the
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popular press and the minority activist press of all complexions (environmental or 
commodity oriented). By taking the speech outside of the USFS forum (end-running 
around the agency, or attempting to), it renders the USFS ineffective. Hence to be 
effective, an agency must regain control o f the discourse and, in our democratic, 
pluralistic and multi-cultural society, it cannot do this by Fiat or authority. It can, 
therefore, only do it by enlarging the terms o f its own discourse— by expanding its 
understanding o f forestry to match that extant in the culture — which entails becoming 
self-reflective and  self-reflexive and acknowledging the context o f its own discourse.
In closing, it is worth remembering Derrida's insistence that deconstruction furnishes the 
grounds upon which justice and democracy are founded: without the will to question our 
own and others' implicit assumptions, to critically examine the value judgments 
concealed within our concepts and conceptual frameworks, to look honestly at our 
motives and agendas, we cannot make a claim to either justice or democracy. We have, in 
essence, as members of a species that considers itself concerned with matters o f justice, 
of right and wrong, an obligation to question, to seek out and deconstruct those 
conceptual frameworks that some would establish as unsurpassable a priori limits—  
frameworks that silence the voices o f  the Others. Deconstructing the Forest Service 
discourse on forest health and decentering science as the arbiter o f the real does not lead 
inevitably to nihilism or to unbridled relativism, nor does it leave the Forest Service 
without a leg to stand on. On the contrary, as Derrida insists, the project o f  deconstruction 
demands from each o f us the utmost care and commitment: we must guard, to the best of
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our ability, the interests o f the Other, in whatever form it takes. Ultimately, because we 
must live in this world, we make a stand fo r  something. But we must do so knowing full 
well that we stand on shifting and uncertain ground and that in making that stand for one 
thing and in acting on that stance, we irrevocably foreclose options, for someone or 
something somewhere.
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